Identity security and Turkish foreign policy in the post-cold war period: Relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East by Gülseven, Enver
 
 
 
 
 
IDENTITY SECURITY AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN 
THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: Relations with the EU, 
Greece and the Middle East 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Enver Gülseven 
 
 
 
 
Department of Politics and History, Brunel University 
 
 
 
 
December 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Since the establishment of the republic in 1923 there has never been a consensus over 
Turkey‘s national identity, either internally or externally.  Westernization was a top-down 
project that fostered societal resistance from the outset and which received only partial 
recognition from the West itself.  The end of the Cold War has further intensified the debates 
over Turkish identity both in Turkey itself and in the wider world. 
 
This thesis examines the implications of a complex and insecure identity for Turkey‘s 
political development and in particular its ability to develop an international role 
commensurate with its size and capabilities.  In doing so, it demonstrates the connection 
between different notions of Turkish identity and foreign policy preferences whilst 
emphasising also the important role of the international institutional context (for example 
membership of NATO and the EU) in shaping the preferences of diverse state/societal actors 
within Turkey in the post-Cold War period.  The focus in this regard is on the military, 
political parties and business/civil-society groups.   
 
The thesis engages recent debates between constructivists and rationalists and argues that a 
constructivist account of Turkish foreign policy is more helpful than a rationalist explanation, 
through the case studies of Turkey‘s relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East in the 
post-Cold War period. It shows how rational actor assumptions operate within a 
constructivist context and aims to shed light on the relationship between identity, political 
interests and foreign policy. The thesis also demonstrates that an insecure identity is a barrier 
to pursue consistent foreign policy goals, thereby lending support to the view that a secure 
identity is a condition of developing a stable and influential role in the post-Cold War system.   
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INTRODUCTION: 
 Turkey‘s geographical and cultural location at the crossroads of different continents, 
civilisations and religions may in principle endow Turkey with unique credentials to play a 
key role in international relations. Turkey is the only Muslim-majority country in the world 
which is secular, democratic and pro-Western. With these credentials, it is the strongest case 
which can disprove the prevalent idea in the West that Islam and democracy are 
incompatible. In this sense, it is often thought as an ideal role-model for other Islamic 
nations. The potential benefits of such a role are particularly great given the sense that the 
9/11 attacks on the United States have, as Taşpınar noted, ‗turned the implausible scenario of 
a ―clash of civilisations‖ into a ―self-fulfilling‖ prophecy‘.1 Indeed, in 1993 Samuel 
Huntington classified Turkey as a ‗torn country‘ whilst at the same time noting that it would 
be a decisive state in his controversial claims regarding a projected future clash of 
civilisations.
2
 For this reason, understanding the dynamics of decision-making in Turkish 
foreign policy is crucial for predicting the future relationship between the West and the 
Islamic world.  
 Whilst the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 9/11 attacks did restore Turkey‘s geo-political 
importance after the end of the Cold War, Ankara has not been able to play the sort of pro-
active foreign policy role many would like. In the past two decades, Turkish politics entered a 
period of instability which is manifest in rising tension between the military and the civilians, 
short-lived coalition governments until 2002, an ongoing civil war with the Kurdish separatist 
movement, the rise of both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism and the deepening of the 
polarisation between secularist Kemalists and Islamists in the country. Indeed, the Western 
media started to talk about the existence of two different Turkeys, namely European Turkey 
and Asia Minor.
3
 In this context, Turkey has pursued an ambivalent foreign policy 
particularly towards the European Union (EU) and the Middle East. 
 This thesis will illustrate how Turkey‘s complex and insecure identity threatens its 
stability, slows down its political development and prevents the formulation of a consistent 
and effective foreign policy which would allow the country to develop an international role 
                                                          
1
 Taşpınar, O. (2005), Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition, (New 
York: Routledge), p.4 
2
 Huntington, S. P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & 
Schuster) 
3
 See New York Times, ‘30000 protest Islamic hue in Turkish System’, 15 April 2007 
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commensurate with its size and capabilities. In doing so, it will draw on constructivist 
approach since Turkey does not fit the static model of a stable state with relatively fixed 
interests that characterize rationalist approaches. National interests are understood differently 
by diverse groups and are pursued through defining or re-defining a collective/social identity 
for Turkey. Over the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy emerged as a platform in 
which rival identity claims have been contested in the context of enhanced polarisation 
between the country‘s two major political/social identities, namely secularist Kemalists and 
Islamists. At this point, it should be noted that these identities are neither monolithic nor 
fixed. Secularism and Islamism in Turkey is understood in a variety of ways. Moreover, 
Kemalists and Islamists have been transforming themselves according to changing internal 
and external contexts. 
 By Islamists, this thesis will refer to those parties whose founders come from the 
‗national view movement‘ (milli görüş) which embraced ambiguous references to the 
Ottoman past, disapproved of further rapprochement towards Europe, and called instead for 
closer economic co-operation with the Muslim countries. In recent years, the secular tone in 
the discourse of Islamists, represented by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has gradually become more intense. Indeed, the AKP emerged as an 
ardent advocate of Turkey‘s EU membership. Nonetheless, the party is still called Islamist by 
many scholars due to the roots of its founders and its attempts to make more space for faith-
based lives under secular conditions. For these reasons, this thesis will also consider the AKP 
as an Islamic-based party.  
 On the other hand, the two terms, ―Kemalists‖ and ―secularists‖ will be used 
interchangeably throughout the thesis and cover such institutions and actors as the 
bureaucracy, the military, the judiciary and the Republican People‘s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP) which see secular nationalism as the main vehicle for Turkey‘s modernization.4 
This camp perceives religion as an individual issue and disapproves of religious expressions 
such as wearing the Islamic headscarf in the public sphere. In recent years, as the Islamists 
became increasingly pro-EU, the secularists who have traditionally underlined the need to 
Westernize in order to modernize the country, started ironically to adopt a reactionary 
position emphasizing national independence and showing signs of Euro-skepticism. The swift 
and unexpected policy change of the Islamists towards the EU generated suspicions among 
                                                          
4
 Yavuz, H. (1997), ‘Turkish-Israeli Relations through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate’. Journal of 
Paletsine Studies XXVII, No. 1, p. 23 
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the secularists who were very much worried that the AKP can take advantage of the EU-
related reforms in order to implement a ‗hidden agenda‘ which would undermine secularism 
in Turkey. 
 Before concentrating on how Turkey‘s interaction with the EU is interpreted by the 
country‘s diverse identities and how these interpretations influence the formulation of 
Turkish foreign policy, the first two chapters will provide a theoretical and historical 
background for the thesis. Chapter one will firstly discuss the emergence of constructivism as 
a ‗middle ground‘ in IR theory as well as its variants. Subsequently, the discussion will shift 
to the ontological contributions of the approach. This section will focus on (i) the role of 
identity in the construction of preferences, threat perceptions and alliances and (ii) the 
constitutive role of norms and international institutions. The discussion on international 
institutions will concentrate on the EU given its transforming effect on Turkey.  
 In accordance with this theoretical background, chapter two will examine the origins 
of identity insecurity in Turkey and show how diverse identities emerged in the country in a 
historical setting. Although the main focus of this thesis is on the post-Cold War period, a 
historical background is essential to understand the dynamics of recent issues in Turkey 
considering the fact that identity debates in the country date back to the late Ottoman period. 
Although Kemalists won the argumentative battle over Turkey‘s national identity in the early 
1920s, rival claims remained strong and continued to influence Turkish foreign policy 
behaviour through hindering the country‘s political development, shaping societal 
perceptions and in general affecting political debates. The chapter will draw particular 
attention to the role of regional identities in the problematization of Turkish national identity. 
 Following these two introductory chapters, the rest of the thesis will provide a 
systematic analysis of Turkey‘s important foreign policy issues by examining the background 
social, economic, ideological and domestic political factors which influence and in some 
cases shape the course of its foreign policy. Three case studies, namely relations with the EU, 
Greece and the Middle East, were selected to support the thesis. The special focus of these 
chapters will be on how Turkey‘s interaction with these regions/countries are interpreted by 
the members of its two major political/social identities, namely Kemalists (secularists) and 
Islamists and how these interpretations affect the perception of Turkey‘s national interests 
and the formulation of Turkish foreign policy.  
 Chapter three will concentrate on Turkey‘s relations with the EU in the post-Cold 
War period. In doing so, it will firstly explore the relationship between Turkey‘s insecure 
identity and the pace of its ‗Europeanization‘ process by analyzing the development of civil-
 4 
 
military relations and civil society in the country. Subsequently, the discussion will shift to 
the perceptions and positions of diverse political parties in both Europe and Turkey regarding 
the Turkish accession to the EU. The aim is showing how the perceptions of actors in each 
side concerning the ‗other‘ as a threat or a challenge to its own identity and their 
interpretation of the other‘s behaviours accordingly influence the relations between Turkey 
and the EU. Finally, the impact of insecure identity on Turkey‘s cultural policy will be 
explored since it is central to the projection of Turkey‘s image in Europe.  
 Chapter four will analyze how different institutional contexts influenced the 
development of Turkey‘s identity and re-shaped its foreign policy towards Greece. Since the 
Cyprus issue constitutes the biggest problem between the two neighbours, and has been 
particularly important for Turkey‘s domestic politics, the main focus of this chapter will be 
developments regarding the Cyprus problem in the post-Cold War period. In the second part 
of the chapter, the discussion will analyze the Turkish Cypriot identity formation and the 
development of a struggle between ethnic identity (i.e. Turkish nationalism) and regional 
identity (i.e. Cypriot patriotism) among the community. This issue which has a significant 
impact on the relationship between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots and thereby on the 
negotiating power of the Turkish side in the Cyprus peace talks has been largely overlooked 
in the current literature.  
 Chapter five will look at the relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern 
countries with a special emphasis on the positions of diverse actors in Ankara. It aims to 
show how Turkish foreign policy towards this region has traditionally been formulated in a 
way that would secure the country‘s self-ascribed identity. Subsequently, it will explore how 
relations with the region have become another source of polarization between Turkey‘s 
diverse identities. Shifts in Turkey‘s positions towards the Arab-Israeli conflict is a 
particularly good case to examine the part played by different conceptions of Turkish identity 
amongst various groups within Turkey in the variation in Ankara‘s attitudes to what are quite 
fundamental issues of foreign policy. 
 By analyzing Turkey‘s foreign policy behaviour towards the EU, Greece and the 
Middle East in the post-Cold War period, this thesis will shed further light on the relationship 
between identity, interest and foreign policy and the capacity of the wider institutional 
context to influence these. It aims to demonstrate how insecure and unstable identity slows 
down a state‘s political development and aggravates the conditions for developing a stable 
and effective role in post-Cold War system. The thesis will extend earlier studies on Turkish 
foreign policy which adopted a constructivist approach by applying a more systematic 
 5 
 
approach to domestic politics. This approach will shift our attention from a singular notion of 
national identity to a range of contesting identities at the domestic level and illustrate the 
impact of this contestation over Turkey‘s identity on the country‘s foreign policy behaviour 
and influence in world politics. In keeping with the theoretical interest in how international 
institutions may shape and transform notions of identity and privilege some groups over 
others, special focus will be on how Turkey‘s interactions within the EU context are 
interpreted by the country‘s diverse groups and how these interpretations affect the 
formulation of Turkish foreign policy. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN: 
This section outlines the research design used in this PhD thesis. It will firstly focus 
on the reasons for choosing the case study approach as the research strategy of the thesis. 
This includes the justification of the selected cases, namely Turkey‘s relations with the EU, 
Greece and the Middle East. Subsequently, the focus will shift to the explanation and 
justification of the range of sources used. A discussion of the extent to which general claims 
can be made on the basis of the material included in the thesis will then bring the section to a 
close. 
RESEARCH STRATEGY: 
The aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to understanding the complex links 
between different notions of Turkish identity and foreign policy preferences and how 
contestations over national identity influences the formulation and direction of Turkish 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. As a method of data selection, the case study 
approach has been chosen for this thesis. A case study approach is a favoured strategy when 
―how‖ and ―why‖ questions are being posed and when the research deals with complex and 
ambiguous phenomena which contain a large number of variables and relationships, and are 
difficult to overview and predict.
5
Without any doubt, Turkish foreign policy is influenced by 
a large number of variables including Turkey‘s historical experiences, its geo-political and 
geo-strategic location, and the existence of domestic contestation between its diverse social 
groups on the question of its national and collective identity. Furthermore, it is impossible to 
provide a complete account of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period without 
analyzing the demands of systemic and regional changes on the country‘s foreign relations. 
Considering all these factors, choosing the case study approach fits well with the nature and 
aims of this thesis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 See Gummesson, E. (2007), ‖Case Study Research,‖ in Gustavsson, B., ed,. The Principles of  Knowledge 
Creation Methods, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) 
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SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES: 
 While much case study research focuses on a single case, most-multiple case designs 
are likely to generate stronger findings due to the possibility of multiple confirmation of the 
findings and the ability to draw out a degree of nuance or variation on a theme. Nevertheless, 
when using a multiple-case design, a major question is how many cases are necessary or 
sufficient to satisfy the objectives of the research? According to Yin, two or three cases can 
be sufficient when the rival theories which propose explanations for the study subject are 
greatly different.
6
As the literature review will show, most scholars studied Turkish foreign 
policy from a rationalist perspective by fixing security as the main foreign policy goal of 
Turkey and focusing principally on external structural imperatives as the main determinant of 
Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, scholars who adopted the constructivist approach 
emphasized identity conceptions of political elites as the main determinant of Turkish foreign 
policy. Considering the great difference between rationalist and constructivist accounts of 
Turkish foreign policy, three cases are sufficient to satisfy the objectives of this study. 
 As a country located on the cultural boundary between the West and the Islamic 
world, Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period has two major dimensions, namely 
the Western and the Eastern. Historically, based on the Western-inspired reforms of Atatürk, 
Turkey had placed great emphasis on its relationship with the Western world. In line with this 
traditional Western orientation, relations with Europe have always been a central part of 
Turkish foreign policy. The other defining aspect of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy 
has been its close ties with the United States. Out of these two important branches of the 
Western dimension of Turkish foreign policy, the investigator chose to focus on the country‘s 
relations with the EU as the first case study.  
 The relationship with the EC/EU has been a core feature of Turkish foreign policy 
since the 1960s. Since the end of Cold War, Turkey has fostered close political, economic 
and cultural relations with Europe through establishing several institutional links with the 
EU. It signed a customs union agreement with the Union in 1995 and since then trading 
relations have steadily increased such that trade with the EU comprised 59 percent of Turkish 
exports and 52 percent of Turkish imports in 2005. Turkey was officially recognized as a 
candidate for full membership in 1999 and started to negotiate membership with the Union in 
2005. Since 2003, Turkey has participated in all CSDP (Common Security & Defence 
                                                          
6
 Yin, R. K. (2003), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (London: Sage Publications), p.51  
 
 8 
 
Policy)
7
 operations and missions to which it has been invited. Indeed, most of these 
operations and missions were within Turkey‘s immediate neighbourhood. Nevertheless, 
Turkey‘s relationship with the EU does not only take place in the form of economic and 
military cooperation but also on the civil society level such as in the organization of business 
groups. The transnational interaction between Turkey and the EU in the personal, cultural and 
educational areas has also shown a dramatic rise in the past years.      
 The increasing density and volume of political, social, and cultural relations between 
the EU and Turkey in particular, given the deeper historical context in which Europe has been 
the traditional ‗other‘, make it a valuable case for exploring the connections between issues 
of foreign policy and identity-based politics domestically. Indeed the focus on relations with 
Europe is also valuable as processes of Europeanization have themselves challenged those 
notions of Westernization that were implicit in relations with the United States. When 
compared with Turkey‘s relations with the United States, the EU case is also prospectively 
interesting in that the more politically and socially invasive nature of this relationship ought 
to allow for the examination of the role of international institutions and norms in changing 
notions of identity and interest for different Turkish actors/groups. 
The second case study, namely relations with Greece, is particularly significant due to 
the fact that both states went to war in 1974 over Cyprus and there remain a number of 
conflicts between the two states in the Aegean Sea. Hence the relationship carries with it a lot 
of political and military sensitivities. Besides this, since Greek Cypriot accession to the EU in 
2004, Cyprus has proved a significant obstacle to Turkey‘s own foreign policy goal of 
achieving EU membership. Indeed, and without wishing to prejudice the argument, the 
Cyprus case is one of the areas in which the different position promoted by the AKP is 
apparent. Traditionally, Cyprus was represented as vital to Turkey‘s national security due to 
its closeness to the Turkish mainland and consequently as a potential source of a fatal threat 
to Turkey. Until recent years, the Cyprus issue remained confined to the military, and the 
policy of Turkey towards the island was to be based on military considerations. Nevertheless, 
in 2002, the AKP government recognised the need for a solution to the Cyprus dispute, 
contrary to the traditional opinion of ―no solution is the solution‖ and subsequently backed 
the Annan Plan and encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to approve the re-unification in April 
2004 referendum. 
 
                                                          
7
 CSDP was formerly known as ESDP (European Security & Defence Policy) 
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As the resolution of the Cyprus problem would significantly facilitate the opening of 
entry negotiations between Turkey and the EU, the shift in Ankara‘s Cyprus policy can be 
ascribed to the AKP‘s commitment to the EU accession process. In any case, it is significant 
that the opening of EU negotiations was regarded as more important than the maintenance of 
the decades-old state policy in regards to Cyprus. The AKP supported a total transformation 
of approach to the issue, which was a fly in the face of the military, much of the ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and the Presidency.
8
Accordingly, the eventual adoption of a completely new 
policy on Cyprus in 2004, which is one of the most striking signs of the transformation that 
Turkish foreign policy has gone through in recent years, enables us to examine whether this 
transformation in Turkish foreign policy can be traced to changing notions of identity and 
interest under the AKP government. 
While keeping its commitment to the goal of EU membership, Turkish foreign policy 
also sought to enhance its Eastern dimension during the post-Cold War period. In the new 
international order, Turkey's geostrategic importance shifted because of its proximity to the 
Middle East, and the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Of these two, the 
investigator chose to focus on the Middle East. Firstly, whilst the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and the emergence of Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus did raise 
enthusiasm for a leadership role for Turkey in this region, this did not last long. The 
persistence of lingering obstacles to cooperation from the Soviet era seemingly led the cause 
of pan-Turkism to be abandoned. Indeed, in light of the country‘s orientation towards the EU 
and its preoccupation with Iraq, the PKK and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia only manage to rank third and fourth at best on Turkey‘s list of priorities.   
Turkish involvement in the Central Asian affairs remains relatively light compared to other 
major actors who are competing for influence in the region including Russia, Iran, China, the 
United States and the EU.  
 By contrast, the Middle East became increasingly important on the agenda of Turkish 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. During the 1990s, an intense debate emerged 
between the Kemalist vision of confrontation and the Islamist vision of engagement in 
regards to the Middle East. When the Islamist Welfare Party came to power in 1996, the 
government attempted to re-orient Turkish foreign policy towards the Islamic world. The 
secularists, notably the military, responded to these attempts by intensifying its ties with 
                                                          
8 Robins, P. (2007). ‘Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: between a ‘post-Islamist; 
government and a Kemalist state’. In: International Affairs 83 (1). 
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Israel. Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has been pursuing a very active foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. After decades of discreet disengagement from its Middle 
Eastern environment, Ankara has become an active player in the international politics of the 
region. This is reflected in a number of issues ranging from developments in Northern Iraq 
and the future of the Kurds to Ankara‘s pursuit to establish close links with Syria and Iran 
while emerging as a mediator between Israel and the Arabs. In brief, the Middle East 
emerged as the most important aspect of the Eastern dimension of Turkish foreign policy in 
the post-Cold War period. Considering the clash between the military and the Welfare Party, 
as well as the activism of the AKP, the relationship with the Middle East provides a valuable 
prima facie case for examining the part played by different conceptions of Turkish identity 
amongst various groups within Turkey in the variation in attitudes to what are quite 
fundamental issues of foreign policy.  
The second reason for choosing the Middle East over Central Asia & the Caucasus is 
the fact that the secularist-Islamist distinction has clearly been the most important political 
cleavage in the country since the end of Cold War. The highest percentage of the vote which 
the Nationalist Action Party (the main representative of those supporting Pan-Turkist ideas in 
Turkish foreign policy) managed to get has been 18 percent in 1999 elections. In 2002 
elections, the party gained no seats in the Turkish Parliament since it failed to gain the 
necessary 10 percent of the vote. Finally, the relationship between Turkey and the Middle 
East is a more informative case for predicting the future of the relationship between the West 
and the Islamic world. Ankara‘s performance in being a role-model for democratization in the 
Middle East will be critical for avoiding future conflicts such as those envisaged in Samuel 
Huntington‘s ―clash of civilizations‖.9 
Overall, relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East constitute the most salient 
aspects of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Hence, an in-depth analysis of 
these three cases will be sufficient to enhance our understanding of the relationship between 
Turkey‘s identity security, political development and foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, 
the three cases are well interconnected and one of them cannot be adequately understood 
without consideration of the other. While Turkish-Greek relations are firmly embedded in the 
EU context, Turkey‘s interaction with the EU deeply influences its relations with the Islamic 
world.  
                                                          
9
 Huntington, S. P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & 
Schuster) 
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THE CHOICE OF SOURCES: 
  The choice of a single data set has the risk of potential biases as the investigator 
could select data that is more beneficial to the original hypothesis. In order to avoid this bias, 
the data collection for this study will be based on a combination of different sources 
including an extensive survey of the books and scholarly journals in English and Turkish 
languages, newspaper sources, documents, interviews and an analysis of foreign policy 
discourses and representations in Turkey, Greece, Europe and the Middle East.  
The literature review was used in order to establish the state of existing research on 
the selected cases in order to build upon this. More specifically, the literature review helped 
to identify; (i) the questions relevant to case studies, (ii) the gaps where original research is 
required, and (iii) opposing views.  
  Qualitative research rests upon understanding. The logic of qualitative research and 
the resulting need of methodical competence differ considerably from those relying on 
statistical evidence. As Finnemore pointed out, one can have indirect evidence of motivations 
for political action such as norms, interests and threats.10 In this regard, the analysis of 
discourses taken with the aim of Turkey‘s appropriate and proper path of strategic 
development is especially useful for the study of social structures.
11
With the aim of 
understanding the possible evolution of identities in Turkey and the role of institutional 
norms in such processes, this thesis examined the changes in state practices as well as 
political discourses and justifications. The kind and the consistency of discourses that actors 
use help us in understanding the motivations behind their practices. Since justifications are an 
attempt to link one‘s actions to standards of appropriate and acceptable behaviour, their 
analysis sheds light on what these internationally held standards are and how they may 
change over time.
12
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 Finnemore, M and Sikkink, K. (1998), ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International 
Organization, Vol.52, No.4, p.892 
11
 Modified from Johnson D. & Johnson R.T, (2000), ‘Civil Political Discourse in a Democracy: The Contribution 
of Psychology’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, Volume 6, Issue 4, p.29  
12
 Finnemore, M. (1996), ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’, in The Culture of National 
Security, ed. Katzenstein, p. 159 
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 Apart from political discourses, the case studies also looked at the discourses and 
representations in Turkey‘s and other relevant countries‘ history education, media, arts, 
literature and popular culture. History education is perhaps the most important channel 
through which national identities and their associated enemy perceptions are transmitted to 
the public opinion. The media also plays a significant role in shaping public opinion and 
national identity conceptions whilst the arts, literature and popular culture are very important 
channels through which negative or positive images of the ‗other‘ are conveyed to current 
and future generations.  
 The case study chapters used a wide range of Turkish and international newspapers 
and internet news sources. An important concern with media data is related to the number and 
extent of bias involved in journalists' selection process which affects the validity of 
observation. In order to avoid this bias, the investigator used articles from several national 
newspapers in Turkey including Hürriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, Zaman, Cumhuriyet and Sabah. 
These newspapers are divided on ideological lines. Out of three mainstream newspapers 
which are controlled by Mr. Aydın Doğan, Hürriyet and Milliyet are more 
nationalist/secularist while Radikal is more liberal. Zaman, another popular paper supported 
by followers of the Islamic leader Fethullah Gülen, caters mostly to religious conservatives, 
and is largely supportive of the AKP. Another important newspaper, Sabah, was recently sold 
to a holding firm, Çalık, seen as close to the AKP. Cumhuriyet, a relatively small and serious 
paper, caters to the old-guard secular elite.  
 Apart from news sources, the investigator also conducted some semi-structured 
interviews in Ankara and Istanbul with some representatives from Turkish political parties, 
business associations and civil society organizations. Most questions of the interviews were 
pre-determined which were asked in a systematic and consistent order. Nonetheless, the 
interviewees were permitted to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared standardized 
questions. Interviewees were sometimes asked to elaborate their answers. Moreover, some 
unscheduled but relevant questions had arisen from interactions during the interviews as well.  
Finally, the case studies also made use of some official reports and archival records 
such as the European Commission documents, Euro-barometer surveys, and data from 
Turkish Statistical Institute. In brief, this thesis used a range of different sources in two 
languages. The methodological objective is to undertake an analysis emphasizing broader 
contextualization, focusing on the logic of contestation, inclusion and exclusion, and the 
relationship between the political, societal and media discourse and the actual political 
behaviour. The thesis thus seeks to offer an appropriately detailed and empirical political-
 13 
 
economic, socio-cultural, institutional, historical and discursive analysis of Turkey‘s most 
important foreign policy issues in the post-Cold War period.  
 
GENERALIZABILITY: 
 An important concern regarding the scientific value of case studies is the question of 
generalizability. Generalizability refers to the capacity of the case to be informative about a 
general phenomenon, to be broadly applicable beyond the specific site, time and 
circumstances studied.
13
 For many this is an unnecessary concern since there is clearly a 
scientific value to gain from examining some single category of individual, group or society 
simply to gain an understanding of that individual, group or society. Nevertheless, case 
studies do not only inform us about a specific individual, group or society but also provide 
understanding about similar individuals, groups and societies.
14
 This project does not aim to 
generalize across time and space. Rather it aims to understand the different factors underlying 
Turkish political-society in the post-Cold War period. This said, and although Turkey 
constitutes a unique case due to its history and geography, there may well be lessons to be 
learned for other countries from the Turkish experience. Turkey shared similar nation-
building experiences with many countries in the world. Moreover many countries possess 
problematic and insecure identities similar to the Turkish case. In this regards, this research 
aimed to be helpful for the understanding of the relationship between identity, interests, and 
state behaviour and influence in international relations. Research on the political development 
and foreign policy choices of other societies in which identity is highly contested between 
diverse groups will be helpful for a better understanding of this important question in 
international relations. Link by link, case by case, construction of meaning by the researchers 
is how case study contributes to social science and society.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW: 
 
Although some international relations scholars predicted that the end of Cold War 
would make Turkey less important, international events, most notably the 1990-91 Gulf War 
and the 9/11 attacks, restored the country‘s geopolitical importance. In this context, Turkish 
foreign policy since the end of Cold War has been a subject of interest as it has never been 
before; thus quite a few books and articles have been published on the topic in recent years. 
However, only a few of them have presented overall studies of Turkish foreign policy.  
Most scholars approached the issue from a rationalist perspective by fixing security as 
the main foreign policy goal of Turkey and focusing merely on external structural 
imperatives as the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy. Only a small share of research 
in this area dealt with the impact of identity and domestic factors. However, most of those 
lacked a solid theoretical foundation and analytical framework, which significantly weakened 
their arguments. This chapter aims to critically review the current literature on the Turkish 
foreign policy of the post-Cold War period. 
In his comprehensive study William Hale summarised the evolution of Turkey‘s 
external relations from 1774 to 2000. He assumed Turkey as a middle power and argued that 
Turkey‘s alliance with other states or its neutrality is determined by the international system. 
Hale acknowledged the fact that Turkish identities became more pluralist after the 1960s. 
However, he claimed that this would not prevent Turkey from pursuing a coherent foreign 
policy.
15Since he defines power in rationalist terms, Turkey‘s identity pluralism would not 
have an influence on the power and role of Turkey in the international arena. Hale predicted 
that Turkey will continue to identify itself with the West in the foreseeable future, while 
maintaining good relations with the Islamic world for pragmatic reasons. Although his book 
is a very comprehensive and authoritative study, Hale understated the domestic dynamics of 
Turkish foreign policy.  
 Alternative claims to national identity have influenced Turkish foreign policy 
behaviour not only through hindering Turkey‘s political development, but also through 
shaping perceptions and affecting political debates in the country. The influence of rival sub-
national identities became even more significant in the post-Cold War period due to the rise 
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of identity politics and tension between the state and society. These developments have 
transformed Turkish foreign policy into a platform of contestation between diverse sub-
national identities with distinct interpretations of national interest. This contestation has been 
influencing the way Turkey formulates its foreign policy especially in regards to Europe and 
the Middle East. Turkey‘s policy toward European integration as well as to cooperation in the 
Middle East has been ambivalent due to its insecure and contested identity. As a result, it 
could not develop a strong sense of reputation, trust and a collective identity with either 
region which unsurprisingly complicates its relations with these regions.  
Another text which followed a rationalist approach is Turkish Foreign Policy in the 
Post Cold War Era, edited by İdris Bal. Most authors of this book agreed on the idea that 
Ankara‘s Turkish foreign policy is determined by structural factors. Only Dirk Rochtus 
focused on some ideational factors and argued that the Kemalist paradigm has not changed 
much since the days of Atatürk, thus is incompatible with basic principles and concepts of the 
European Union (EU). He believes that with the final break-up of Kemalism, Turkish foreign 
policy will be liberated from its security-oriented approach. The rest of the book is dominated 
by diplomatic history, and many chapters lack a theoretical framework.  
By mainly drawing on a neo-realist approach, Ahmet Davutoğlu, in his book, Stratejik 
Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: The International Position of 
Turkey) aimed to offer new alternatives to Turkish foreign policy. According to him, Turkey 
is on the edge of a historic crossroad and should combine "its historical and geographical 
depth with rational strategic planning,"
16
 in order to take advantage of local and global 
sources of dynamism and play a greater role in international politics. He claimed that Turkey 
has no option to be a peripheral player since it is located at the centre of world politics and 
thus destined to play a central role. Calling on Turkey to ―rediscover its historic and 
geographic identity‖ which its traditional foreign policy neglected, Davutoğlu advocated an 
assertive foreign policy orientation.
17
 Nevertheless, this assertiveness is built on "zero-
problem strategy" in regard to relations with Turkey's neighbours. With its wide-ranging 
topics and alternative approaches, this book is a major complementary source to understand 
the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy. Nevertheless, Turkey‘s relations with its neighbours 
include serious identity issues. Besides, Davutoğlu suggested a new identity for Turkey to 
                                                          
16
 Davutoğlu, A. (2001), Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: The International 
Position of Turkey), (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları), p.11 
17
 Murinson, A. (2006), ‘The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.42, 
No.6, p.953 
 16 
 
play a central role in world politics. Hence, his propositions could be better understood 
though a constructivist rather than a neo-realist theory framework.  
Yücel Bozadağlıoğlu is one of the first scholars who adopted the core insights of the 
constructivist approach in his analysis of Turkish foreign policy behaviour. In his book 
(Turkish foreign policy and Turkish identity), he argued that throughout its modern history, 
Turkey‘s foreign policy has been influenced by its self-ascribed ‗Western‘ identity which was 
created after the establishment of the republic. He offered a critique of the rational-choice 
literature on Turkish foreign policy and argued that Turkish foreign policy has been, and still 
is, determined by identity considerations, which are analyzed in terms of three competing 
formations: Western, Islamic and Nationalist. Bozdağlıoğlu mentioned an identity crisis in 
Turkey, which is understood as the inconsistency between the state‘s self-perception and the 
perception of Turkey by others. For him, the sources of Turkish identity crisis are the 
negative effects of the modernization project and the EU‘s reluctance to accept Turkey as a 
full member. Bozdağlıoglu noted two important points to explain why constructivism offers a 
better explanation for Turkish foreign policy. First, Turkey started to identify herself with the 
West before the Soviet threat existed. Second, although cooperation with Iran and Iraq would 
be beneficial for Turkey in terms of solving the Kurdish problem, Turkey avoided 
cooperation with these states due to its own insecure identity.
18
  
Bozdağlıoğlu‘s book is a remarkable reference for understanding the impact of 
Turkish identity on Turkish foreign policy. Nonetheless, it has some short-comings as well. 
First of all, the issue of identity in Turkey is more than a crisis which refers to a temporary 
situation. The quest for a new identity dates back to the first Westernization movements in 
the Ottoman Empire and continues to this day. Secondly, Bozdağlıoğlu ascribed the notion of 
identity to Turkish state and developed his argument by setting constructivism against neo-
realism. However, national identity is not constructed only out of interstate interactions but 
also from the interpretations of such interactions by diverse social actors. Indeed, states are 
merely frameworks in which a contestation between diverse social identities takes place over 
the definition of national interests. Social identities continue to exist even when they are not 
represented in the state and can influence societal perceptions and political debates. Turkish 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War period is often a product of such domestic contestations 
between the country‘s two major social/political identities, namely Kemalists and Islamists. 
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For this reason, applying a more systematic approach to domestic determinants, specifically 
the preferences of diverse social groups, will help us to better understand the dynamics of 
Turkish foreign policy. 
Another important text on Turkish foreign policy is Philip Robins‘ Suits and 
Uniforms. Robins presented a multi-dimensional analysis of the complex dynamics of 
Turkish foreign policy. He has adopted a methodology which requires a thematic approach 
instead of a regional account. The main argument of the book is that Turkey is a status quo 
power, which strongly maintained its Westward orientation in terms of its foreign relations.
19
 
Robins examined Turkish foreign policy by identifying and analyzing its key processes and 
players. He presented the government, presidency, foreign ministry and the security 
establishment as the main actors of Turkish foreign policy. He particularly emphasized the 
interaction between the civilian and the military actors. To him, parliament, interest groups, 
public opinion and ethnic pressure groups are secondary players with a limited impact. For a 
better understanding of foreign policy, Robins sought to integrate internal and external 
factors which shape Turkish foreign policy. He mentioned historical, ideological, security-
related, and economic factors as the ideational and material determinants of Turkish foreign 
policy. Although, he did not present a region-by-region account, he concentrated on four case 
studies to examine the emergence and evolution of Turkish foreign policy. The case studies 
include the Bosnian conflict, the relationship with Israel, northern Iraq, and the relations with 
the Central Asian Turkic Republics. 
Suits and Uniforms is the product of comprehensive research, which provides a 
valuable resource for all those who need to understand the complexity of Turkish foreign 
policy. Moreover, with its methodology, it brought freshness into the study of Turkish foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, it has its limitations too. Firstly, although Robins gives so much 
importance to the impact of domestic factors, he has a very limited discussion of recent 
development particularly after 1999. His discussion on the issue of Kemalist and Islamist 
paradigms‘ impact on Turkish foreign policy is insufficient. Both of these paradigms have 
been transformed and neither is monolithic anymore. Moreover, he mentioned neither the 
impact of radical reforms on a number of issues following the confirmation of Turkey‘s EU 
candidature nor the latest developments in Cyprus before and after the re-unification 
referendum. These developments have significantly influenced the debates on Turkish 
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foreign policy. In this sense, Robins‘ work although being quite comprehensive, needs to be 
updated. 
Secondly, Robins deliberately avoided concentrating on important foreign policy 
issues such as relations with Greece and the EU as well as the Cyprus problem. Domestic 
dynamics such as the transformation of Islamic and Kemalist identities had a great impact on 
Turkey‘s relations with Greece, Cyprus and the EU, which are all inter-connected issues. In 
this regard, these cases could have been good test cases for his methodology. Relations with 
the EU are particularly important, since it still holds a decisive impact on Turkey‘s relations 
with other parts of the world.  
In their book Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, Larrabee and Lesser 
briefly mentioned the influence of Turkey‘s changing domestic situation, particularly the rise 
of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism as well as economic problems, on self-definition 
and  future goals of the country. However, special focus has been on the strategic and security 
issues facing Turkey, including a number of issues posed by the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001 and the subsequent international response. The book also emphasized how 
the shift in European priorities and self-perception affected their relations with Turkey. They 
claimed that the new concern of Europe is not deterring Russia but to create a cohesive 
economic and political union, which decreased the Western dependence on Turkey.  
The authors offer a comprehensive presentation of several issues of Turkish foreign 
policy, including relations with Europe, the United States, the Balkans and Eurasia. 
Nevertheless, their discussion of the impact of domestic and ideational factors was quite 
limited. Moreover, like many of the other books, it was published before the emergence of 
important domestic and international developments such as the Iraq War or the United 
Nations‘ failed attempt to reunify Cyprus.   
Another important text in this field is ‗Turkish Foreign policy in the 21st century’ 
which is edited by Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın. This book attempted to bring about a 
comprehensive coverage of various issues concerning Turkish foreign policy. The authors 
highlighted the impact of systematic changes on the foreign policy of Turkey. To them, since 
its establishment Turkey pursued a rational foreign policy, yet this came to an end with the 
1980 coup and the end of Cold War.
20
 They noted ‗if Turkey has to move away from Europe, 
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anti-secular and anti-democratic tendencies may grow stronger‘.21 However, they claimed 
Turkey will continue to cooperate with the West, as other alternatives cannot satisfy Turkey‘s 
economic, security and ideological needs. This clearly illustrates that they do not see much 
connection between the domestic developments and the foreign policy choices of Turkey. 
The book also fails to examine and predict possible foreign policy alternatives in the new 
century, since the most radical changes, most notably the rise of AKP in 2002, occurred 
before its publication.   
Amikam Nachmani‘s book, Turkey: Facing a New Millennium examined Turkish 
foreign policy in 1990s, which he regarded as successful years. Nachmani briefly looked at 
Turkey‘s quest for a new identity and the tension between Kemalists and Islamists, since the 
end of the Cold War. Yet, he argued that secular-Islamist disagreements have not worsened in 
the 1990s. Nachmani explained how conflicting ideologies of secular nationalism and 
political Islam have prevented Turkish-Iranian cooperation even in areas where the two states 
share a common view, such as their objection to an independent Kurdish state and growing 
Russian influence in Central Asia.
22
Moreover, he offered an explanation for the fading 
Turkish interest in Central Asia. According to him, the reason of this declining interest is the 
fact that Turkey prefers Russian instead of Iranian domination in the region, as the latter 
would engender the rise of radical Islamism. Nachmani‘s principal argument is that Turkey 
will not be a true regional superpower simply because it will not take the risk of engaging in 
clashes, confrontations and wars with its neighbours
23
. He saw this as an advantage since he 
was quite optimistic about the integration of Turkey into the EU. Although being quite 
informative, this book mainly focuses on early 1990s and is not well-informed about the 
recent debates on Turkey‘s role and identity in the new millennium. 
Published in 2004, Nasuh Uslu‘s Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War period 
is another text which aimed to evaluate Turkish foreign policy in future by focusing on shifts 
in threat perceptions and new domestic realities. Uslu highlighted Turkey‘s fear of losing the 
security support of the West in the unstable period after the Cold War, and the search for a 
new identity in the country for pursuing its own interests instead of Western interests. 
However, he claimed that the Western orientation of the Turkish foreign policy cannot 
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change radically since there are mechanisms which will prevent this from happening.
24
 
Another important text which paid attention to the role of identity in Turkish foreign 
policy is Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik (Turkey’s Foreign 
Policy Agenda: Identity, Democracy, Security) which is edited by İhsan Dağı, Ramazan 
Gözen and Şaban Çalış. This book consists of a range of articles which attempted to show the 
problems created by identity, democracy and security issues for the formulation of Turkish 
foreign policy. The authors argued that identity, democracy and security are the main areas 
where Turkish foreign policy fell into stalemate due to changing domestic and global 
developments in the post-Cold War period. The book predicted that these issues may cut 
Turkey off from global developments and further isolate the country from the rest of the 
world unless they are tackled with domestic dynamics.
25
 
Most of the books mentioned above were written prior to the dramatic changes that 
have taken place inside and outside Turkey. The results of the 2002 parliamentary elections 
which brought the AKP into power alone, the developments in Cyprus issue such as the 
United Nations‘ proposal to re-unify the island and the referendum in 2003, massive 
enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, have deeply affected the formulation of Turkish 
foreign policy and Turkey‘s foreign relations. Furthermore, the impact of the transformation 
of Islamic and secular identities on Turkish foreign policy, which is demonstrated by their 
stance towards the EU membership and the solution of the Cyprus problem, has not been 
sufficiently analyzed.   
There is a consensus in the current literature that the end of Cold War created new 
opportunities for Turkey. Nevertheless, most of the texts drew a similar conclusion in which 
Turkey will continue its Western-oriented foreign policy. Shifts in political elites with 
different conceptions on national identity may change the identity of the state. In this context, 
states re-define their interests, which may bring different foreign policy behaviour. In recent 
years, Turkey‘s Westernized elite which has neglected their country‘s Ottoman past and 
Islamic identity has been challenged by the Islamists who take pride of Turkey‘s Ottoman 
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past and Muslim identity.
26
 Since 2002, the AKP with its Islamic roots has been controlling 
the Turkish government. Nevertheless, Turkey has a deep foreign policy bureaucracy and 
traditions, which can hardly be manoeuvred by a political party. Moreover, the Turkish 
military continues to be an important player in Turkish politics. This situation constrains the 
ability of the AKP government to pursue a foreign policy independent of considerations of 
the domestic power balance. In this context, Turkish foreign policy emerged as a platform in 
which rival identity claims of diverse/political identities have been contested. In this 
contestation, the EU plays an important role through shaping and altering the notions of 
identity that Turkey‘s diverse camps hold and privileging some over others. In brief, Turkish 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War period is often a product of such domestic contestations 
between the country‘s two major social/political identities, namely Kemalists and Islamists, 
in the EU context. Hence Ankara has been pursuing an ambivalent foreign policy especially 
towards the EU and the Middle East.  
The thesis engages recent debates between constructivists and rationalists and argues 
that a constructivist account of Turkish foreign policy is more helpful than a rationalist 
explanation, through the case studies of Turkey‘s relations with the EU, Greece and the 
Middle East in the post-Cold War period. It shows how rational actor assumptions operate 
within a constructivist context and aims to shed light on the relationship between identity, 
political interests and foreign policy. It will build on previous studies on Turkish foreign 
policy which emphasized the role of identity by applying a more systematic approach to 
domestic determinants in foreign policy analysis. The thesis aims to shift attention from a 
singular notion of national identity to a range of contesting identities at the domestic level 
and show the repercussions of this contestation over Turkey‘s identity on its foreign policy 
behaviour and influence in world politics. International institutions, notably NATO and the 
EU, play a key role in the contestation between Turkey‘s diverse camps through shaping and 
transforming actors‘ identities and privileging some groups over others. Hence, the case 
studies will put a strong emphasis on the importance of the institutional context for Turkey‘s 
foreign relations.  
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CHAPTER ONE:    
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE “FOURTH DEBATE” 
IN IR THEORY 
In the last two decades, the ―fourth debate‖ in International Relations (IR) theory 
between constructivism and rationalism has become more important as constructivists have 
built on epistemological challenges rooted in sociological perspectives emphasizing shared 
norms and values. As Wiener noted the ―fourth debate‖ could emerge from its battle-ridden 
disciplinary context since third debaters, namely rationalists and reflectivists, kept with the 
practice of binary positioning as the dominant disciplinary practice in the 1980s.
27
 However, 
constructivists managed to break with the traditional battlefield behaviour and became widely 
accepted in the IR community in the 1990s. As a result, the ―fourth debate‖, in Wiener‘s 
view, resembled an actual conversation characterized by a more encompassing discussion 
between different theoretical positions in the discipline compared with the hostile debating 
style of earlier debates.
28
At this point a good question to ask is how constructivism achieved 
much greater popularity and recognition among IR scholars compared to previous approaches 
which challenged mainstream rationalist theories? In other words, what distinguished 
constructivists from reflectivist scholars and how did constructivism become so important in 
the ―fourth debate‖?   
Emanuel Adler identified two main differences between constructivism and 
reflectivist approaches. First of all, unlike reflectivist approaches
29
, constructivism does not 
reject the existence of a world independent from our thoughts.
30
 It recognizes the world of 
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brute facts. What constructivists oppose is the view that phenomena can constitute 
themselves as objects of knowledge independently of discursive practices. According to 
them, socially meaningful objects or events are always the result of an interpretive 
construction of the world out there. Put differently, the knowledge of reality is socially 
constructed. Nevertheless, the principles of knowledge construction are not totally internal to 
discourse, but socially constituted through practices.
31
  
While recognizing the existence of brute facts, constructivists distinguish between the 
natural and social world and emphasize the ‗social facts‘ that do not exist in the physical 
world. In the words of linguistic philosopher John Searle social facts ‗depend on human 
agreement that they exist and typically require human institutions for their existence‘.32 
Social facts include money, property rights or marriage in contrast to material facts which 
exist in the physical world whether or not there is agreement that they do such as rocks and 
trees.
33
 Constructivists stressed that many concepts of world politics are social facts since 
they exist only by virtue of human acts of creation which happen in a cultural, historical, and 
political context of meaning. For instance, one of the most important concepts of world 
politics, sovereignty is a social fact whose existence requires a shared understanding and 
acceptance of the concept. Similarly, the boundaries which divide states exist only by virtue 
of human agreement. 
Secondly, constructivist and reflectivist approaches differ in their objectives of 
enquiry. Due to their ontological position, reflectivist scholars may abandon the search for 
causes and objective truths. Their main aim of inquiry is emancipation from oppressing 
discourses, power structures and ideologies and theories.
34
 On the other hand, constructivists 
do want to know how norms constitute the security identities and interests of international 
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and transnational actors in particular cases.
35
This does not meant that constructivists are not 
interested in progress in International Relations. However, they believe that progress is not 
only based on what theorists say. It requires a re-definition of actors‘ identities and interests 
as well. In brief, constructivism is not an expression of frustration. It is a working research 
program which is interested in providing a more complete explanation of world politics. 
Another important difference between reflectivist approaches and constructivism is in 
regards to their relationship with mainstream theories. Reflectivist scholars have tended to 
resist dialogue with rationalists and tend to undermine the actual insights produced by 
rationalist approaches such as neo-realism.
36
 As Sorensen put it ‗de-constructing any theory 
can produce helpful insights. The problem only comes in when this is taken to the extreme 
where everything in the criticized theory is rejected and the possibility of any cross-
fertilization between theoretical traditions is denied‘. 37 Despite their weaknesses, rationalist 
approaches have produced valuable insights about world politics, notably about anarchy, and 
is quite helpful in exploring specific aspects of world politics from a particular point of view. 
In line with this view, most constructivists have a productive way of holding on to the 
insights produced by rationalist approaches including neo-realism. A core constructivist 
research concern is what happens before the rationalist model kicks in. Constructivism is 
more of an approach which provides an ontology differing from rationalist approaches and its 
central theme is the impact of the ideational factors on the material factors. Indeed, many 
rationalists and constructivists claim that no great epistemological or methodological 
differences divide them.
38
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MIDDLE GROUND:  
One of the key factors behind constructivism‘s popularity is its alleged ‗middle 
ground‘ position. Many prominent constructivists such as Alexander Wendt, Emmanuel 
Adler and Jeffrey Checkel emphasized constructivism‘s ‗middle ground‘ position between 
rationalist and reflectivist theories of IR. Wendt‘s constructivism aimed to build on the shared 
features of the liberalist wing of the rationalist tradition and the modern constructivist wing of 
the reflectivist tradition. In his well-known book Social Theory of International Politics, 
Wendt defended his constructivism from both those rationalists who see it as equal to post-
modernism and those more radical constructivists want to go much further than he does.
39
 
Checkel argued that constructivism has the potential to bridge the mainstream theorists from 
reflectivists. In his own words: ‗with the latter, constructivists share many substantive 
concerns (role of identity and discourse, say) and a similar ontological stance; with the 
former, they share a largely common epistemology. Constructivists thus occupy a middle-
ground between rationalist and reflectivist scholars‘.40 Finally, Adler argued that it is 
constructivism, rather than any alternative such as the neo-liberal focus on ideas, which 
seizes the middle ground between reflectivists and rationalists due to its position at two 
intersections—that between materialism and idealism, and that between individual agency 
and social structure.  
Indeed, the first move from materialism towards idealism was realized by neo-liberal 
institutionalists. They agree with realists that behaviour is affected by outside physical forces 
However, like reflectivists, they take the role of ideas, which they defined as ‗beliefs held by 
individuals‘, into account.41 Neo-liberals demonstrated the proposition that ideas and 
institutions are at least relatively autonomous determinants of international life and 
concentrated on the ways in which ideas can have independent causal effects. Nevertheless, 
due to their ontological assumption of fixed and exogenous interests, neo-liberals framed the 
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explanatory problem as ‗ideas versus interests‘ and assumed that ideas matter only to the 
extent that they are consequential beyond effects of power and interest.
42
 According to 
Wendt, this view has been helpful since there is much in world politics that power and 
interest cannot explain. Nevertheless, ideas and interests cannot be compared as competing 
causal variables due to the constitutive effects of the former on the latter. Therefore, this 
model is incomplete since it overlooked the constitutive effects of ideas on power and 
interests. As Adler put it ‗due to its assumption of fixed interests, neo-liberal epistemology 
misses most of the ―action‖, namely, the constitution of actors‘ identities and interests by 
collective cognitive structures‘.43 
On the other hand, constructivists such as Wendt attempted to show both causal and 
constitutive functions of ideas. For this reason, constructivism is often characterized by its 
opposition to materialism. Nevertheless, the character of this opposition depends on the 
interpretation of materialism as a theory which accounts for the effects of power, interests or 
institutions by reference to ‗brute‘ material forces. Brute material forces refer to things which 
exist and have certain causal powers independent of ideas such as physical environment. 
Wendt did not deny that brute material forces have some effects on the constitution of power 
and interest. In his own words; ‗at some level material forces are constituted independent of 
society, and affect society in a causal way. Material forces are not constituted solely by social 
meanings, and social meanings are not immune to material effects‘.44 Nonetheless, Wendt 
emphasized that only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material. Moreover 
the meaning of power is also largely a function of ideas. Power translates into threat only 
within a certain set of understandings and representations. For example, the material fact that 
Germany has more military power than Denmark imposes physical limits on Danish foreign 
policy toward Germany, but those limits will be irrelevant to their interaction if neither could 
consider war with the other.
45
 In brief, Wendt‘s constructivism does not imply a radical ‗ideas 
all the way down‘ idealism which denies any role whatsoever to material considerations. It 
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acknowledges that material factors matter but argue that how they matter depends on ideas. A 
more detailed discussion of the relationship between ideas, interests and threat perceptions 
will be presented later in the chapter. Now let us focus on the second dimension of 
constructivism‘s ‗middle ground‘ position.   
The debate on materialism and idealism paved the way for another vital question 
regarding the primacy of either social structure or individual agency for the explanation of 
human action. According to methodological individualists such as Jon Elster, the elementary 
unit of social life is the individual human action. In his own words ‗to explain social 
institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and 
interaction of individuals‘.46 On the other hand, scholars such as Emile Durkheim and Max 
Weber rejected methodological individualism and emphasized the vitality of structure for 
explaining the origins of human action. To them, social facts cannot be reduced to individual 
cognition and demand a social explanation. Finally, a third option, adopted by several modern 
social theorists, aimed to make a balance between these two camps. Anthony Giddens‘ 
structuration is a well-known example of this approach. In a similar manner with 
structuralists, structuration theory emphasizes the significance of structures. Accordingly, all 
actions are performed within a context of a pre-existing social structure which is governed by 
a set of norms and laws. Hence, structure constrains the actions of individual agents. 
Nevertheless, in this account, structures are not separate from the self-understandings and 
practices of human agents. Giddens aimed to joint agents and structures in a ‗dialectical 
synthesis‘ that overcomes the subordination of one to the other.47  
Neo-realism has a dual commitment both to methodological individualism and 
structural analysis. On one hand, it privileges structural constraints over agents' strategies and 
motivations. On the other hand, it argues the international system structures consist of 
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externally related state agents. External relations refer to interactions between entities which 
can exist without the other. Therefore, the starting point of neo-realist analysis is states with 
given properties. Ontologically, the result is to reduce one unit of analysis—structures—to 
the other—agents.48 In line with this view, neo-realists defined political structures by three 
elements: ordering principle, differentiation of functions among the units, and distribution of 
capabilities across units.
49
 Anarchy is the ordering principle of international politics and 
refers to the lack of a hierarchically superior and coercive power which can resolve disputes 
or enforce laws and order on states. The conditions of anarchy eliminate functional 
differentiation between states. Put differently, states under anarchy act according to the logic 
of self-help and acquire egoistic identities and fixed interests. Since anarchy is assumed to be 
constant and it entails the sameness of units, neo-realists reduced the international structure to 
the properties of its member elements. Therefore, they explain structural change in terms of 
the distribution of capabilities.  
On the other hand, constructivists were deeply influenced by Giddens‘ structuration. 
In line with his views, Wendt rejected the neo-realist definition of international system 
structures as consisting of externally related, pre-existing state agents. To him, system 
structures cannot generate agents if they are defined exclusively in terms of those agents in 
the first place.
50
 Therefore, neo-realist definition leads to an understanding of system 
structures as only constraining the agency of pre-existing states and is theoretically too weak 
to support a social theory of state. Constructivists emphasized that international structure is 
not only consisting of material capabilities but also social relationships. In Wendt‘s words 
‗social structures include three essential elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and 
practices; and these three elements are interrelated‘.51 Since these elements are internally 
related, they cannot be defined independently of their position in the structure.  
A social structure leaves more space for agency, i.e. for the individual or state to 
influence their environment, as well as to be influenced by it. Therefore, constructivists 
highlighted a process of interaction between agents and structures. Their ontology is one of 
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mutual constitution of the two units of analysis, where neither is reduced to the other. 
Given that the structure and agents are mutually constituted the conditions of action are what 
the actors make them to be. Accordingly, self-help and power politics are socially constructed 
under anarchy. In Wendt‘s words ‗there is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that 
create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has 
no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are 
institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it‘.52 
In other words, if states find themselves in a self-help system, according to Wendt this is a 
result of their own practices.  
While emphasizing the power of practice in shaping the character of anarchy, Wendt 
rejected the neo-realist assumption that there is only a single logic of anarchy. Instead, he 
talks about three logics of cultures of anarchy, namely Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. To 
him, only the Hobbesian structure is a truly self-help system and transformation from one 
culture to another is possible. The nature of the internal relations that comprise a social 
structure also defines a set of possible transformations of its elements.
53
 In short, structure 
influences or constrains social action yet it can also be (re)-created and transformed by it. 
This does not mean that states in anarchy can suddenly alter their circumstances. However, 
relationships evolve over time. They are not necessarily characterized by enmity and egoism. 
For example, the United States and Canada have evolved as friends, while other states are 
enemies. Similarly, France and Germany were former enemies who have learnt to cooperate.  
In short, constructivism represents a middle ground between individualism and structuralism 
because it is not merely focusing on how structures constitute agents‘ identities and interests 
but also aims to explain how individual agents socially construct these structures in the first 
place.
54
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VARIANTS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM: 
As the above discussion indicates, constructivists have a shared critique of the static 
material assumptions of rationalist approaches. They have questioned the individualist 
ontology of rationalism and have highlighted the social dimensions of world politics as well 
as the possibility of change. Furthermore, they accepted the possibility of a reality to be 
constructed, which differentiates them from reflectivist approaches that problematize this 
possibility.
55
 Nonetheless, in examining this ‗reality‘ they developed diverse ways and 
methods.  
There are many classifications of constructivism, one of the most useful being that of 
John Gerard Ruggie. Ruggie identified three variants of constructivism. The first variant, 
which he calls neo-classical constructivism, examines the role of norms and identity in 
shaping political outcomes while emphasizing the significance of empirical work in doing so. 
The members of this variant are epistemologically committed to the idea of social science and 
certain methods common to positivism which includes hypothesis testing, causality and 
explanation.
56
 The typical methodological starting point of neo-classical constructivists is the 
qualitative, process-tracing case study. Ruggie put himself as well as some other prominent 
constructivists such as Adler, Onuf, Kratochwill and Finnemore in this category. 
At this point, it is important to note that there is a difference in the understanding of 
social science and causality between the members of neo-classical constructivism and 
rationalist approaches. For example, Adler argued that constructivism combines 
‗understanding‘ and ‗explaining‘ to construct a sociologically sensitive scientific approach to 
International Relations. According to him science and interpretation are not fundamentally 
different endeavours aimed at different goals.
57
 Neo-classical constructivists‘ understanding 
of causality also differs from that of rationalists. Causality in rationalist approaches refers to 
the relationship between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the 
second event is a consequence of the first. Neo-classical constructivists argue that 
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deterministic laws are improbable in the social world and thus reject the notion that social 
forms ‗determine‘ human action. According to Adler constructivists subscribe to a notion of 
social causality that takes reasons as causes, because ‗doing something for reasons means 
applying an understanding of what is called for in a give set of circumstances‘.58 Finnemore 
also stated that norms and rules do not determine action yet they provide actors with direction 
and goals for action and therefore socially constitute—‗cause‘—the things people do.59   
The second variant of constructivism is labelled by Ruggie as post-modernist 
constructivism. The members of this category include Richard Ashley, David Campbell and 
James Der Derian. These scholars seek to understand the ways in which the world is 
constructed. Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida they focus on the role of language 
in the construction of norms and rules. Considering their commitment to post-positivist 
epistemologies, this role is not explanatory. Put differently, post-modernist constructivists do 
not aim to provide causal explanations. To them, causality is considered chimerical.
60
 
Therefore they are interested in constitutive explanations which answer a ‗how this is 
possible‘ question rather than ‗what caused this to come about‘ type of question. For instance, 
rather than investigating the factors which caused a change in a state‘s identity, they would 
focus on the background conditions and discourses that enabled such change in the first 
place. 
Ruggie‘s third constructivist variant is naturalistic constructivism which is mostly 
based on the work of Wendt. While being committed to the idea of social science, Wendt 
acknowledged that natural and social worlds are partly made of different kinds of stuff, and 
that these ontological differences require different methods for their study. In his own words: 
‗we cannot study ideas in exactly the same way that we study physical facts because ideas are 
not the kind of phenomena that are even indirectly observable‘.61 For this reason, Wendt put 
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his emphasis on scientific realism, especially on the writings of Roy Bhaskar. Scientific 
realism is developed largely as a reaction to empiricism and challenged this epistemological 
theory in two important issues, the first one being the status of unobservables. In the eyes of 
empiricists, entities exist only if we have direct sensory experience of them. On the other 
hand, scientific realists argue that unobservable structures can be scientifically legitimate as 
long as they have observable effects or are manipulable by human agents.
62
 In other words 
unobservable entities are seen as real and causally efficacious. In line with this view, Wendt 
argued that examining unobservable entities to account for observable behaviour is perfectly 
legitimate scientific practice.  
The second difference between empiricists and scientific realists is in regards to the 
nature and requirements of scientific explanation. According to empiricists, explanation 
involves the categorization of a phenomenon under a law-like regularity. We explain 
something casually only when we have included it deductively under a law. Therefore, 
empiricists put their emphasis on ‗why‘ questions.  On the other hand, scientific realists argue 
that scientific explanation involves the identification of the underlying causal mechanisms 
which physically engendered the phenomenon. Therefore, we explain something casually 
only when we have described the mechanisms or process by which it is generated.
63
 This 
understanding of causality gives more value to ‗how‘ questions.  According to Wendt, the 
adoption of scientific realism allows the possibility of a new understanding of social science 
in which scholars will no longer need to choose between ‗science‘ (i.e. empiricist science) 
and the supposedly ‗un-scientific‘ paradigms of critical theory. They would be able to think 
‗abductively‘ about causal mechanisms to build their theories, instead of trying to find law-
like generalizations about observable regularities.
64
 
Wendt also argued that constitutive theory should not be seen as necessarily 
descriptive since it can be explanatory too. For example, questions like ‗what is the European 
Union?‘ ‗Is it an emerging federation?‘ ‗An international regime?‘ is constitutive. The 
answers to these questions are in part descriptive. However they can be explanatory as well 
because while making sense of the EU, they also provide insights into the union‘s behaviour. 
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If the EU is an emerging federation then it will have a tendency to centralize authority; if it is 
an international regime then it will have a tendency to maintain its members‘ sovereignty.65 
In short, answering ‗what‘ questions can be a valuable and distinct kind of theorizing and can 
be both descriptive and explanatory.   
Other prominent constructivists such as Checkel also criticized a pure positivist 
methodology and stressed the need to supplement them with interpretive techniques in order 
to provide a more complete account of International Relations and build multi-lane bridges 
between different approaches. According to him, most constructivists attempted to build just 
one-lane bridges, going from constructivism to rationalism, rather than two-lanes (the second 
going from constructivism to reflectivist and critical approaches) and he identified positivism 
as the main culprit of this weakness.
66
 Chekel also criticized postmodernist constructivists for 
not operationalizing their arguments, notably the role of language and communication, and 
argued that a possible post-positivist starting point would be scientific realism.
67
 According 
to him, this can create a sufficiently broad epistemological platform to bring together all 
constructivists in an effort at multi-lane bridge building.    
Even though she was identified by Ruggie as a neo-classical constructivist, Finnemore 
also advocated a scientific realist position in her latest writings. In a joint article with Henry 
Farrell, she wrote: ‗we are more convinced by social-scientific variants of scientific realism, 
which stress (in contrast to post-positivists) that causation is important, but also (in contrast 
to positivists) that causal mechanisms exist independently of directly measurable 
relationships between variables‘.68 In her studies of the casual effects of norms, she analyzed 
changes in state practices as well as discourses, notably justifications. According to her, one 
can only have indirect evidence of norms just as one can only have indirect evidence of most 
other motivations for political action such as interests and threats.
69
 In line with this view, she 
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highlighted the importance of examining justifications since they are an attempt to link one‘s 
actions to standards of appropriate and acceptable behaviour. Therefore, by examining them 
we can begin to understand what these internationally held standards are and how they may 
change over time.
70
  
The constructivism favoured in this thesis is in line with the views of above scholars 
such as Wendt, Finnemore and Checkel who combined a social ontology that is critical of 
methodological individualism with a middle-ground philosophy and epistemology that 
emphasize social causality as well as the benefits of complimenting positivist methodologies 
with interpretive techniques. These scholars agree that we should emphasize causal 
mechanisms yet we should not reduce them to observable entities. Instead of attempting 
necessarily to construct law-like generalizations on the one hand, or to reject the value of the 
scientific inquiry on the other, they sought to identify relevant causal mechanisms, and 
arrived at useful judgments in regards to how identities and norms influence state interests 
and behaviour.  
By adopting a similar approach, this thesis will show how ideational factors, namely 
identities and norms, causally affected the formulation of Turkish foreign policy while 
constituting Turkish actors‘ perceptions of their interests. Special emphasis will be on (i) how 
contestations over state identity and variations in actors‘ identity security affect the foreign 
policy behaviour and capacity of the country and (ii) how norms promoted by international 
institutions may shape and transform notions of actors‘ identities and privilege some groups 
over others. Special focus will be on how EU norms allowed the key actors of Turkish 
foreign policy, notably the military and political parties, to re-define their interests in late 
1990s and early 2000s and paved the way for a transformation in some of the key dimensions 
of Turkey‘s foreign policy. With the aim of providing a more complete understanding, the 
background conditions such as business ties and the role of civil societies, as well as changes 
in political and media discourses that made such transformations possible, will also be 
explored in the case study chapters. The rest of this chapter will discuss the ontological 
contributions of constructivists to the study of world politics in general and Turkish foreign 
policy in particular. It will firstly focus on the relationship between identities, interests and 
threat perceptions. Subsequently the focus will shift to the effects of norms and international 
institutions on actors‘ identities and behaviour.     
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ONTOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 
 As the above discussion indicated, there is no common epistemological ground for 
constructivists. However, the main strength of constructivism lies in its deeper and broader 
ontology which emphasizes identities, norms, social agents, and the mutual constitution of 
structure and agency. This rich ontology and sociological approach have allowed us to 
understand the socio-cultural context within which rational actors operate and have expanded 
the theoretical lines of mainstream international relations theory through the incorporation of 
identities, norms, and socialization within institutions. Let us now discuss these important 
constructivist variables in greater detail. 
A. IDENTITY:  
 The concept of identity is at the centre of the constructivist critique of rationalism. 
According to constructivists, identities are necessary in both domestic and international 
politics. In Hopf‘s words ‗they perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell you 
and others who you are and they tell you who others are‘.71 By telling you who you are, 
identities imply a particular set of interests for actors. For example, identity as a liberal 
democracy cannot be separated from an interest in complying with norms regarding human 
rights. Likewise, identity as a capitalist cannot be separated from an interest in generating 
profit.
72
 Nevertheless, the relationship between identity and interest is a much more 
complicated issue. Although certain identities impose certain interests, the former is not 
always independent from the latter. Sometimes actors can choose particular identities in 
accordance with their interests. However these interests themselves presuppose still deeper 
identities. To further elaborate this complex relationship, a comparison between rationalist 
and constructivist accounts of interests is helpful. 
Constructivism and rationalist approaches share the assumption that interests imply 
choices. Nevertheless, rationalist approaches goes further and assume that interests of states 
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are exogenous and given. Accordingly, all states have similar and fixed interests that are 
limited to an often narrow conception of utility-maximization due to the anarchic nature of 
the international structure. Since the main aim of states under anarchy is survival, they need 
to behave in line with structural requirements, which eventually make them acquire selfish 
interests.
73
 Constructivists did not deny the importance of interests. Wendt noted: ‗no one 
denies that states act on the basis of perceived interests, and few would deny that those 
interests are often egoistic. I certainly do not...What matters is how interests are thought to be 
constituted‘.74 For example, the argument that states are only interested in survival assumes 
that they are satisfied or ‗status quo‘ powers. A status quo state has no interest in conquering 
other states or changing the rules of the international system. But the question is how this 
interest is constituted?  
Wendt drew our attention to beliefs such as being satisfied with its international 
position or seeing itself as ‗a member of a society of states‘.75 These beliefs are not only 
about the external world. They also constitute a certain identity and its relationship to the 
world. Hence, constructivists connected interests to the identity of the subject and claimed 
that neither the former not the latter can be separated from a world of social meaning. In this 
account, the interests of states which are linked to their identities are a variable dependent on 
historical, cultural, political and social context. In short, constructivism treats identity and 
interest as endogenous and socially constructed. Therefore they can vary depending on 
historical, cultural, political and social context. Furthermore, they are not objectively 
grounded in material forces but the result of ideas and the social construction of such ideas.  
 Wendt treated identity as a property of intentional actors that generates motivational 
and behavioural dispositions.
76
 Put differently, it is a subjective quality which stems from an 
actor‘s self-understanding. However, the producer of an identity is not in control of what it 
ultimately means to others.
77
 Therefore, the meaning of those understandings will depend on 
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whether other actors represent an actor in the same way. This shows us that ideas held by the 
‗self‘78 as well as those held by the ‗other‘ can enter into identity. The character of this 
internal-external relationship varies according to the kind of identity in question.  
Wendt identified four kinds of state identities, namely corporate, type, role, and 
collective. He claims corporate identity consists of ‗self-organizing qualities that constitute 
actor individuality‘ and therefore it is ‗exogenous to otherness‘. 79  The type identity refers to 
a social category applied to persons who share some characteristics such as values, 
languages, or historical commonalities etc. In the state system, type identities correspond to 
regime types such as capitalist states, democratic states etc. Type identities of states have a 
social dimension since ‗others‘ are involved in their constitution. However they are still 
exogenous to the state system because they do not depend on other states for their existence.  
Unlike corporate and type identities, role identities are not based on intrinsic 
properties, they exist only in relation to others. One cannot enact role-identities by oneself. 
Many roles are institutionalized in social structures. This facilitates the sharing of 
expectations on which role identities depend on. Most roles allow a measure of interpretation, 
but only within certain limits. The breach of these limits can bring a contestation over role 
identities. Finally, collective identity ‗takes the relationship between self and other to its 
logical conclusion, identification, which refers to a cognitive process in which the self-other 
distinction becomes blurred‘.80 Identification is generally issue-specific and hardly ever total 
but always involves extending the boundaries of the self to include the other. Collective 
identities built on role identities as it merge self and other into a single identity. They also 
built on type identities since collective involve shared characteristics, but not all type 
identities are collective because not all involve identification. For instance, Turks and Greeks 
share many cultural characteristics due to their cohabitation for more than four hundred years. 
However, these common characteristics were not translated into a strong sense of 
identification between the two nations. In brief, collective identity is a combination of role 
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and type identities which has a causal power to encourage actors to define the welfare of the 
other as part of that of the self, to be altruistic.  
States‘ behaviour can be motivated by a variety of interests rooted in corporate, type, 
role and collective identities. However, their corporate identity as states generates some 
common interests such as physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being and ‗collective 
self-esteem‘. The form these interests take will vary with states‘ other identities which to 
varying degrees are constructed by the international system.
81
 For instance, the understanding 
of survival can vary depending on the historical context. In the eighteenth century ceding 
territory to other states was a common practice. In 1878 the Ottomans gave the administration 
of Cyprus to the British since this was not perceived as a threat to the survival of their 
empire. In the current international system, this practice is very uncommon since a state‘s 
survival is increasingly identified with the maintenance of territorial integrity. For example, 
giving up pre-dominantly Kurdish South-eastern Anatolia is currently an unimaginable option 
for Turkish governments since this is perceived as an existential threat to the spatial identity 
of Turkey.  
Similarly, the understanding of economic well-being can also vary depending on the 
type of the state.  Economic growth, more specifically increasing material benefits to their 
citizens, is the key criterion of economic well-being in capitalist states due the logic of the 
market or the necessity to legitimate the economic order. Nonetheless, this has not been the 
case all the time. For instance, feudal modes of production were not inherently growth-
oriented.
82
 In Turkey, the enrichment of certain groups, most notably Islamist circles, was not 
supported by the secular state until recent years. Likewise, economic interaction with oil-rich 
Gulf States was discouraged by the Turkish state until 1980s despite its potential contribution 
to the economic growth of Turkey.  
Finally, collective self-esteem refers to a group‘s need to feel good about itself, for 
respect or status.
83
 Like other interests, this interest can be expressed in different ways too. 
One way of expression is whether collective self-images are positive or negative. Self-images 
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are constructed by taking the perspectives of the others. Therefore, they depend on self‘s 
relationships with significant others. Positive self-images emerge from mutual respect and 
cooperation. On the other hand, negative self-images emerge from perceived disregard or 
humiliation by other states. Since groups cannot long tolerate such images if they are to meet 
the self-esteem needs of their members, they will compensate by self-assertion and/or 
devaluation and aggression toward the other.
84
 For instance, the ambivalent position of the 
EU towards Turkey‘s membership and unenthusiastic position of several European states 
generated feelings of exclusion and humiliation among large segments of the Turkish 
population. These feelings contributed greatly to the rise of nationalism and led a significant 
decline in the levels of popular support for Turkish membership of the EU. Indeed, recent 
opinion polls revealed the rise of a general anti-Westernism in the Turkish public which is 
manifest with a strong anti-Americanism and rising anti-Israel feelings.  
According to Wendt, these corporate interests must be fulfilled in order to secure 
state-society complexes.
85
 Even if actors can interpret the ways of fulfilling their corporate 
interests differently, this does not mean that they can construct them anyway they like. As 
Hopf put it social practices that constitute an identity cannot imply interests that are not 
consistent with the practices and structure that constitute that identity.
86
 Embedded identity 
constructions define the boundaries of legitimate ideas and limit the range of possible 
interpretations.
87
 Moreover, how a state fulfils its corporate interests depends on how it 
defines the self in relation to the other, which is a function of social (role) identities.
88
 The 
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ability of states to develop ‗selfish‘ or ‗collective‘ identities is determined by whether or not 
social identities imply an identification with the others.  
When states constitute other as enemy, they acquire selfish identities and do not 
recognize the other‘s right to exist. These states will not voluntarily restrict violence towards 
each other and this leads to the emergence of Hobbesian culture of anarchy. The Lockean 
culture on the other hand is characterized by rivalry rather than enmity. Here, the self and 
other respect each other‘s right to exist. Finally, when states identify with the other 
positively, they develop a collective identity which implies non-violence towards each other. 
This corresponds to the Kantian culture of anarchy which prevails between the democratic 
states of the world. The prevalent culture of anarchy in the international system is determined 
by the majority of its members and will compel states to behave in a certain matter while 
constituting their identities. These identities in turn will define the meaning of actors‘ power, 
namely their material capabilities.  
At this point, let us shift our attention to the relationship between identity, power and 
threat perceptions. Constructivist account of identity offers a plausible explanation for how 
power translates into threat within a certain set of understandings and representations. This 
important question has been overlooked by the rationalists. According to neo-realists such as 
Kenneth Waltz, states having greater power represent an inherent threat since nothing in the 
anarchic international system prevents them from using the power advantage to coerce 
weaker neighbours.
89
 In line with this view, they argued that states ally against power. 
Subsequent neo-realists such as Stephen Walt observed that this is empirically mistaken and 
recognized that states balance not against power but rather against threats. He also identified 
three key factors contributing to threat, namely geographic proximity, offensive capability 
and ‗aggressive‘ intentions.90 Several constructivists have challenged the deterministic 
relationship between power and threat and showed how identity is linked to the construction 
of threats and represents a potential source of alliance formation.  
Risse-Kappen argued that Walt‘s factors could not adequately explain the formation, 
cooperation and continuation of alliances. According to him, threat perceptions do not 
emerge from international power structure only. Actors‘ domestic identities are also essential 
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for their perceptions of one another in the international arena. More specifically, actors 
assume that the external behaviour of a state will be in line with the values and norms 
governing its internal political processes that shape its identity.
91
 Liberal states assume that 
non-liberal states which do not rest on free consent and exercise violence towards their own 
people, are more likely to behave aggressively in their interactions. Therefore they are deeply 
suspicious of non-liberal states‘ intentions and see their military capabilities as threatening.  
For instance, the United States does not perceive the large quantity of nuclear 
weapons held by France as threatening. In contrast, North Korea‘s or Iran‘s possible 
possession of even one or two generates terrific concern in Washington D.C. Another 
example from Turkey is helpful to further elaborate the point. Until recent years, Iran was 
perceived as an important threat in Ankara despite four centuries of amicable ties between the 
two nations. The key factor which triggered such threat perceptions was Iran‘s domestic 
Islamic regime and its support to Islamist groups in other Muslim countries, not the country‘s 
military weapons. In other words, Iranian power became threatening as a tool to export the 
Iranian domestic order to Turkey. Since 2002, Iran is considered less threatening for Turkey. 
This decline in the perceptions of ‗Iranian threat‘ is not a result of Iran‘s declining military 
power. On the contrary, Iran became a militarily stronger country and is likely to develop a 
nuclear arsenal in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the fading perceptions of ‗Iranian threat‘ 
in Turkey can be better understood with the country‘s identity shift in recent years. In brief, 
identity plays a defining role in shaping perceptions towards other states‘ military 
capabilities. Put differently, material capabilities acquire meaning for states according to who 
has those capabilities, that is, a friend or an enemy. 
Michael Barnett is another prominent constructivist who criticized Walt and 
emphasized identity in the formation of threat perceptions and alliances. He argued that the 
concept of intent in Walt‘s explanation of alliances is left underspecified and undertheorized. 
In his own words ‗by rejecting the proposition that intent is linked to anarchy or the balance 
of power and by failing to offer a conceptual tie in its place, Walt leaves the issue unresolved: 
How is intent determined? What constitutes a threat?‘92 According to him, the variable of 
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identity fills the gap here in two ways. Firstly, a shared identity affects the interests of the 
actors who hold this identity by determining the socially acceptable policies available to 
them. In this way, it shapes their desired and available security policies. For example, Arab 
identity caused Arab states to identify Israel as a threat and enemy. Even if this hostility did 
not overcome collective action problems and ‗free-riding‘, it determined what was acceptable 
and legitimate and indicates a strong relationship between identity and the definition of 
threat. Secondly, identity makes some partners more attractive than others. States holding 
similar corporate identities are more likely to identify each other positively and seek 
cooperation.
 93
 For example, democratic states usually align with one another and do not ally 
against each other during times of war.  
According to Barnett, identity does not only provide some leverage over the choice of 
an alliance partner, but also suggests that the maintenance of that alliance can be dependent 
on parties‘ mutual identification. Accordingly, an important basis of alliances is not simply 
shared interests in relationship to an identified threat but rather a collective identity that 
promotes mutual identification. He highlighted that states need to uphold the values and 
norms of a community to be counted as its members. In other words, being part of a 
community entails complying by the community‘s norms not only in foreign policy 
behaviour but also in state-society relations. And in order to be able to uphold the values and 
norms of a community, states must have a stable identity. While emphasizing the need of a 
stable identity, Barnett also noted that upholding a stable and secure identity consistent with a 
wider community may be especially difficult for some states at certain times. At this point, a 
good question to ask is ‗which states are more likely to have difficulties in upholding stable 
and secure identities‘? Let us now focus on the issue of identity security of states and the 
impact of having unstable and insecure identities on their foreign policy behaviour and 
capacity in the international system.  
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B. THE SECURITY OF IDENTITY: 
Indeed, even in the most homogeneous societies in terms of ethnicity, religion and 
social culture, boundaries of national identity are hardly settled. Communities and societies 
can be understood as engaging in a continuous debate over their collective identity.
94
 In the 
words of Edward Said, society ―is the locale in which a continuous contest between adherents 
of different ideas about what constitutes the national identity is taking place‘.95 In other 
words, no state‘s identity is entirely secure or stable as identities are always open to 
contestation. Nevertheless, the identities of some states at certain times can be less secure 
than others. Pluralistic societies and the so-called ‗torn‘96 societies whose elites seek to 
redefine their country‘s collective identity are more likely to suffer from insecure identities. 
In these societies, state identity is highly contested between diverse social groups who have 
different and often conflicting understandings of national interests.  
Eventually, the definition of national identity (and consequently the state‘s identity) 
will be dominated by the most powerful groups or individuals. These groups or individuals 
during the state-building process will attempt to impose their own identities and 
institutionalize them in legal, political, and social structures at both internal and international 
levels. Internally, they will develop myths and institutions to safeguard and secure their 
identity. Nevertheless, alternative social identities can survive even when they are not 
represented in the state and endure to shape perceptions and affect political debates in a 
country. Perceptions of such actors can be socially strong particularly when there is a tension 
between the state and large segments of the society. As Doğu Ergil noted ‗when national 
identity is not a construct negotiated by the citizens of that nation, it creates problems for 
neglected and excluded groups that can escalate into perceived security threats by the 
hypersensitive state‘.97 In order to secure their identity, dominant actors will seek to embed it 
in interstate normative structures, notably regimes and security communities. The acceptance 
of a state to a society of states can further confirm its identity. This often involves 
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membership in an international organization and represents an additional source of the state‘s 
identity.  
The confirmed identity can stay relatively stable and secure for a long period of time 
until a critical juncture occurs. Critical junctures refers to ‗perceived crisis situations 
occurring from complete policy failures, but also triggered by external events‘.98 Domestic 
developments such as changes in political economy, demography or territorial boundaries can 
trigger debates on identity and prevents a state to maintain a stable identity. In this context, a 
state‘s corporate identity can be changed through different mechanisms such as revolutions, 
domestic institutional arrangements or elections. A change in the state‘s corporate identity 
will also bring a change in its social identity since foreign policy can be dominated by 
entirely new organizations or individuals with different identity conceptions that may 
understand the national interest in a different way.
99
 
 The interaction between corporate and social identities of a state can also takes place 
in the opposite direction. External development such as a change in systemic patterns can 
also pave the way to wide-scale domestic change and revive or intensify debates about the 
collective identity and the state‘s relationship with the larger community. Under new 
historical conditions, the state‘s collective identity or the debate about that identity can be 
conflicting with the demands and defining characteristics of the broader community.
100
 Such 
a situation can mean rejection by others who are thought to hold similar identities and 
undermines the state‘s membership in the community. This significantly undermines the 
security of a state‘s social identity and can influence its corporate identity as well. Lack of a 
clearly defined role in the international level will change the range of legitimate identity 
options for political actors in a country. As a result, dominant actors can modify their ideas 
about political order and about nation state identity since the old concepts are usually 
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regarded as irrelevant or as having failed.
101
 On the other hand, excluded groups can take 
advantage of the situation to weaken the dominant group‘s political position and to present 
their identity as the alternative. These developments will intensify the debates over corporate 
identity and can pave the way to an ‗identity crisis‘ which in turn further influences the role 
identities of contesting actors. 
An important question arises at this point: How does contestation of state identity 
influence the foreign policy of the state in question? Considering the links between identities 
and preferences, we can assume that implementing a certain foreign policy would require 
consent and consensus among diverse groups that are involved in the formulation of foreign 
policy and that have different role identities. When such consensus does not exist, a state‘s 
interests arise out of a struggle between different domestic groups trying to influence the 
course of the state‘s foreign policy in accordance with their identity conceptions. The 
contesting definitions of state identity are usually attached to contradictory expectations. 
‗Such expectations may call for incompatible performances; they may require that one hold 
two norms or values which can suggest conflicting behaviours; or they may require that one 
(identity) necessitates the expenditure of time and energy such that it is difficult or impossible 
to carry out the obligations of another (identity)‘.102 Put differently, competing identity 
conceptions of diverse actors who take part in the formulation of foreign policy complicate 
the definition of national interests, suggest different foreign policy pathways and prevent 
development along any one path. This brings ambivalence to the foreign policy of the state in 
question. Growing ambivalence in a state‘s foreign policy causes confusion and brings a 
decline in the predictability of its behaviours and in this way complicates its relations with 
other states. For example if the state in question is a member of an alliance, its ambivalent 
foreign policy which stems from its contesting identity, will undermine the alliance‘s 
foundation or a state‘s membership in it.  
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 In recent years, this has been especially obvious, since many states began debating 
their national identity and its relationship to other international communities, most notably 
the ‗West‘. Turkey is a particularly good example to such a situation. External developments, 
notably the end of Cold War, globalization and European integration, as well as domestic 
developments such as economic liberalization since 1980s, massive internal migration from 
Eastern Anatolia to Western Turkey and EU-related political reforms triggered debates on 
Turkey‘s corporate and social identities. These developments changed the range of legitimate 
ideas on state identity for Turkish political actors. On one hand, secular elites who are 
dominant in the Turkish military as well as the bureaucracy slightly modified their identity 
conceptions and began to emphasize Turkey‘s multi-civilizational and bridge identity 
between East and West. On the other hand, Islamist groups who first came to power in 1996 
seriously challenged both the country‘s corporate (Kemalist) and role (Western) identities, 
and instead highlighted an Islamic identity.  
In recent years, both groups have been transforming themselves according to 
changing internal and external normative contexts notably that of the EU which. Islamists 
became increasingly supportive of the EU membership while the secularists tolerated some 
EU-related reforms which reduced their political powers. These transformations temporarily 
relieved the tension between the two groups in early 2000s. Nevertheless, a consensus on the 
long-lasting issue of identity could not have been reached in the absence of the full EU 
membership signal in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, contestation over identity 
became more intense in the uncertain context of Turkey‘s future relations with the EU which 
is manifest with the rising polarization between the secularists and Islamists. Contesting 
identity definitions of the country‘s two key political camps call for diverse behaviours and as 
a result Turkey has been pursuing an ambivalent foreign policy in the past two decades. This 
ambivalence in Turkish foreign policy is most evident in the country‘s relations with the EU, 
Greece and the Middle East. For example, shifts in Ankara‘s position in the Cyprus issue 
shows how different conceptions of identity brings contradictory foreign policy behaviour 
and hinders development along any one path. On the other hand, the transition of Turkey‘s 
relations with Israel from a very close alliance to a normal and eventually a problematic 
relationship shows how identity insecurity can undermine alliances. The case study chapters 
will focus on these issues in greater detail.  
As the above discussion indicated state identities are not monolithic and static. On the 
contrary, they are highly contested especially in ‗torn‘ societies and are dynamically 
produced and re-produced through a clash of sub-national identities. States‘ interactions in 
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various institutional contexts can intensify and complicate the debates over national identity 
by adding more elements such as norms and values. Such interactions can alter the normative 
understandings of actors and eventually transform their identities which will have important 
consequences for a state‘s foreign policy. Let us now turn our attention to the constitutive and 
transformative role of norms and institutions which is another important contribution of 
constructivism to IR theory. 
C. LOGICS OF ACTION, NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS: 
As Fearon and Wendt pointed out a typical way of understanding the difference 
between rationalist and constructivist approaches is in terms of the logics of action they 
emphasize.
103
 Rationalists, who assume that the interests and preferences of actors are 
exogenously given and fixed, emphasized what James March and Johan Olsen called the 
logic of consequentialism (LOC).
104
 This logic treats actors as calculating machines who 
assess different courses of actions and then choose whichever provides the most efficient 
means to their ends. In this logic, instrumental rationality prevails. Put differently, choices of 
rational actors are guided by the outcome of action. Actions are valued and chosen not for 
themselves, but as efficient means to a further end. On the other hand, most constructivists 
highlighted what March and Olsen called the logic of appropriateness (LOA). This is the 
realm of normative rationality whereby actors try to ‗do the right thing‘ rather than 
maximizing their given preferences. In other words, this logic treats actors as rule-followers 
who decide what to do by posing the following questions: (i) ‗what kind of a situation is 
this?‘, (ii) ‗who am I?‘, (iii) ‗how appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?‘105 
The LOA thus comprises three main elements, namely situation, identity and rules. 
Situations can be interpreted differently and this enables individual differences in action. 
Even actors holding similar identities or roles can act differently if they interpret the situation 
differently. At this point, institutions play a key role by shaping identities and the tools by 
which actors interpret situations and in this way produce similar behaviour from dissimilar 
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actors. Hence, the identity that March and Olsen stressed is institutional identity which is 
defined by certain duties and obligations. Institutional identities demand certain actions in 
order for that identity to be fulfilled and maintained. And rules inform actors about what to 
do in order to behave as their institutional identity demands by storing information about 
institutional practices, routines and norms. In brief, LOA assumes that actors decide what to 
do by interpreting a situation, determining his/her identity and then look for a rule which 
defines appropriate options.
106
           
The contrast between LOC and LOA leads to different understandings of social norms 
and the reasons thought to explain norm compliance. Neo-realists assume that norms do not 
have causal force whereas neo-liberals argued that they can have an important role in 
particular issue-areas. Nevertheless, even for the latter, norms are still a superstructure 
constructed on a material base.
107
 Norms are created by agents and have a regulative role, 
namely assisting agents with exogenous interests for optimizing utility. Nevertheless, they 
can also constrain the choices and behaviour of self-interested states. Since the actions of 
rational agents are guided by LOC, people follow norms only/if it is useful to do so. In other 
words, norm compliance is an exercise in cost/benefit calculation -- be it in response to 
material benefits or the threat of sanctions. It is a game of altering strategies and behaviour.
108
  
On the other hand, constructivists argue that a norm, which is defined by Jepperson, 
Wendt and Katzenstein as ‗collective expectations about appropriate behaviour for a given 
identity‘109 can have regulative as well as constitutive roles. They can define or constitute 
identities in the first place or regulate behaviours for already constituted identities. Therefore, 
norms can have independent causal effects on agents‘ behaviour. Rather than being a 
superstructure on a material base, they contribute to the constitution of that base. Global 
norms and states interact: they are mutually constructed. In this way, norms establish 
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expectations about how actors will behave in a specific environment. For example, the norm 
of sovereignty regulates the interactions of states in international affairs while simultaneously 
defining what a state is. Similarly, human rights norms do not only protect citizens from state 
intervention but also define a ‗civilized state‘ in the modern world.110  
Since agents‘ actions are assumed to be guided by LOA, constructivists argue that 
agents comply with norms because they internalize them. In other words, they think norms as 
the right or legitimate thing to do. Constructivists put a strong emphasis on arguing, learning 
and persuasion which leads to the agents‘ internalization of norms. Accordingly, agents do 
not only and always power; they also puzzle and learn. As Checkel put it ‗agents puzzle 
because they are engaged in cognitive information searches -- typically induced by policy 
failure or an uncertain environment. As a result, the strategies and, perhaps, underlying 
preferences of these agents are in flux; they are thus open to learning‘.111  
In line with these views, many constructivists attempted to show how norms shape 
states‘ identity and interest and in this way change their foreign policy behaviours. Martha 
Finnermore has been influential in examining the way in which norms are involved in the 
process of the construction of actor's perceptions of their interests. According to her, norms 
create permissive conditions and provide states with direction and goals for action. As a 
result, changing norms can create new interests which enable them to adopt new and different 
behaviour. Finnemore has focused on the role of international organizations in spreading new 
international norms and models of political organization. She outlined the ways that 
international organizations ―teach‖ states new norms of behaviour and construct domestic 
institutions and procedures inside states that reflect emergent international norms and 
practices.
112
 In her analysis of humanitarian interventions, Finnemore argued that the 
changing norms about who is ‗human‘ after the Second World War, in which international 
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institutions most notably the UN played a key role, created new interests and eventually 
transformed states‘ intervention behaviour. In her study of United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), she shed light on the creation of science 
policy bureaucracies in many countries despite the lack of pressures from domestic electorate 
or powerful countries.  
While Finnemore mostly emphasized how norms promoted by international 
organizations change state behaviour, some other constructivists argued that international 
norms have important effects on state behaviour via domestic political processes. Thomas 
Berger explained the maintenance of Germany‘s and Japan‘s non-assertive foreign policies, 
despite dramatic changes in their security environments and steady growth in their power, 
with the internalization of anti-militaristic norms. In doing so, he focused on domestic 
cultural-institutional context in which defence policies of these two states are made. He 
emphasized the concept of ‗political-military culture‘ which refers to ‗the subset of larger 
political culture that influences how members of a given society view national security, the 
military as an institution and the use of force in international relations‘.113  
According to Berger, the study of the political-military culture of a nation requires an 
examination of the original set of historical experiences that define how a society views the 
military and national security. A particular focus should be on the interpretation of these 
events among diverse social groups in the society. In his case studies, Germany and Japan, he 
emphasized how military defeat in the Second World War had shrunk the prestige of armed 
forces in both countries and initiated a transformation of their political-military cultures from 
a highly militaristic one to an anti-military one over the years. Berger also took our attention 
to several institutional and ideological structures which were created in both countries to 
secure their new political-military cultures. In the case of Germany, he particularly 
highlighted ideological structures such as the beliefs and values used to legitimate the new 
national security policies and institutions, notably a new definition of German national 
identity as part of the ‗Western civilization‘.114 In short, these two states have developed 
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beliefs and values that make them reluctant to resort to the use military force despite strong 
systemic pressures as a result of their historical experiences and the way in which those 
experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors.
115
  
Berger‘s emphasis on domestic cultural-institutional context and his concept of 
‗political-military culture‘ is quite helpful to understand changes in Turkey‘s foreign policy 
in the last two decades as well. Just like pre-war Germany and Japan, Turkey had also been a 
militarist society since its foundation in 1923. The armed forces, led by Kemal Atatürk 
played a decisive role in the establishment of Turkish state as well as all of its institutions. 
This highly militaristic political-military culture was legitimated with several ideological 
structures. Central to these legitimations were a definition of Turkish national identity as 
Western, homogeneous and secular. Other legitimations were related with Kemalists‘ 
interpretation of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and include 
geographical determinism, the Sèvres Syndrome, and several types of fear, notably Islamic 
reaction (Irtica), encirclement and disintegration. Until recent years, these ideological 
structures have been quite effective to maintain the army‘s legitimacy. Turkey‘s Kemalist and 
militarist political culture was translated into a Western-oriented foreign policy during the 
Cold War. On the other hand, Ankara pursued a cautious and non-interventionist approach 
towards neighbouring countries, especially the Islamic Middle East.  
Nevertheless, Turkey‘s traditional security culture started to be questioned from the 
1980s onwards. A series of political and economic liberalizing reforms of Özal‘s period 
paved the way for the emergence of a Turkish civil society and empowered Islamic groups, 
which eventually started to question Turkey‘s security conceptions and foreign policy 
practices. On the other hand, the revival of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in the 
1990s despite several interventions significantly reduced the army‘s prestige in the eyes of 
the country‘s liberal and intellectual circles. The EU‘s decision to recognize Turkey as a 
candidate country in 1999 also consolidated Turkey‘s emerging political-military culture. 
EU-related reforms reduced the political powers of the military while empowering political 
and societal actors which promote a different security culture, and legitimized their policy 
choices. Turkey‘s new political-military culture, which was legitimated with a new definition 
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of its identity as a bridge between East and West, was translated into a transformation of its 
foreign policy, especially towards its neighbours. This long and uneasy process and how 
Turkey‘s contesting political-military cultures affected its foreign policy will be explored in 
the following chapters in greater detail. 
In a similar manner with Berger, Thomas Risse-Kappen also emphasized domestic 
political structures and argued that the ability of international institutions to promote norms 
and influence state policy is dependent on domestic structures understood in terms of state-
societal relations. He also highlighted how domestic norms can also regulate interactions 
between states. According to Risse-Kappen, this is particularly valid for democracies that 
externalize their internal norms when cooperating with each other and in this way mediate 
power asymmetries by norms of democratic decision making. He identified four ways in 
which such norms affect the interaction between democratic allies: (i) decision-makers 
predict allied demands or consult their partners before preferences are formed, (ii) norms 
serve as collective understandings of appropriate behaviour and can be used by actors when 
justification for an argument is needed, (iii) cooperation rules also affect the bargaining 
processes between allies: democratic norms de-emphasize the use of material power in intra-
allied bargaining processes, (iv) democratically-elected leaders are constrained by domestic 
pressures and procedures and since these procedures form the core of the value community, 
using them to enhance one‘s bargaining power is considered appropriate.116     
For the above-mentioned reasons, inter-democratic institutions are special since they 
can build upon a strong sense of community of liberal states. Once established they 
contribute to the consolidation of its members‘ democracies and reinforce the positive effects 
of democracy on peace. In brief, there is a two-level norm game occurring in which the 
domestic and international norms are increasingly linked. As Finnemore pointed out many 
international norms were once the domestic norms of a country/society or region.
117
 Besides, 
international norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures 
and domestic norms. Nevertheless, the effects of domestic norms are strongest at the early 
stage of a norm‘s life cycle. Once a norm has been institutionalized in the international 
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system, domestic effects became less important. This brings our attention back to the role of 
international institutions which were described by Claude as ‗custodians of the seals of 
international approval and disapproval‘118 and play a key role in establishing and assuring 
states‘ compliance with international norms. 
D. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: 
The issue of how international institutions operate and influence actors‘ decisions has 
been another matter of debate between rationalists and constructivists. In the rationalist 
account, if no agreements among actors could be mutually beneficial, there would be no need 
for specific international institutions.
119
 However, if actors share a view that cooperation will 
be mutually beneficial, they will establish international regimes and organizations which 
provide forums in which they can mitigate collective-action problems such as several 
temptations for cheating, deception and free-riding. According to rationalists, international 
institutions change transaction costs and reduce certain forms of uncertainty. More 
specifically, they provide information, stabilize expectations and make de-centralized 
enforcement feasible by creating conditions under which reciprocity can operate.
120
 In this 
way, they change the rational means-ends calculations and constrain behaviour and strategies 
of states. 
Constructivists on the other hand, suggest that the influence of international 
institutions is much deeper. In this view, they can transform the identities and interests of 
political elites as well as civil society by providing legitimacy for collective decisions, and 
through the process of socialization, spreading their norms and rules. International 
institutions also promote shared understandings and a collective security identity. This is 
particularly valid for inter-democratic institutions for the above-mentioned reasons. As Risse-
Kappen noted inter-democratic institutions are special since they can build upon a strong 
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sense of community of liberal states. However, the degree of institutionalization as well as 
the extent to which ‗pluralistic security communities‘ have emerged varies among inter-
democratic institutions.
121
 For instance, when one compares NATO with the EU in terms of 
their degree of institutionalization and the extent to which collective identities have 
developed among its members, the latter scores higher than the former on both dimensions. 
For this reason, the EU received special attention from IR scholars since it is an excellent 
case study for getting at some bigger issues in regard to the relations of institutions, states and 
individuals. The EU has been acting as a strong catalyst for the transformation in Turkey‘s 
public and foreign policies as well. For this reason, the rest of this section will focus on the 
EU and how it influences its member and applicant states. 
The EU has a unique nature compared to the all other international organizations. This 
uniqueness stems from the fact that the European integration process necessitates the 
delegation of a broad range of state sovereignty to the supra-national institutions of the 
organization such as the European Commission, European Parliament and the European 
Court of Justice, which is also known as ‗deep‘ integration. The commitment to a deep 
integration was made clear when six original members of the EU‘s forerunner, European 
Economic Community (EEC) expressed their determination in the first recital of the preamble 
of the Treaty of Rome ‗to lay down the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe‘.122 Currently, the degree of integration, the level of political community 
and pooling of sovereignty in Europe far exceeds those seen in other regions of the world. In 
Checkel‘s words ‗if there is any place in the world where the nation-state would seem to be in 
re-treat, it is in Europe.‘123 Through its acquis communautaire (the accumulated legislation, 
legal acts, court decisions which constitute the body of EU law), the EU influences virtually 
every aspect of policy-making and implementation in its member states. In brief, EU 
membership transforms the domestic structure of a member state through initiating a process 
of ‗Europeanization‘, in which the Union‘s political and economic dynamics as well as norms 
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and practices become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-
making.
124
  
Apart from its commitment to a deep integration, the EU also committed itself to 
enlargement in Europe from the very beginning. Starting with six members in 1950s, the EEC 
doubled its number of members by a range of accessions during the 1970s-80s. The end of 
the Cold War in 1989 transformed the context of European integration by opening-up the 
possibility of a continent-wide union. Nevertheless, admitting new member states which were 
experiencing painful economic transformations raised challenges to the idea of an ‗ever 
closer union‘. The lengthy process of eastern enlargement threatened to disturb the internal 
order of the Union as well. These concerns triggered a widening versus deepening debate on 
the question of future European integration and led in 1990 to the launch of two 
intergovernmental conferences. Out of these emerged the Treaty on European Union in 1993 
which is also known the Maastricht Treaty.  
Maastricht legally created the European Union and deepened integration in various 
ways such as outlining the phases towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), enhancing 
the legislative powers of the European Parliament and establishing Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). In the same year, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Union 
confirmed its firm commitment to enlargement, while simultaneously defining the 
membership criteria, which are often referred to as the ‗Copenhagen criteria‘. The 
Copenhagen criteria require that a state have the institutions to preserve democratic 
governance and human rights, have a functioning market economy, and accept the obligations 
and intent of the EU.
125
  
By clarifying the conditions of full membership, the EU started to exert pressures and 
other phenomena associated with Europeanization on its applicants as well. Indeed, as 
Grabbe pointed out, the EU influence in the applicants can go well beyond its official 
competences in the current member states.
126
 In other words, the accession process pushes the 
applicants towards greater convergence with particular institutional models than has occurred 
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within the existing EU. She explains the EU‘s greater influence on its applicants by the added 
dimensions of conditionality and a negotiating process. Conditionality makes mitigating the 
influence of EU policies more difficult for applicants than for member states. The 
Copenhagen conditions are extensive, and what constitutes fulfilling them is open to 
interpretation.
127
 This provides the EU substantial power in deciding what needs to be done to 
realize compliance. Furthermore, applicant countries cannot debate the introduction of the 
acquis during the accession talks since it is non-negotiable.  
During the entire process of accession the EU uses several mechanisms to bring about 
desired changes in the behaviour of an applicant state. Nonetheless, rationalist explanations 
are exclusively based on cost-benefit calculations in the light of external incentives provided 
by conditionality. Schimmelfennig emphasized the role of incentives and political rewards 
used by the EU in the transformation of human rights and democracy norms in the CEECs. 
According to him, persuasive tools have been less effective when applied without incentives, 
particularly if domestic opposition to change is powerful.
128
 Grabbe provided a more detailed 
analysis of the mechanisms of Europeanization in EU applicants and identified five such 
conditionality tools. The first tool is the provision of legislative and institutional templates, 
which refers to a legal transposition of the acquis and the harmonisation with EU regulations. 
Secondly, money: aid and technical assistance, which has the function "of supporting the 
transfer of EU models". Thirdly, benchmarking and monitoring, that refers to the assessment 
of the progress of each candidate country through regular reports published by the European 
Commission. Fourthly, advice and twinning, enables direct involvement of the EU 
administrative bodies and actors in the national arenas. The final conditionality instrument is 
the mechanism of gate keeping which refers to access to different stages in the accession 
process, especially achieving candidate status and beginning accession talks.
129
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Constructivists such as Checkel did not deny the existence of strategic calculation or 
the role of incentives and rewards in the process of member and applicant states‘ 
Europeanization. Indeed, Checkel criticized other constructivists for ignoring that much of 
much of everyday social interaction is about strategic exchange. When this mechanism 
operates alone, actors adapt their behaviour to the norms of the EU in order to maximize their 
given interests. Nevertheless, Checkel also emphasized that actors can learn new interests and 
acquire new preferences in the absence of obvious material incentives through their 
interaction with broader institutional contexts.
130
 In line with this view, he identified two 
additional socialization mechanisms within the EU, namely role playing and normative 
suasion. Role playing, involves non-calculative behavioural adaptation and thus it starts the 
shift from LOC to LOA. Here, actors comply with the norms of an institution simply because 
it is easier socially to do so, not because of strategic calculations or because they think it is 
the right thing to do. On the other hand, when norm suasion occurs actors actively internalize 
new understandings of appropriateness. The shift from LOC to LOA is complete and actors 
comply with the norms of an institution because they think it is the right thing to do even 
though they did not used to think so.
131
 
Despite their distinctiveness, the three mechanisms of Europeanization are intimately 
related entities and can interact with each other over time. In many cases, strategic calculation 
or role playing take place at the beginning of a process which ultimately leads to 
internalization of norms and preference change.
132
 Furthermore, incentives and rewards used 
by the EU are essentially related to membership. As Checkel and Zürn pointed out: 
‗incentives are important as socialization mechanisms yet their success is dependent on the 
construction of a certain relationship between those involved in the process and the diffusion 
of ideas that leads to valuing membership. In brief, incentives are constructed as well‘.133 
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Even Grabbe acknowledged that aid, trade and other benefits have not had such direct and 
evident consequences as progress towards membership.
134
 Therefore, before membership can 
be used as an incentive by the EU, the targets of socialization should be persuaded that 
membership is beneficial to them. There can be significant variation among elites in applicant 
states on the desirability of membership. At this point two important questions arise: (i) ‗why 
membership is sometimes considered an incentive by the targets of the socialization?‘ and (ii) 
‗why the EU considers enlargement—especially towards certain countries—desirable?‘   
 In the rationalist account, expected individual costs and benefits determine member 
states‘ and applicants‘ enlargement preferences. To be more specific, a member state favours 
the integration of an outside state and an outsider state seeks to expand its institutional ties 
with an international organization under the conditions that it will acquire positive net 
benefits from enlargement.
135
 In line with this view, rationalist scholars explained EU‘s 
commitment to enlargement merely with the economic benefits or security gains of its 
member states. More specifically, enlargement meant expansion into new markets for certain 
member states and stability for the Union as a whole. Nevertheless, member states could try 
to gain access to new markets through ways short of membership such as free trade 
agreements. Moreover for some member states it was clear that the negative consequences of 
enlargement will outweigh possible benefits. For instance, while the geographical location 
indicates that Ireland, Portugal or Spain are not very vulnerable to political instability in the 
CEECs and are not best placed to exploit the economic opportunities of enlargement.
136
 
Indeed, internal policy reforms entail for these states the risk of losing substantial receipts 
from the EU budget. Even if we assume that the Union as a whole had an interest in stability 
in Europe, new boundaries could also bring new divisions in the continent and pave the way 
for instability. For this reason, the EU could attempt to contribute to stability in other ways 
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short of membership such as financial aids. 
Rationalists emphasized similar motivations for applicant states‘ interest in EU 
membership. For instance, the deepening of economic integration in the Union brings 
negative externalities for outsiders and trigger demands for membership. Other motivations in 
the rationalist account for desiring EU membership include changes in the world economy or 
security environment, and rising economic dependence on the Union.
137
 Nevertheless, EU 
membership implied certain risks for the CEECs as well. Poor competitiveness of these 
countries could lead to increased balance of payments deficits and hence economic insecurity 
especially in countries such as Poland and Romania. Moreover, there were concerns about a 
German economic domination over Poland as a result of significant trade and FDI by German 
businesses. EU‘s demands on human rights also involved some security risks for the CEECs. 
These demands provoked intense debates regarding minority rights in many of the CEECs 
such as Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.   
 Considering all these factors, an exclusive focus on utility cannot capture the 
enlargement preferences of the EU and its applicants. For this reason, many scholars such as 
Schimmelfennig accepted that norms also influenced actors‘ preferences. In order to explain 
EU‘s choice to expand towards the CEECs, Schimmelfennig emphasized the concept of 
‗rhetorical entrapment‘ and argued that actors with self-interest in enlargement have 
strategically used normative arguments to shame the rest of the Union into accepting it.
138
 In 
other words, those who had no interest in enlargement found themselves ‗rhetorically 
entrapped‘ to approve it due to EU‘s statements during the Cold War that implied a moral 
commitment to accept these states as members. This suggests that norms functioned merely 
as constraints on actors‘ behaviour. Sedelmeier opened the possibility that norms can also be 
used non-instrumentally. To him, the influence of norms can be different on different actors. 
More specifically, norms can be constitutive for the policy advocates of enlargement whereas 
calculations of reputation and social costs of deviation explain how these policy advocates 
mobilize backing for enlargement in the Union as a whole.
139
 However, as Sjursen pointed 
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out the effectiveness of such processes of shaming is dependent on the actors‘ belief that the 
norms at stake exist and are valid.
140
 In other words, actors will be ashamed of not complying 
with certain norms only if they consider such norms as valid and legitimate. Hence it is the 
commitment to norms that are considered legitimate rather than rationalist calculations of 
reputation that allows us to understand EU‘s enlargement preferences.  
 While emphasizing the constitutive role of norms, many constructivists put a strong 
emphasis on cultural factors such as a sense of community, ‗cultural match‘ and a collective 
identity to explain enlargement preferences.
141
 Accordingly, whether member states and 
applicants consider enlargement as attractive depends on the degree of community they 
perceive to have with each other. ‗The more an external state identifies with the international 
community that the organization represents and the more it shares the values and norms that 
define the purpose and the policies of the organization, the stronger the institutional ties it 
seeks with this organization and the more the member states are willing to pursue integration 
with this state‘.142 In line with this view, many scholars emphasized the role of EU‘s 
collective identity in its enlargement preferences. For the purposes of this thesis, Sjursen‘s 
study on EU enlargement is quite helpful since it gives us a clue not only on why the EU 
expanded but also on why it prioritized the accession of the CEECs over Turkey.    
 Sjursen made a distinction between two different forms of norm-guided justifications 
for enlargement, namely ethical-political arguments and moral arguments.
143
Ethical-political 
arguments refer to the values that are perceived as constitutive of European identity and 
involve a duty and solidarity only with those who share them. On the other hand, moral 
arguments involve references to rights that can be regarded just by all actors irrespective of 
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their cultural identity.  According to Sjursen, ethical-political arguments which indicate a 
sense of kinship-based duty are more effective in mobilizing support for enlargement. In 
order to elaborate this hypothesis, Sjursen compared EU‘s statements about relations with the 
CEECs and Turkey and demonstrated a significant difference between the two. The accession 
of the CEECs into the EU was represented as the end of an artificial division in Europe which 
was imposed by the outsiders. This representation has been a constant factor not only in EU‘s 
policy documents but also in the EU‘s leaders‘ speeches regarding the enlargement towards 
the CEECs. In brief, the main justification used for eastern enlargement was that the CEECs 
are a part of the ‗European family‘ that must be returned to Europe.144 On the other hand, 
Turkey was mostly represented as an important partner to Europe rather than a natural part of 
the ‗European family‘. There has been almost no reference to duty of kinship with regard to 
this country. Those favouring Turkey‘s membership constructed a rationale explicitly 
connected to the utility defined in terms of security. In other words, the main justification for 
supporting Turkey‘s EU membership is its strategic importance rather than the fact that it is 
‗one of us‘.145  
Despite the differences between the justifications for enlargement towards the CEECs 
and Turkey, the EU emphasized that the decision about who would be allowed to join the 
Union is objective since entry talks with an applicant starts only after it meets a core of the 
Copenhagen criteria. However, in the process of backing applicants in their efforts to meet 
these criteria, the Union has given priority to the CEECs over Turkey. As Lundgren showed 
Poland, for example, was given much more financial support toward democratic transition 
than Turkey after the end of Cold War.
146
 Moreover, the CEECs were courted to attend and 
engage in regular meetings in various EU institutions far in advance of accession, whereas 
Turkey was not. In brief, the EU‘s identity construction of the CEECs as ‗European‘ and an 
‗extension of self‘ paved the way for their prioritization over Turkey in the Union‘s 
                                                          
144
 Sjursen, H. (2002), ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement 
Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, No.3, p.503 
145
 Ibid, p.504 
 
 
146
 Lundgren, Å. (1998), Europeisk Identitespolitik: EU’s Demokratibisbånd till Polen och Turkiet, PhD thesis 
(Uppsala: Uppsala University) cited in Sjursen, H. (2002), ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and 
Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, No.3, p.492 
 62 
 
enlargement policy.  
Turkey‘s EU bid has engendered heated debates in the EU about the nature of 
European identity and the very boundaries of modern Europe. Consequently, a high degree of 
variation can be observed in the preferences of member states in regards to Turkey‘s EU 
membership. Contrasting voices within the EU ranging from the negative attitude of German 
Christian Democrats to the more favourable stance of the UK or Italy constantly send mixed 
signals to Turkey. These are strengthened by the inconsistent EU positions on this issue. As a 
result of EU‘s ambivalent position towards Turkey‘s membership, Ankara has been 
criticizing the Union for applying double standards reducing its incentives to comply with EU 
political recommendations. In this context, Turkey‘s Europeanization has been particularly 
slow in comparison with the CEECs. 
Nevertheless, explaining Turkey‘s problematic and slow Europeanization process 
only with mixed messages from the Union would be incomplete. In the constructivist 
account, the strength and stability of enlargement preferences in an applicant state is 
dependent on the extent of the domestic consensus on its state identity and policy norms. If 
an applicant has a relatively secure and consensus-based state identity, its politics will be less 
controversial and the resulting enlargement preferences will be stable and strong. On the 
other hand, if identity of an applicant state is highly contested, its politics will be ambivalent 
and the resulting enlargement preferences will be instable.
 147
  For instance, a widespread 
consensus on state identity can be observed in the CEECs. Political elites in these countries 
collectively promoted a common identity between Eastern and Western Europe after the end 
of Cold War. As mentioned above, this common identity was systematically echoed in the 
EU. The ―Europeanness‖ of the CEECs was hardly questioned by the EU and their accession 
to the Union was not a question of if but when. Due to the existence of a domestic consensus 
on state identity and its recognition by the EU, opposition to change has been weak in the 
CEECs. Furthermore, EU models were being presented at the same time as the CEEC policy-
makers were seeking institutional models to replace or to create new structures.
148
 In this 
context, these states saw themselves as a student in a teacher-student relationship. As a result, 
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the CEECs adopted fundamental norms and practices of the EU rather quickly and smoothly 
and eventually joined the Union as full members within a decade.   
On the other hand, as mentioned throughout the thesis, there has never been a national 
consensus over Turkey‘s identity. Westernization was a top-down project that fostered 
societal resistance from the outset and which received only partial recognition from the West 
itself. The end of the Cold War has further intensified the debates over Turkish identity both 
in Turkey itself and in the wider world. As chapter two and three will show in detail, 
Turkey‘s EU bid has been a source of a tense relationship, reinforcing divisions and conflicts 
not only within Turkey but also within Europe. Unlike the CEECs, Turkey has had severe 
problems with its reform process as a result of a lack of a domestic consensus on its state 
identity which generated a strong domestic resistance to change. This resistance includes 
forces that emphasize Turkey‘s envisaged ‗special conditions‘ and hinder the tide of the 
country‘s Europeanization. EU‘s questioning of Turkey‘s European credentials and its 
ambivalent position on its future membership also reinforced debates on identity and 
triggered instability in the country. As a result, Turkey has been travelling a particularly 
difficult and often bumpy road toward European integration. Furthermore, along the way the 
country has been passed by a number of competitors who now themselves have a say on 
Turkey‘s EU membership. In brief, Europeanization is as much an EU-inspired project as a 
national venture, involving the interaction of both external and internal factors.
149
 Its success 
necessitates commitment, will and consensus from both sides. Subsequent chapters will 
examine the difficulties that Turkey faces in its Europeanization process due to its insecure 
identity in greater detail. 
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STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CONSTRUCTIVISM: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The strength of constructivism lies at least partially in its ‗middle ground‘ position 
between rationalist and reflectivist approaches in IR theory. This position on one hand, 
enabled scholars to criticize the mainstream rationalist theory, or at least to be innovative 
with regard to it, on the other hand allowed them to avoid the drawbacks of reflectivist 
approaches. While avoiding ‗the pitfalls of the extremes of empiricism and idealism, of 
individualism and holism, or of single truth and relativism‘150, constructivists developed a 
rich and broad ontology which emphasizes identities, norms, social agents and mutual 
constitution of structure and agency. With its rich ontology and sociological approach, 
constructivism has expanded the theoretical lines of mainstream IR theory and allowed us to 
understand the socio-cultural context within which it operates.  
Rationalist approaches, notably neo-realism minimized the role of socio-cultural 
context and perceived national interest as a static, culture-free black box. Constructivism on 
the other hand attached a social dimension to the central debates of international relations, 
emphasized inter-subjective meanings and opened the black box of interest and identity 
formation.
151
 Constructivists have sought to understand the full range of roles that ideas and 
beliefs play in world politics rather than treating them simply as instrumental. They 
successfully demonstrated the causal and constitutive role of ideational factors on state 
identities and interests, independent of material factors.
152
 After all, neither individuals nor 
states can be separated from a context of normative meaning which shapes their identity and 
the possibilities available to them. Moreover, material structures are given meaning only by 
the social context through which they are interpreted. Therefore constructivism also shed a 
light on how power translates into threat within a certain set of understandings and 
representations. 
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Constructivists‘ stress on the mutual constitution of structure and agency helps to 
explain structural change and tackle the neo-realist pessimism about the odds of cooperation.  
Given that structure and agents are mutually constituted, the conditions of action are also 
what the actors make them to be. Most objects of international relations such as national 
borders or sovereignty are constructed by human agency in a cultural, historical and political 
context of meaning. As Wendt pointed out self-help and power politics are also socially 
constructed institutions, not essential features of anarchy.
153
 Conflicts and wars occur as a 
result of states‘ own social practices, which reproduce selfish and militaristic approaches.154 
Therefore, they are not inevitable even in an anarchic system. Changes in states‘ practices can 
eventually transform the type of anarchy and the nature of international system that states 
interact and pave the way to a more cooperative world. In short, constructivism‘s emphasis 
on the constitution of material forces by ideas brought the transformative potentials of the 
system to light. 
Constructivism is particularly useful to understand Turkish foreign policy in the post-
cold war period. Rationalist approaches might be helpful for explaining specific decisions 
which are taken in a stable environment. Identities and interests can sometimes last over the 
course of an interaction and thus make rationalist assumptions plausible. For instance, if 
Hobbesian culture lasted over a long period of time, then, it would be useful to think of the 
system in rationalist terms. Nevertheless, state identities and interests can change over time 
and this can eventually transform the culture of anarchy in the international system. In such a 
scenario, rationalist assumptions become problematic. After the end of the Second World 
War, a shift from a Hobbesian to a Kantian culture of anarchy started to develop in Europe 
simultaneously on the basis of the NATO and the EU. Since the end of Cold War, the 
continent has entered a post-modern system in which bipolarity and rivalry has been replaced 
by the development of a Kantian security community.
155
  
Turkey‘s engagement with these two pluralistic security communities in Europe, 
namely NATO and the EU, has influenced its ‗culture of anarchy‘ as well and shifted the 
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country out of a Hobbesian culture towards the Kantian one. Internally, the country has 
become much more open to pluralism and much more at ease with its cultural and ethnic 
diversity. Turkish foreign policy also entered into an age of transformation. We witnessed the 
adoption of a ‗win-win‘ approach in foreign policy which is manifest with shifts in important 
policy areas such as Cyprus. As Kirişçi pointed out nothing illustrates the new "win-win" 
approach to foreign policy better than the shift in Turkey's position on the Cyprus issue in 
2003-2004.
156
 Turkey‘s EU candidacy and the principle of conditionality that the union 
employs with its candidates have also enabled Ankara to develop a new "soft power" foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. Considering the change that characterizes Turkish politics in 
the post-Cold War period, rationalist assumptions with regard to national interest and rational 
actors do not fit with the nature of Turkey‘s foreign policy. In other words, Turkey does not 
match the static model of a stable state with relatively fixed interests that characterize 
rationalist approaches. 
Despite its important contributions and assets, constructivism has its limits as well. 
The argument that any change in strategic practice can change the identities of states from 
collective to selfish or vice versa, does not explain what would change the nature of state 
practice or why states would want to change it in the first place. In a similar manner with 
neo-realism, most constructivists overlooked the interconnectedness of international and 
domestic politics. In order to show that states‘ social identities and interests are endogenous 
to state interaction and can change depending on that interaction, Wendt, arguably the best 
known advocate of constructivism, developed a systemic approach and excluded the domestic 
dimension of identities from his examination. In other words, he ignored domestic processes 
to focus on the effect of interaction between states. He treated the corporate identities of the 
states as fixed and pre-social entities.
157
 This modest view of the state and domestic 
dimension of its identity can be helpful for his theoretical objectives. Nevertheless, it 
fundamentally weakens the constructivist argument. 
As mentioned earlier, the corporate identity of a state will emerge as a result of a 
domestic contestation between diverse social groups. Once emerged, corporate identities 
shape the direction and intention of states‘ systemic interactions. Put differently, states begin 
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interacting with each other with an already constructed corporate identity. Moreover they can 
construct ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ before the interaction begins through discursive practices such as 
representations. Therefore, states do not start interaction unintentionally at all times. The 
corporate identity and representations are helpful to understand why states are interested in 
interacting with each other in the first place and what their intentions are in such 
interactions.
158
 For instance, similarity in corporate identity and positive representations can 
encourage states to identify with each other and seek cooperation. Alternatively, some 
interaction patterns originate as side-effects from the desire to create, uphold, destroy and 
transform corporate identities.
159
  
In brief, corporate identity is an important independent variable in the construction of 
social identities at the systemic level. Once constructed the social identity of a state and its 
interactions in the international system will in turn influence its corporate identity by adding 
more elements such as norms and values. This influence can be a confirmation or rejection of 
a state‘s self-claimed identity depending on the nature of interaction. In turn, any change in 
the corporate identity of a state due to internal or external events will eventually affect its 
social identity in the international system. Therefore, a more complete understanding of a 
state‘s foreign policy requires a greater attention to its corporate identity and how it interacts 
with the state‘s social identity.  
As indicated earlier in this chapter, some constructivists showed how states‘ corporate 
identities, notably domestic structures and domestic norms, can influence their systemic 
interactions. Berger explained Germany‘s and Japan‘s pacifist foreign policy with their 
domestic cultural and institutional context, namely their anti-military political-military 
culture. Risse-Kappen emphasized how democratic states externalize their domestic norms in 
their interactions with each other. Nevertheless, even these scholars treated identity as a 
possession of an entire nation. This treatment is problematic since many countries experience 
contestations over their identity and as the Turkish case indicates some identities are formed 
in the absence of a consensus between the state and large segments of society. Therefore this 
thesis aims to move our attention from a singular understanding of state identity to a range of 
contesting identities at the domestic level and emphasize the impact of these contestations on 
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state‘s foreign policy behaviour and capacity in the international system.  
In line with this aim, the following chapters of the thesis will focus on a range of 
important foreign policy issues of Turkey in the post-Cold War period. Since the end of Cold 
War, Turkish foreign policy emerged as a platform in which rival identity claims have been 
contested. In this context, national interests are understood differently by diverse groups and 
institutions and are pursued through defining or re-defining a collective/social identity for 
Turkey. For this reason, many aspects of Turkish foreign policy can be better understood by 
an approach which pays attention to Turkey‘s corporate identity as well as its interaction with 
its social identity. Accordingly, the case study chapters will concentrate on the identity 
conceptions of important domestic actors and institutions in Turkey who can influence the 
formulation of Turkish foreign policy. In keeping with the theoretical interest in how 
international institutions may shape and transform notions of identity and privilege some 
groups over others, special focus will be on how Turkey‘s interactions within the EU context 
are interpreted by the country‘s diverse groups and how these interpretations affect the 
formulation of Turkish foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
This chapter will examine the origins of identity insecurity in Turkey and show how 
diverse identities emerged in the country in a historical setting. The main focus of this thesis 
as a whole will be on the relationship between Turkey‘s insecure identity and its foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, in order to understand the impact of 
identity insecurity on Turkey‘s political development and foreign policy during this time 
frame, it is first necessary to understand the historical roots of such identity insecurity. 
The history of Turkey‘s identity issue goes back to the late Ottoman period in which 
state elites had sought solutions to questions of identity as well as independence and 
modernization. Identity conceptions promoted by diverse groups such as the Young 
Ottomans, Islamists and the Young Turks during this time period, shaped trends which 
subsequent Turkish actors unavoidably inherited. The early Kemalists‘ preoccupation with 
independence and cultural Westernization demonstrated significant continuity with their 
Young Turk predecessors. On the other hand, Young Ottomans‘ emphasis on the 
compatibility of Islamic culture and Western liberalism influenced the identity conceptions of 
all centre-right parties in Turkey including the currently governing AKP. Indeed, the foreign 
policy of the party is sometimes termed by various analysts as being ‗neo-Ottoman‘. 
Therefore before examining the identity conceptions of Turkish actors in the republican 
period, the first task of this chapter is to establish the genealogy of ideas and policies they 
inherited from the late Ottoman era.   
The second part of the chapter will concentrate on how Kemalists constructed and 
institutionalized the identity of republican Turkey through a series of cultural reforms aiming 
to westernize the country in Europe‘s image. Although, Kemalists managed to pause identity 
debates in Turkey, rival claims to national identity remained strong and continued to shape 
societal perceptions and affect political debates in the country. In line with this view, the third 
part of the chapter will show how alternative identity conceptions became a reference point 
for the opposition in Turkey following the establishment of the multi-party system in 1946. 
Here, the main focus will be on how Westernization was re-interpreted during the 1950s and 
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was understood as fostering relations with the West rather than a cultural imitation of it, and 
with the United States rather than Western Europe as the model.  
Subsequently, the discussion will shift to the Özal period during the 1980s which 
represents a turning point for both domestic and foreign policies of Turkey. This section will 
show how Özal‘s policies prepared a suitable ground for the rise of identity politics after the 
end of the Cold War which is manifested with the Islamist challenge to the dominance of 
Kemalism. Since the foreign policy developments in the post-Cold War period constitutes the 
main topic of the case study chapters, the emphasis here will be on important internal 
developments which transformed Turkish foreign policy into an area of contestation between 
diverse identities. The chapter will come to a close with a brief discussion of how the EU 
context added a new dimension to the process of Westernization, that is to say 
Europeanization, and contributed to the transformation of Turkish identities. Throughout the 
chapter, a special emphasis will be given to the role of regional differences, which existed 
since the Ottoman times, in the problematization of Turkish national identity construction and 
external projection.  
 
DEBATES ON IDENTITY IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD: 
 Turkey‘s identity question has its roots in a long-lasting geographic and social divide 
dating back to the Ottoman times. At the height of its power, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the Ottoman Empire encompassed a very large area spanning three continents and 
controlled much of South-eastern Europe, Western Asia and Northern Africa. These vast 
territories were home to an extremely diverse population ranging from the Muslim majority 
to the minority population, specifically Christians and Jews. As a theocratic state, the 
Ottomans classified their subjects according to their religious beliefs. This system of 
classification, known as the Millet System created semi-autonomous communities within the 
empire and allowed non-Muslim communities to maintain their own laws, courts, judges and 
schools.
160
 Turks, Kurds, Albanians, Bosniaks and Arabs constituted the Muslim Millet 
whereas Greek Orthodox, Jews and Armenians were other major millets of the empire. The 
Millet System was a significant mechanism which sustained the multi-cultural nature of the 
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Ottoman society.
161
  
Even though the empire encompassed a very large territory, the settlement of the 
Ottoman Turks who dominated the ruling class, was largely concentrated in two distinct 
areas, namely the Balkan Peninsula which was also called Rumelia or European Turkey and 
Anatolia which was also called Asia Minor. For this reason, the Ottoman Empire 
fundamentally rested on two geographic pillars and had been a polity with two separate 
centres of gravity. Rumelia included the most advanced, most densely populated and 
wealthiest provinces of the empire and was home to a disproportionately large part of the 
Ottoman ruling elite. In particular, the cosmopolitan port city of Salonika (Selânik in 
Turkish) was a terminus for steamships and railways, an important manufacturing and 
commercial centre, and indeed the most industrialized city in the empire.
162
 It was one of the 
Ottoman cities best supplied with schools and army headquarters both of which were open to 
new currents of thought. On the other hand, Anatolia which provided the bulk of the imperial 
armies was relatively poor, isolated and traditional.
163
 
  The earliest debates on identity in the Ottoman Empire took place in the period of 
stagnation in which the Ottoman armies suffered humiliating defeats in Europe. As Hanioğlu 
put it, ‗the confrontation with the West and the endeavour to examine the reasons of the 
superiority of the West had been the turning point in the history of Ottoman thought‘.164 
Following the defeats, Ottoman elites abandoned the idea of Islamic superiority and became 
increasingly interested in the internal developments in Western Europe. Indeed, Europe 
became a mirror through which they perceived their own weakness, differences and 
traits‘.165As Kasaba put it ‗this represents the first breach in the Ottoman iron curtain‘.166 
During the late eighteenth century, Sultan Selim III launched a program of reforms known as 
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Nizam-i Cedid (New Order) in a drive to catch up militarily and politically with the West. 
Furthermore, he created different channels of communication with Europe, the most 
important being the European instructors in military education and the embassies. Another 
important development of the period was the dramatic increase in the number of bureaucrats 
who were sent to various European capitals to observe Western ―ways‖. As a result of 
increasing contact with Europe, European (especially French) ideas and lifestyle began to 
spread among the Ottoman elite, particularly among the military officers and bureaucrats.  
 In 1839, Sultan Abdülmecid I declared the Tanzimat Fermanı in Istanbul, the first of 
several reforming edicts with the aim of preventing feudalization and restoring the central 
authority of the Ottoman state. Tanzimat reforms included guarantees for life, honour and 
property of the sultan‘s subjects, an orderly tax system, a system of recruitment for the army 
and equality before the law of all subjects whatever their religion.
167
 Although external 
pressures played a role in the adoption of these reforms, most Ottoman statesmen shared the 
belief that the only way to save the empire from disintegration was to introduce European-
style reforms.
168
 During the Tanzimat era, the Ottoman economy was incorporated into the 
world free-trading regime as a peripheral state which intensified economic and political ties 
between the empire and the West. This created an advantageous position for the non-Muslim 
millets who established partnership with Western European merchants. Thanks to their 
European partners, many Greeks, Armenians and Jews were granted protection from 
European powers and benefited from lower taxes as well as the capitulations.
169
 The 
protected status of the non-Muslims in a period in which trade expanded rapidly paved the 
way for the emergence of an entrepreneurial non-Muslim bourgeoisie who greatly prospered 
in a relatively short time. Herkül Milas defined this era as the golden age for the Greeks and 
other non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire.
170
  
Nevertheless, the Tanzimat reforms had not produced the expected results and had not 
saved the empire from decline. Western norms did not work with the centuries-old Ottoman 
political culture. Moreover, the intensification of a religious division of labour between 
Muslims who dominated a greatly increased state apparatus, and non-Muslims who 
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dominated the industrial and commercial sectors under foreign protection meant that 
economic growth could not be fully exploited by the state to increase its resources.
171
 At the 
same time, the rising prosperity of non-Muslim millets provided a material basis for their 
intellectual revival and independence struggle in the coming years while causing resentment 
among large segments of the Muslim society. This resentment contributed greatly to the rise 
of identity debates and the emergence of opposition groups such as the Young Ottomans.  
The main idea of the Young Ottomans was that reforms should not be based on 
cultural imitation of the West, but on a true and modern understanding of Islam, the argument 
being that Islam was a rational religion receptive to scientific innovation and that in its 
original form the Islamic community had been an embryonic democracy.
172
Influenced by 
such thinkers as Montesquieu and Rousseau and the French Revolution, the Young Ottomans 
also developed the concept of Ottomanism which aimed to prevent the spread of ethnic 
nationalism among the minorities by promoting a ‗we-feeling‘ of being Ottoman and an 
"Ottoman nation" in parallel with this feeling.
173
In time, the Young Ottomans became 
increasingly influential and began cooperating with Sultan Abdülhamid in a drive to realize a 
liberal transition with Islamic arguments and balance the Tanzimat’s imitation of Western 
norms.  
This cooperation paved the way for the promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution 
in 1876, which was indeed written by the Young Ottomans. Nevertheless, this liberal 
transition was discontinued when the Sultan abolished the General Assembly and suspended 
the constitution only two years after its adoption under the guise of Ottoman-Russia War in 
1878. Following the defeat of the Ottomans in the war, the Sultan began cooperating with 
another opposition movement, namely Islamists, which also emerged during the Tanzimat 
period. Islamists argued that Westernizing reforms would result in the loss of Ottoman 
cultural identity and suggested a return to the values of the Sharia.
174
 They were not against 
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the adoption of Western technology, yet disapproved of Western ideologies especially 
nationalism and secularism. In line with this view, Abdülhamid opposed Ottomanism and 
promoted a Pan-Islamist ideology which aimed at the unity of all Muslims.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, it became clear that neither Ottomanism 
nor Islamism would be able to save the empire from decline. Ottomanism was largely 
rejected by many in the non-Muslim millets and by many Muslims. To the former, it was 
perceived as a step towards dismantling their traditional privileges. On the other hand, the 
Muslims regarded it as the elimination of their own superior position.
175
 Due to its multi-
ethnic and multi-religious character, the Ottoman society was also vulnerable to an Islamist 
ideology. In this context, we witnessed the emergence of alternative groups promoting 
alternative conceptions of identity.  
The most influential of these groups was the Young Turks (Jön Türkler) who 
established a secret society in 1889 which would later be labelled as the ‗Committee of Union 
and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, ITC). The birthplace, or more specifically the 
geographical origins of the family, was an important distinguishing mark among the Young 
Turks. As Zürcher noted, most of the leaders of the ITC, both military and civilian, shared a 
common geographic origin in the Southern Balkans (Rumelia).
176
 The legacy of growing up 
in ethnically heterogeneous Rumelia made the prominent ideologues of the Young Turk 
movement highly aware of the problems of national identity and political allegiance as well 
as the rising socio-economic gap between the non-Muslim and Muslim millets of the empire. 
Consequently, they developed a fierce Ottoman Turkish nationalism which defined ‗other‘ in 
religious terms. According to the Young Turks, the ideal identity for the empire was that of 
Turkish race, Islamic religion and Western Civilization.
177
  
In 1908 the Young Turks started a revolution in Rumelia where the threat to Ottoman 
integrity was the most prominent, and the need for reforms was most evident. However, the 
revolution rapidly spread to the rest of the empire and resulted in the Sultan announcing the 
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restoration of the 1876 constitution and reconvening the parliament on 3 July 1908.  
The members of the Young Turk movement were actually united with their opposition to the 
status quo. In the absence of this common goal following the establishment of the second 
constitutional era, the movement began to fracture and diverse loyalties started to emerge.  
 Nevertheless, during the crisis engendered by the Balkan Wars in 1912 the 
nationalists became dominant whereas the liberal fraction was sidelined. At the end of the 
Balkan Wars, all of the Young Turk officers and civil servants who had been born in the 
empire‘s Rumelian provinces lost their ancestral homes. Indeed, Rumelia, except the area of 
Eastern Thrace which includes Istanbul, was completely lost. Important Ottoman cities like 
Salonika, Üsküp and Monastir were incorporated into Christian states of the Balkans. 
Consequently, a large portion of upper class Rumelian Turks as well as other Muslims and 
Jews had to flee and became refugees (muhacirs) in what remained of the Ottoman Empire. 
Muhacirs were settled primarily in Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia and adopted these 
regions as their new homeland. In 1915, at least a quarter of the inhabitants of Anatolia were 
either muhacirs themselves or their children.
178
 
The trauma caused by the Balkan Wars deeply affected the identity conceptions and 
policies of the Young Turks as well as their Kemalist successors. In particular, the feeling 
that Anatolia should not go the way of the Balkans was certainly instrumental in the ITC‘s 
adoption of an aggressive form of Ottomanism which suggested Turkification of all non-
Turkish elements within the empire. Thanks to their power monopoly, the Young Turks 
managed to carry out far reaching secularizing and modernizing reforms which established 
the basis of the Republic of Turkey, but could not save the empire. In fact, the outbreak of the 
First World War gave the Young Turks the opportunity to act independently and fully exploit 
their available resources. Nevertheless, identity politics, aiming at the creation of a Turkish 
nation in the new homeland Anatolia took precedence over economic and military rationality.  
On 1 October 1914, the ITC government unilaterally abolished the age-old 
capitulations in a drive to create a ‗national economy‘.  Although the ‗national economy‘ 
programme laid the foundation for the rise of a Turkish entrepreneurial class, for the empire it 
meant a loss in commercial, technical and managerial skills and a fall in productivity. 
Similarly, the Young Turks‘ emphasis on Turkishness paved the way for a rise in ethnic 
consciousness among the Turks and prepared a suitable ground for the establishment of a 
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nation-state. However, it simultaneously weakened the loyalty of not only non-Muslim 
millets of the empire but also of other Muslim groups, most notably the Arabs who 
collaborated with the British and French and revolted against Ottoman rule in 1916. The Arab 
Revolt was a major cause of the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the First World War. In brief, 
when external circumstances gave the Young Turks the opportunity to act independently, 
identity politics, took priority over increasing the financial and human resources of the state 
and contributed to the empire‘s dissolution after the end of First World War.   
 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC & THE SINGLE-PARTY 
PERIOD (1923-1946): 
As the above discussion showed, contestation between diverse groups over the 
identity of Turkey dates back to the late Ottoman period. This contestation was interrupted 
with the establishment of the republic in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Like 
most of the Young Turks who dominated the empire in its last decade, Salonika-born Kemal 
was also of Rumelian origin. During the early years of his military career, he joined the ITC 
and indeed played a role in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Nonetheless, in subsequent 
years he became known for his opposition to, and frequent criticism of, policies pursued by 
the ITC leadership. During the First World War, Kemal proved himself as an extremely 
capable military officer. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the war, he led the 
Turkish national movement in a War of Independence. As a result of his successes against the 
invaders during this war, the Treaty of Sèvres which suggested the partitioning of Anatolia 
and Thrace was annulled and was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Following the 
recognition of Turkey‘s current borders at Lausanne, Kemal became a national hero which 
gave him sufficient legitimacy and power to shape a new state in his own image, one that 
looked west for its inspiration. Unlike the reconciliatory and compensatory westernizing 
reforms of the Tanzimat and the constitutional periods, Kemal‘s Westernization would be 
unconditional and radical.
179
 
According to Kemal, the westernizing reforms during the Ottoman period created a 
dualism by establishing new laws, institutions and regulations without abolishing the old 
ones. In order to end this dualism, Kemal started his mission by abolishing existing state 
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institutions which were related to the Islamic and Ottoman past. The first task towards this 
end was the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923 as a fait accompli. 
Unsurprisingly, Kemal became its first president, while his closest ally İsmet İnönü, an Izmir-
born pasha with a Rumelian background, formed the first cabinet of the new republic. 
Following the abolition of the monarchy, Kemal‘s next target was the institution of Caliphate 
which represented Turkey‘s attachment to Islam and the past. The Caliphate was ‗the tumour 
of the middle ages‘180in his eyes and as such had no place in the new secular Republic of 
Turkey. Together with the office of sheikh of Islam, the Caliphate was abolished on 3 March 
1924 despite a strong opposition who argued that the institution enhances Turkey‘s influence 
in international relations. In addition, Kemal disbanded the ministry of religious affairs, 
closed the religious courts of the Sheriat (Islamic law), and transferred religious schools to 
secular arms.  
Even though Islam was excluded from the state structure, religion was the dominant 
way of defining the boundaries of Turkey‘s national identity which is revealed in republican 
regulations in regards to immigration and naturalization. The government considered Muslim 
groups such as Albanians, Bosniaks, Circassians, as assimilable and helped them to re-settle 
in Turkey. On the other hand, Christians including Turkish-speaking Karamanlis from 
Central Anatolia were seen as inassimilable into Turkishness. Most of them were sent to 
Greece through a populations exchange agreement in 1929. In accordance with this 
agreement, Turkey accepted approximately 500,000 Turks and other Muslims, who were 
forced to leave their homes in the Balkans, in exchange for nearly two million Greeks, who 
were forced to leave Anatolia.
181
 After 1929, Turkey continued to accept Turks and Muslims 
as immigrants and did not discourage the emigration of members of non-Muslim minorities. 
More than 90 percent of all immigrants to Turkey arrived from the Balkan countries. As a 
result, people of Rumelian origin constituted approximately one fourth of Turkey‘s 
population in the 1930s and dominated the new republic both politically and economically. A 
very important part of the CHP leadership, the only legal political group in the country, was 
composed of people from Rumelia with a shared background in the ITC.  Moreover, most of 
the economic assets which were either seized by state trusts or put under direct state control 
                                                          
180
 Köker, L. (1995), Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi (Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy), 
(Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari), p.158 
181
 The Turks and other Muslims of Western Thrace were exempted from this transfer as well as the Greeks of 
Istanbul and the Aegean islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada. 
 78 
 
were allocated to managers who were mostly CHP members and Rumelians. In brief, as 
Zürcher pointed out, ‗although located geographically for more than 90 percent in Anatolia, 
Republic of Turkey is in fact a creation of Europeans (referring to Rumelian Turks), who 
shaped the country after their own image‘.182 
After determining the boundaries of Turkish national identity, Kemal focused on its 
re-construction. The Kemalist doctrine was informed by the dominant European ideologies in 
the 1930s and perceived modernization as Westernization. However, what the Kemalists 
understood by Westernization was mostly an adoption of Western culture and lifestyle. 
According to Kemal, the adoption of Western culture was a pre-requisite for reaching the 
level of ‗contemporary civilization‘ (muasir medeniyet). Indeed, the Kemalist reforms were 
in essence a social and cultural revolution, very much inspired by the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Orientalist norms that regarded Islam as the major barrier to modernization. 
In line with this view, the Turkish state adopted an assertive secularism (laiklik) which 
favoured a secular worldview in the public sphere and aimed to limit religion to the private 
sphere.
183
In other words, laiklik did not only suggest the separation of politics and religion 
but involved a restructuring of Turkish society in accordance with secular lifestyle and 
positivist thinking. In practice, this means preventing religious influence in the spheres of 
education, economics, family, dress code, and politics.
184
 
As part of the cultural Westernization project, Mustafa Kemal banned traditional 
headgear fez which he considered as a symbol of feudalism while encouraging Turkish men 
to wear European attire. Although never officially forbidden, the hijab (veil) for women was 
strongly discouraged; and women were encouraged to wear Western attire too. From 1926, 
the Islamic calendar was replaced with the Gregorian calendar and Friday was replaced with 
Sunday as the weekly day of the rest. A more radical reform was made in 1928 when the 
government replaced the Arabic script with a modified Latin alphabet as the official writing 
system of the Turkish language. Although this caused a dramatic increase in the literacy rate, 
practicality was not the main motivation behind this radical decision. As Akural pointed out 
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Arabic script was the symbol of the past, symbol of the Muslim identity of Turkey. Its 
abolition enabled the reformers to cut younger generations‘ cultural ties with the Ottoman 
past and Middle Eastern civilization.
185
  
Kemalist Westernization was a top-down and elitist project rather than a process 
generated by the society. The determination of national identity was made strictly at the level 
of the statist republican elites and excluded the mass of society. In a drive to create a 
homogeneous nation, the Kemalist elites who were mostly of Rumelian origin excluded the 
traditional and pious Anatolian masses both politically and economically and denied the 
existence of multiple identities that came to be imprisoned in the periphery. The state was 
provided with the task of safeguarding the envisaged ‗civilized‘ nation against the 
‗barbarians‘ within.186 Those who expressed the cultural and religious aspirations of the 
Anatolian population were dealt with by the national gendarmerie and the political police. To 
a certain extent, the Kemalists succeeded in creating new ‗white‘ Turk, ‗defined in terms of 
his/her ability to imitate external European appearances‘187, while suppressing other ethnic 
and religious identities, thus making them feel excluded and marginalized. In turn, this 
exclusion and marginalization generated major reactions from the Turkish people and 
articulated itself against secularism. 
Between 1925 and 1938, there were more than twenty five Kurdish and Islamist 
rebellions against the Kemalist Revolution. One of the most important of these uprisings was 
organized by influential Kurdish religious leader Sheikh Said who mobilized some Kurdish 
tribes as well as a group of Hamidieh soldiers
188
 to fight against the new republic. The 
rebellion was quite important in the sense that it combined two of the most threatening 
elements, namely Islamism and Kurdish nationalism, against the new secular Turkish 
republic and its centralization, Turkification and Westernization measures. The rebellion was 
eventually suppressed with the use of the Turkish army in large numbers. Nevertheless, it 
slowed down Turkey‘s political development in two ways. Firstly, military operations 
intensified the resentment among the Kurds and thus widening the gap between the Turkish 
state and the Kurdish society. Secondly, the rebellion paved the way for the suppression of 
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dissident elements including the first opposition party, the Progressive Party (Terakiperver 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası, TCF) which was banned in 1925. In brief, the rebellion interrupted the 
multi-party regime of the new Turkish state and led to the establishment of a single-party rule 
which lasted until 1946. Before focusing on the internal developments after 1946 let us have 
a brief look at how the Kemalist Revolution influenced the foreign policy of Turkey in the 
single-party period. 
As argued in chapter one, any change in the corporate identity of a state due to 
domestic political developments will eventually affect the identity formation at the systemic 
level where states will try to re-orient their preferences in accordance with the new identity. 
Changes in corporate identity can vary from simple modifications to a complete 
transformation of the identity which will drastically alter the state‘s foreign policy 
orientation. The Kemalist Revolution can be considered as a complete transformation of 
Turkey‘s corporate identity and required a completely new framework for the formulation of 
Turkish foreign policy. As a natural consequence of the Ottoman expansion in three 
continents, Turks were known as ‗conquerors‘. In other words, Turkey inherited the Ottoman 
image and was seen as a revisionist power. This image was harmful for developing friendly 
relations with other countries, particularly with Western ones. Hence, Kemal wanted to prove 
that Turkey was now a pro-status quo power which is no longer interested in conquering new 
lands. This pro-status quo position was represented with the new national motto of the 
republic ‗peace at home, peace in the world‘. 
In line with its pro-status quo identity, Turkey did not pursue a policy of 
expansionism and avoided any act that was contrary to peaceful co-existence. Kemal signed 
pacts with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in the Balkans, and with Iran, Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the East. Ankara also maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, in its interactions with the neighbouring countries, Ankara mainly sought 
stability. Interaction with the Middle Eastern countries was particularly kept at a minimum 
level. For example, the Saadabad Pact which was signed with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan in 
1937 was essentially securing non-interference in domestic affairs among its members rather 
than promoting cooperation.
189
 
The need of upholding Turkey‘s new corporate identity paved the way for the 
prioritization of Western countries in Turkish foreign policy. Kemal declared all ‗civilized‘ 
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nations, referring to the West, as friends of Turkey. However cooperation with the West was 
complicated by the unresolved issues with France and the UK including the status of the 
straits, the status of the oil-rich Mosul region and the Ottoman public debts decided at the 
Lausanne Peace Conference after the WW1. Furthermore, there was the latent mistrust 
towards the West due to the memory of the Treaty of Sèvres. Nevertheless, the signing of the 
Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the straits in 1936 eliminated an important 
barrier for the development of Turkey‘s relations with the West. In 1939, Ankara established 
a tripartite alliance with the UK and France which can be considered as the beginning of 
Turkey‘s cooperation with the West.  
In brief, the orientation of Turkish foreign policy was determined during the time of 
Atatürk when he desired Turkey to reach ‗the level of contemporary civilization‘, referring to 
the West. The construction of a new identity through Kemalist reforms provided the new 
political elite with the framework within which Turkish foreign policy would be formulated. 
Consequently, Turkey fully and unconditionally identified itself with the West. Following 
Atatürk‘s death in 1938, his successors took further steps to make Turkey an actual ally of the 
West.    
 
TRANSITION TO THE MULTI-PARTY PERIOD: (1946-1980): 
 The above discussion showed that Turkey‘s corporate identity is constructed without 
a national consensus over the issue. As noted in chapter one when national identity is not a 
construct negotiated by the citizens of the nation, it creates problems for neglected and 
excluded groups that can escalate into perceived security threats by the hypersensitive 
state.
190
 In such cases, dominant actors may seek to secure state identity by embedding it in 
interstate normative structures, notably regimes and security communities. The acceptance of 
a state to a society of states which often involves membership in an international organization 
provides an additional source of the state‘s identity. Turkey‘s enthusiasm to integrate itself 
into the West following the end of WW2 is a good example which supports the above 
argument. Indeed, the emergence of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in this period provided an excellent opportunity for Turkey to consolidate its 
institutional links with the West and secure its self-ascribed identity.  
Nevertheless, this required further adoption of Western values, notably democracy 
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and respect for human rights that came to constitute the key features of Western identity in 
the post-WW2 period. More specifically, one-party governments were no longer acceptable 
means of rule for modern Western states. In this context, President İnönü decided to re-
introduce the multi-party system in 1946 in an attempt to show Turkey‘s allegiance to the 
West and its institutions. Although the capacity of the opposition was restricted to the role of 
a minority party in the Turkish parliament, the transition to a multi-party system paved the 
way for Turkey‘s membership in several emerging Western institutions such as the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
191
 in 1948 and the Council of 
Europe in 1949. Turkey‘s membership in these institutions provided an additional source of 
its identity and thus reinforced Kemalists‘ identity security. In turn, rising identity security 
prepared a suitable ground for the complete liberalization of Turkey‘s political system in 
1950. 
The Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) was founded in this context and came to 
power in 1950 after winning the first free and fair elections in Turkey with 52 percent of the 
vote. DP‘s victory has been a turning point for both Turkey‘s domestic politics and foreign 
policy. The emergence and rise of the DP was connected with two important transformations 
within Turkey during the 1940s. Firstly, Turkey experienced a socioeconomic transformation 
which led to the enrichment of the landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie.
192
 The 
commercial bourgeoisie had been promoted by the state since the early days of the republic, 
but with its newfound wealth, was now more and more independent from such connections 
and became increasingly interested in constraining the role of the state both politically and 
economically. Secondly, the interwar years witnessed notable ideological transformations 
among political and intellectual elites of Turkey. Since the exceptional circumstances of the 
newly-established republic were no longer valid, different opinions on how to achieve the 
national goal of reaching the level of ‗contemporary civilization‘ emerged.193  
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Since all founding members of the DP were former members of the CHP, the party‘s 
ideology was also rooted in Kemalism. Indeed, the Democrats emerged out of decade-long 
contestation of the diverse interpretations of Kemalism within the CHP. Due to its Kemalist 
roots, the DP shared the CHP‘s zeal for the Westernization of Turkey. Nevertheless, unlike 
its predecessor which had emphasized the necessity of adopting Western culture, the DP 
interpreted Westernization as achieving economic and political liberalization and fostering 
relations with the West through NATO membership. In line with this interpretation, the party 
called attention to the freedom of Turkish citizens vis-à-vis the state and initiated an 
economic and political liberalization process by taking the United States as the model. As far 
as the economic dimension is concerned, the DP highlighted the inviolability of private 
property, and material enrichment of all. It attempted to adjust the economic culture in 
Turkey by promoting private enterprise, free market and agricultural production while 
abandoning CHP‘s trajectory of state-led industrialization. Achieving economic liberalization 
was portrayed as ensuring Turkey‘s progress towards its goal of ‗contemporary civilization‘. 
The reference point for this was often declared to be the ‗liberal democracies‘ of ‗the West‘, 
among whom the United States‘ model would be particularly influential.194 The DP leaders 
were speaking of turning Turkey into a ‗little America‘ during the 1950s. Indeed, the first 
three years of the DP was extremely successful. Living standards of many people, especially 
those of big landowners, dramatically increased. Between 1948 and 1953 rural income per 
capita at constant prices rose roughly by 25 percent.
195
  
As part of the political liberalization, the DP emphasized religious freedoms. The 
party portrayed itself as the champion of the Anatolian masses and exploited their resentment 
at CHP‘s forced secularization. It smartly used Islam in order to restore the Anatolian 
masses‘ psychological bond with the state. For example, one of the first decisions of the DP 
government was lifting the ban on the recital of the ezan (call to prayer) in Arabic. A month 
later, the government decided to allow the broadcasting of Koran readings over the state 
radio. Simultaneously, it attempted to expand the scope of religious education. In 1951, the 
Ministry of Education established Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (Imam-hatip Okullari) 
in seven cities and expanded their number to sixteen by 1955.
196
 Enhancing religious 
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freedoms and the relaxation of state control over society was consistent with the DP‘s re-
definition of Turkey‘s path to a ‗Western‘ model of modernization. When advocating 
religious freedoms, the party leaders often referred to the example of the West, where 
freedom of conscience was presented as inviolable.
197
 Furthermore, they emphasized that  
religious freedoms would be helpful to prevent the spread of Communist ideas among the 
Turkish public and in this way would contribute to reinforce Turkey‘s Western identity in the 
international system. 
Apart from economic and political liberalization, another important aspect of the DP‘s 
understanding of Westernization was establishing direct alliances and cooperation with the 
Western powers. Thus Westernization in this regards became a general philosophy of DP‘s 
foreign policy. Turkey‘s accession to NATO in 1952 was a logical conclusion of this 
philosophy. Rationalists explained Turkey‘s motivation to become a member of the Western 
alliance merely with the security concerns in the Cold War, more specifically with the Soviet 
threat. Undeniably, the presence of the Cold War intensified Turkey‘s preference to integrate 
itself into the Western alliance. However, as indicated in the previous section, Ankara sought 
to enhance its institutional links with the West even before the Soviet threat occurred. 
Moreover, as Ülman underlined Turkey could have stayed neutral in the Cold War and 
remained protected. In his own words ‗in case of a Soviet attack, Turkey would receive help 
without NATO membership since the United States could not allow the Soviet Union to 
conquer the Middle East‘.198  
Therefore, Ankara‘s decision to join the Western alliance was not simply for attaining 
protection against the Soviets. This was a foreign policy formulated in association with the  
 nation-building project that was dominated by a quest to secure Turkey‘s Western identity, 
as well as foreign aid, along with security necessities. Following Turkey‘s NATO admission, 
DP leaders often highlighted the contribution of membership to Turkey‘s Western identity 
and regarded the membership as the recognition of it by the West. Indeed, as Bozdağlıoğlu 
put it ‗NATO membership has been the most stable of Turkey‘s institutional connections 
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with the West‘.199 In brief, the quest of NATO membership was much more than a simple 
reaction to the superpower struggle. It reflected a pre-existent linkage between national and 
foreign policies in DP thinking, chiefly based on a project of Westernization understood as 
economic and political liberalism and cooperation with the West. In this regards, the shift in 
Turkey‘s development model and its zeal to join the NATO indicates how a state‘s corporate 
and social identities interact with each other. The establishment of economic liberalism in 
accordance with the American model paved the way for closer ties between Turkey and the 
United States and eventually led to the former‘s NATO accession in 1952. In turn, 
membership in NATO reinforced the transformation of Turkey‘s corporate identity towards a 
liberal democracy.   
 Nevertheless, NATO is a military alliance which is defined in defensive terms. 
Accordingly, its main function has been safeguarding the sovereignty of its member states 
rather than promoting democracy. In line with this function, NATO created a secret group 
within the Turkish military, similar to other secret armies throughout Europe such as Gladio 
in Italy, charged with waging sabotage campaigns and resistance in the case of a Soviet 
invasion. This group which eventually emerged as the so-called ‗deep-state‘ became prone to 
corruption, interference with domestic politics and society.
200
 In this context, the DP leaders 
felt unconfident despite their electoral strength since they could not manage to reorganize or 
control the military, the judiciary and the bureaucracy who remained strictly committed to the 
CHP‘s understanding of Kemalism and Westernization.  
Moreover, DP‘s economic vision was based on a fragile foundation and gave birth to 
the formation of two hostile political camps in the country. The first camp consisted of the 
middle class and urban industrial bourgeoisie who as Ergil noted ‗had to shoulder most of the 
financial burden (as taxes) of DP‘s miracle‘201 whereas the second camp who mostly 
benefited from their policies, consisted of commercial bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and 
middle and subsistence farmers. Rising friction between these two camps led to a chaos in the 
country which revealed itself with student riots, street demonstrations, and constant criticism 
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of the DP regime by the press. This instability forced the DP government to pass some 
undemocratic laws against its main competitor CHP and use force against the protestors 
including students which prepared the necessary ground for the military intervention on 27
 
May 1960. Although direct military rule came to an end with the elections in 1961 in which 
the CHP triumphed, the military secured its position within the Turkish political system by 
establishing the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) and a second house 
(Senate) in the Assembly. MGK was supposed to help the government in making decisions 
regarding the national security. Nevertheless, since national security is a very broad and 
open-ended term, officers began to interfere in Turkish politics whenever they thought it 
necessary.
202
  
During the first half of the 1960s, two important incidents obliged Ankara to re-
evaluate its relations with the United States and NATO‘s commitment to protect Turkish 
interests. The first one was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962-3. During the crisis, Ankara felt 
exposed since negotiations which involved the withdrawal of United States‘ nuclear missiles 
from its territory were concluded in its absence. The second incident was the outbreak of the 
Cyprus crisis in 1963. When Turkish Prime Minister İnönü informed Washington about its 
plans to intervene in the conflict to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots, American President 
Lyndon Johnson warned Ankara that NATO would not guarantee Turkey's security if a war 
erupted after a Turkish intervention to Cyprus.
203
 Due to experiencing serious problems with 
the United States and NATO over these two issues, Ankara attempted to diversify its foreign 
policy but only within the Western camp. As a result, Turkey intensified its relations with 
Western Europe by signing an association agreement with the European Community (EC) in 
1963. The Agreement initiated a three-step process toward creating a Customs Union which 
would help secure Turkey's full membership in the EC. 
When the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP), which was established by the body 
politic of the former DP came to power in 1965 under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, 
Ankara attempted to restore its damaged relations with the US and NATO. AP emphasized 
the importance of NATO membership not merely for Turkey‘s security and economy but also 
for the modernization of the country. In the words of Demirel; ‗Turkey considered its alliance 
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with NATO as a manifestation of the identity of fate among the countries embracing freedom 
and democratic ideals‘.204 Since the founding members of the AP were former members of 
the DP, AP government also promoted an economic development based on American model. 
Nonetheless, unlike DP‘s agricultural strategy, AP emphasized industrial and commercial 
sectors. Large amounts of credits were transferred from the agriculture to urban industrial and 
commercial investments. Turkish businessmen cooperated with many foreign capitalists who 
took advantage of high tariff barriers in the country.  
Despite these developments, the majority of Turkish society was still struggling with 
poverty. Moreover, monopolies led to economic stagnation towards the end of the 1960s. In 
this context, communist ideas became increasingly popular among the Turkish public. 
Besides, the rising popularity of leftist ideas encouraged the CHP to move to a centre of left 
position. Apart from leftist movements, political Islam which remained completely 
underground until 1940s appeared as an alternative in the Turkish political scene. 26 January 
1970 witnessed the establishment of the first Islamist party in Turkey, named the National 
Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP). In fact, Islam has always been a reference point for 
the opponents of CHP since it was the most effective instrument for establishing channels 
with the peripheral masses in Anatolia. Islamist circles backed and played active roles in the 
DP as well as its successor AP. Furthermore, the AP cooperated with religious movements 
including the Nurcus. However both the DP and its successor were committed to Kemalism 
as well as its Westernization ideal which they re-interpreted as close relations with the West. 
On the other hand, the MNP was the first political party with a dominant Islamic 
discourse in its party platform which came to be known as the National View (Milli 
Görüş).National View was a direct challenge to the Kemalist project of Westernization and 
secularization. Emphasizing concepts like morality, virtue and social justice, this ideology 
distinguished modernization from Westernization and accused the West and the westernizers 
for the backwardness of the Islamic nations. National view supporters argued that, ‗culturally, 
geographically and historically Turkey does not belong to the West; instead it shared its past, 
values and institutions with the Islamic world a world that had to be mobilized to balance the 
power and pressure of the West‘.205  
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At the beginning of the 1970s, Turkey entered a state of turmoil once again when 
radical leftists and extreme nationalists became militant. Strikes, demonstrations and explicit 
challenges to Atatürk‘s legacy by Islamists had become the last straw for the second military 
intervention in 1971.  After a period of interim military government, Bülent Ecevit became 
Prime Minister and governed in a coalition with the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi, MSP), which was established by the cadre of MNP after its closure. The 
most important event of this period was the military intervention to the island of Cyprus in 
1974 as a response to the Greek military junta‘s coup against Cypriot President Makarios. 
Military success boosted the prestige of the Turkish military in the eyes of the public and 
legitimized its interference in politics. However, it further deteriorated Turkey‘s relations 
with the United States. Indeed, Washington imposed an arms embargo against Turkey - by far 
the most important sanction against Turkey's Cyprus operation. American embargoes and 
other external shocks brought political instability and economic decline to Turkey in the 
second half of the 1970s.  
These developments triggered strong anti-American feelings in the country. 
Consequently, Turkey had shifted its attention to Western Europe once again and begun 
considering an application for EC membership by end of the 1970s. However, then Prime 
Minister Demirel put off the application in order to receive the support of anti-Western 
Islamists for his weak minority government. This is a good example which shows how the 
lack of a consensus on Turkey‘s identity brings ambivalent policies and unstable foreign 
policy preferences. During the Cold War when half of the European continent was under 
Soviet control Turkey possessed a greater chance of integrating itself into Western Europe. 
As Yılmaz and Bilgin wrote ‗the perpetuation of the master narrative of the Cold War – that 
represented the Soviet Union as the other – helped to (re)produce Turkey‘s Western 
identity‘.206 As mentioned above, Turkey joined several Western institutions in the Cold War 
context without much questioning of its cultural identity. Even if Turkey might not be 
granted full membership, an application would accelerate the process of establishing the 
customs union with the EC which was proposed by the Ankara Agreement.
207
 This could 
have brought stability to the country and prevent the subsequent military interventions to 
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Turkish politics. Yet Islamists prevented Demirel to use this opportunity and Turkey entered 
another unstable period with unsolved economic and social problems. In this context, the 
military intervened in politics once again on 12 September 1980 and put an end to the 
instability while effectively freezing Turkey‘s relations with the EC and hindering its political 
development. 
 
ÖZAL ERA & TURKISH ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS:  
 Following the 1980 coup, the military entirely altered the political system of Turkey 
by banning all former politicians and designing a new constitution. The adoption of a new 
constitution by a referendum paved the way for the re-establishment of civilian rule in 1983.   
In the first elections following the referendum, the newly-founded Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Özal emerged as the strongest party 
in the Turkish Parliament by gaining 45.2 percent of the total vote. Thus the 1983 elections 
marked the beginning of the Özal era, which would last for some ten years and would 
transform Turkey both economically and politically. In fact, Özal came from the same 
tradition as Menderes and Demirel, and that Özalism can be viewed as a representative of the 
neo-DP or neo-AP current.
208
 Nonetheless, Özalism is distinguished from these currents in 
both domestic and foreign policy terms.  
 A notable difference of the Özal era was the abandonment of the import-substitution 
strategy of economic development and the promotion of export-led growth. As a result of this 
shift, Turkey succeeded not only in diversifying its exports but also in becoming an important 
market for direct foreign investment. Moreover, the liberalization program overcame the 
balance of payments crisis, re-established Turkey's ability to borrow in international capital 
markets, and led to renewed economic growth. Even though the Menderes and Demirel 
governments supported the conservative Anatolian capital, their success was limited. 
However, Özal‘s rural and religious background enabled him to by-pass the boundaries 
between the traditional and the modern and construct strong links with the Anatolian masses 
by making use of the Sufi orders, kinship ties and mosque associations.
209
 His liberal 
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economic and social policies promoted religious interest groups and enabled the periphery, 
villagers, workers and traditional religious groups to enter the economy. Indeed, the growth 
of an Islamic business world and of the religious but pro-democratic ‗Anatolian bourgeoisie‘ 
was one of Özal‘s main successes.  
All these developments accelerated the restoration of Turkish democracy following 
the coup. During the 1980s, many non-democratic rules were abolished, and the masses 
gained legal rights to resist pressure from the state. The restoration of democracy and a 
growing income enabled previously marginalized political and ethnic groups, notably 
Islamists and Kurds, to press for a new identity and citizenship definition that would include 
diverse ethnicities, cultures, religion, political ideas and minority languages. In this context, 
Özal made strong references to the Ottoman past and argued that Ottoman political and 
cultural systems could be a perfect model to solve Turkey‘s identity problems. Most of his 
suggestions on the issue such as the adoption of the eyalet sistemi (state system), the 
localisation of the administration, and the presidential system were inspired by the Ottoman 
past. Özal further argued that the United States and the Ottoman Empire were similar 
political structures: Both allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their 
religion, nationality and economic preferences.
210
 
In line with these arguments, Özal promoted an American understanding of 
secularism and a Turkish version of Islam which was more tolerant of other religious groups 
and more moderate than French laïcité. He sought a middle way between Islamism and 
Turkish nationalism, his goal being to formulate a religious understanding which was suitable 
for democracy, liberalism and capitalism.
211
The answer was Türk-İslam Sentezi (Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis) which represented an official re-evaluation of Islam as part of Turkish 
identity with the aim of promoting national solidarity and integration.  In accordance with 
this ideology, the government expanded state-run religious services and introduced religious 
education as a compulsory subject in public schools. In school text books the term ‗national‘ 
was often used in a religious sense.
212
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The shift in Turkey‘s corporate identity during the Özal period created a new foreign 
policy understanding as well which manifested itself in a wider identity abroad, Ottoman 
rather than Turkish covering all neighbouring Muslim peoples and all minorities in Turkey. 
In line with this neo-Ottomanist identity conception, Turkey became an attraction centre for 
the Turkic and Muslim people of the former Ottoman Empire and appeared as their ‗natural‘ 
ally. Following the end of Cold War, almost all leaders of the Turkic world, Bosnia, Albania 
and Macedonia rushed to Ankara for support over their economic and political problems. In 
this context, Turkey began pursuing a much more active foreign policy in its own region. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to Menderes‘ security-oriented regional policies, Özal pursued such 
a policy to promote economic and cultural co-operation between Turkey and its neighbours. 
For the very first time, Ankara formulated its foreign policy towards the Balkans and the 
Middle East on common religious and cultural values.
 213
   
Nevertheless these developments were not a challenge to the traditional Western 
orientation of Turkish foreign policy. On the contrary, Özal made efforts to combine Turkish 
and Western interests in the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. In 
doing so, he tried to persuade the West that Turkey was an influential regional power; and 
with its democratic, secular and pro-Western system could be a good model for its 
neighbouring countries. As will be shown in chapter five, Özal attached a special importance 
to relations with Washington and saw the Gulf crisis as a perfect opportunity for Turkey to 
show its value to the Western security system especially to the United States. Apart from 
these attempts to combine Turkey‘s interests with that of the West, Özal also highlighted the 
importance of Turkey‘s integration with the West. Indeed, one of the most important foreign 
policy initiatives of Özal was Turkey‘s application for full EC membership in 1987. In a 
similar approach with Menderes and Demirel, Özal also prioritized political Westernization 
rather than the cultural side of it and in line with this view, made efforts to persuade the 
Europeans to accept the Turks as Muslim Europeans into the European political system. He 
emphasized that such a development would facilitate the institutionalization of democracy in 
Turkey. 
To conclude, Özal‘s period can be considered as the first instances through which 
Turkish foreign policy started to diverge from its traditional Kemalist roots. In line with a 
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new identity based on Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Turkey‘s national interests were re-defined 
and this paved the way for the development of a multi-dimensional foreign policy 
understanding. This new understanding marks the beginning of Turkey‘s activism in its  
foreign policy towards the Middle East which later become a more usual phenomenon. The 
details of these developments will be examined in the case study chapters. At this point, let us 
now shift our attention to the rise of political Islam following the Özal period which 
transformed Turkish foreign policy into a platform of contestation between diverse identities.   
 
THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM & IDENTITY POLITICS: 
Following Özal‘s unexpected death in 1993, Demirel was elected to be the ninth 
president of Turkey. In June 1993, he asked Professor Tansu Çiller to form a government, 
thereby making her Turkey's first female prime minister. Çiller earned high marks from 
international bankers for taking steps forward in privatizing Turkey's money-losing state 
enterprises. Economic liberalization continued to increase Turkey‘s industrial production 
destined for export as well as foreign direct investment. Despite these developments, the 
Turkish economy as a whole worsened as Çiller government did not have any strong, clearly 
defined economic plan and continued to run huge deficits. Moreover, extensive privatization 
brought a dramatic rise in unemployment and a drastic decrease in the number of jobs. This 
increased rural-to-urban migration, while the work opportunities for newcomers were 
shrinking.
214
 In addition to rising unemployment, the value of the Turkish Lira continued to 
decrease in a constant devaluation against harder currencies. In brief, while opening the 
Turkish economy to the world, neo-liberal policies deepened the gap between the rich and the 
poor.  
In 1994, a huge budget deficit threw the Turkish economy into a serious economic 
crisis. Annual economic growth fell by thirteen percentage points to -5.5 percent in 1994.Real 
wages for employees fell by 30 percent between 1990 and 1994, while inflation grew more 
than 100 percent. In addition to these economic problems, the violent conflict between the 
Turkish state and the Kurdish separatists had intensified since the beginning of the 1990s. All 
these developments led to a political and societal malaise in the country. Turkish society 
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began to suffer from a lack of direction with amplified anomie and lawlessness.
215
 Several 
polls clearly showed the decline of confidence in the state and the politicians. Globalization 
and rapid change in the post- Cold War period also created new pressures on Turkish society 
to seek a sense of identity and community.
216
 These pressures were intensified when the EU 
began emphasizing the cultural dimension of European identity and seriously question 
Turkey‘s European credentials. In this context, we witnessed the rise of identity politics in the 
country and Islamists started to compete with secularists on the identity and foreign policy 
direction of Turkey.  
The re-evaluation of Islam as part of Turkey‘s national identity during the Özal period 
prepared a suitable ground for the rise of political Islam. As Karakas put it the ideology of 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis did not only led to a nationalization of Islam, but also to an 
Islamization of the nation.
217
 Demographic change also played a key role in this process. The 
rural areas of Central and Eastern Anatolia had enjoyed strong population growth during the 
first republican period and were largely responsible for the growth in the population of 
Turkey from fourteen million in 1923 to twenty one million in 1950. Since then, the overall 
population has more than tripled to seventy million, with most of the growth taking place in 
the rural areas of Anatolia or among first-generation rural migrants in Western Turkey‘s 
metropolitan centres. As a result of massive rural-to-urban migration, Turkey‘s biggest cities 
which were once the strongholds of Kemalism, have gradually ‗Anatolized‘. Unsurprisingly, 
both Istanbul and Ankara have had Islamist mayors since 1994.  
Throughout the 1990s, the role of Islam became evident in every sphere of political 
and social life including the media, art, music, literature and cinema. This corresponded with 
the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) which was established in 1983 by 
the leadership of MSP after the closure of the party in 1980. By mobilizing groups such as the 
urban migrants, the Anatolian bourgeoisie and the peripheral masses, the RP emerged as the 
largest single party at the national elections of 1995. The RP‘s election victory enhanced the 
self-confidence of its religious core supporters and led to a politicization of religion which 
manifested itself especially in the issue of headscarves. The RP organized massive 
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demonstrations with imams sympathetic to its cause and with female students wearing 
headscarves.
218
 This period also witnessed an Islamization of the public sphere: alcoholic 
beverages were prohibited from state restaurants and cafeterias, several initiatives against 
prostitution were introduced and ―indecent‖ sculptures were removed from public 
places.
219
During his short period in power between 1996 and 1997, Erbakan also initiated 
several Pan-Islamic projects and attempted to re-orient Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Islamic world. 
All these developments fuelled the public debate between Islamists and secularists, 
intensified the politicization of lifestyle issues and more importantly transformed Turkish 
foreign policy into an arena of contestation between diverse identities. As will be shown in 
chapter five, secularists responded to the RP‘s pan-Islamic foreign policy attempts by 
strengthening ties with Israel. The organization of anti-Israel protests by the RP-controlled 
Sincan municipality near Ankara was the final straw that paved the way for the so-called 
‗post-modern coup‘ in 1997 when the MGK pressured Erbakan‘s government to step down.  
The ‗post-modern‘ coup has been an important turning point for the transformation of 
political Islam in Turkey. The members of the banned RP founded the Virtue Party (Fazilet 
Partisi, FP) in 1998. However, this party was not as uniform as its predecessor. A reformist 
faction emerged under the leadership of Abdullah Gül and challenged the traditionalist party 
leader Recai Kutan at the party congress in 2000. This was the first signal of the split in 
Turkish political Islam. Although Gül could not manage to beat Kutan in this congress, he 
was supported by almost half of the party members. Eventually, Gül and other reformists 
within the FP such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bülent Arınç and Yaşar Yakış broke away 
from the National View tradition and established their own party, namely the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) following the closure of the FP by the 
constitutional court in 2001. The traditionalist faction led by Recai Kutan also established its 
own party which was named as the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). With the establishment 
of two political parties, the division of political Islam in Turkey has been institutionalized.  
In 2001, the Turkish economy was hit by another major economic crisis, the effects of 
which were much more severe than that of the first one in 1994. The crisis further weakened 
the loyalty of the Turkish people to the established parties and reinforced the rise of reformist 
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Islamists. In the general elections of 2002, the AKP emerged as the biggest party in the 
Turkish parliament by taking 34.3 percent of the vote while the SP, the traditionalist 
successor of the FP, received only 2.5 percent. The secularist CHP became the only 
opposition party by winning 19.4 percent of the total vote. Even though the AKP officially 
broke away from the strictly religious rhetoric of RP‘s National View ideology, it has 
attracted voters who had in the past voted in line with the this tradition. The 2002 elections 
have underlined the deep ideological and geographical divisions in Turkey. The secularist-
Islamist distinction appeared as the most important political cleavage in the elections. 
Besides, Turkey exhibited a clear regional polarization. Electoral maps indicated a secular 
rim along the Aegean and the Mediterranean coasts as well as Thrace and an Anatolian 
hinterland, dominated by religious conservatives who mainly supported the AKP. The AKP 
leadership represented a geographic shift in influence as well as a political one, coming from 
smaller and more conservative cities in the Anatolian interior of the country. Indeed, popular 
secularist newspaper Sabah described the AKP victory as a ‗revolution by impoverished 
Anatolia against the old political guard‘.220  
Despite domestic and international concerns in regards to the direction the AKP 
would take the country, the new government declared its commitment to EU membership and 
started an ambitious reform program as soon as it came to power. The transformation of 
Islamists‘ position from an anti-Western to a pro-EU position was initially triggered by the 
so-called ‗post-modern coup‘ in 1997. However, an instrumental logic alone does not fully 
capture the reasons behind this transformation. As will be shown in chapter three, an equally 
important factor in the change of the Islamists‘ position regarding EU membership was the 
understanding that Europeanization involves more political and economic transformation 
than cultural Westernization. More specifically, Turkish Islamists realized that 
Europeanization requires the consolidation of democracy and civil liberties in Turkey on the 
basis of EU norms and means a more democratic, more plural and more open society 
emancipating their identity from the limits of Kemalism. 
Unsurprisingly, the swift and unexpected change of the Islamists‘ position towards the 
EU generated suspicions among the secularist actors in Turkey who were concerned about a 
‗creeping Islamization‘ through the strategic use of Europeanization process. Indeed, Turkey 
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is a rather unique case in European integration. It is the only EU candidate which has a 
Muslim-majority population. In this regards, it is the only case in which Europeanization 
could prepare a suitable ground for cultural de-Westernization. In the words of Jung: ‗in the 
application of the pluralistic norms of the Copenhagen Criteria to Turkish society, especially 
the crucial right of the freedoms of expression and religion, the state necessarily will 
gradually lose its monopoly over the religious field. In this way, the Europeanization and 
democratization of Turkey might indeed be accompanied by its cultural Islamization‘.221 
Nevertheless, as a result of their strong commitment to the EU process, the AKP 
managed to receive the backing of Turkish liberals and peak business groups and established 
a new and powerful pro-EU bloc that cut across the secular-Islamist divide in Turkey. On the 
other hand, positive signals and incentives from the EU prevented any intervention from the 
secularist military against the adoption of EU-related reforms even though such reforms 
significantly reduced its influence on Turkish politics. As chapter three will indicate, the 
military regarded the civilianization of political system as appropriate in view of its 
commitment to the ideals of Westernization, its learning from the past experiences, and its 
socialization within Western institutions such as the NATO. In this context, the country went 
through a major reform process with regard to its democracy and human rights standards. The 
constitution was amended twice, and eight comprehensive reform packages were adopted 
with the aim of fulfilling the political dimension of Copenhagen criteria. On top of that, as 
will be analyzed in chapter four, Ankara transformed its traditional Cyprus policy and 
adopted a more conciliatory approach on the issue. As a result of these developments, the EU 
decided in December 2004 to begin membership negotiations with Turkey in 2005. 
 Nevertheless, the Union started to send mixed signals to Turkey after the beginning of 
entry talks. While ambivalent messages were coming from various EU quarters, the AKP 
attempted to satisfy its culturally conservative grassroots by making several proposals such as 
lifting the ban on Islamic headscarves in Turkish universities and public buildings and 
criminalizing adultery in the new Penal Code. Combined with mixed signals from the EU, 
these developments severely damaged the pro-EU consensus in Turkey. Consequently, the 
confrontation over secularism and national identity has intensified which was manifested 
with the crisis over the presidential elections in 2007. The AKP was criticized of using the 
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Europeanization process as window-dressing for its ―real agenda‖, the Islamization of 
Turkey. The candidacy of Abdullah Gül for the presidency in April 2007 was perceived as a 
symbolic step in that direction. The intensive reaction of the CHP and the bureaucracy led to 
early elections in 2007 which brought another victory for the AKP.  
However, even after the elections, the secularists continued their fear-mongering 
campaign on the issue of the envisaged Islamization threat.
222
 In 2008, Turkey's highest court 
has been asked to close down the AKP and prevent most of its leaders from having any role 
in politics for five years. The judges refrained from imposing these penalties and chose 
instead to fine the party. Therefore the country avoided a major political crisis. Nevertheless, 
the developments in the Ergenekon case which investigates claims regarding the existence of 
a terrorist group within the state and the military, showed the larger tensions in Turkey 
between a secular elite seeking to maintain its fading influence and the growing and 
increasingly  assertive religious-conservative masses. In brief, as will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter three, the EU context contributed to the transformation of Turkey‘s 
conflicting identities and led a short-lived consensus between 2002 and 2005. However, the 
increasing uncertainty of future relations with the Union after 2005 broke the consensus, 
intensified the ideological and geographical polarization in the Turkish society and politics 
which inevitably slowed down the pace of political reforms in the country.    
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CONCLUSION: 
 To conclude, the history of Turkey‘s long-lasting identity insecurity goes back to the 
late Ottoman period. As mentioned above, Ottoman elites promoted different and contesting 
identity conceptions as possible solutions to questions of independence and modernization. 
This contestation was paused with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 when 
the secularist westernizers under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged as the 
dominant group in the country. Atatürk had formalized the goal of ‗reaching the level of 
contemporary civilization‘, and attempted to realize it through a series of cultural reforms 
aiming to westernize the country in Europe‘s image. Nonetheless, Kemalist identity was not a 
construct negotiated by the citizens of the nation. Therefore, it created problems for neglected 
and excluded groups that escalated into perceived security threats by the Turkish state. 
Consequently, Kemalists had sought to enhance institutional links with the West in a drive to 
secure Turkey‘s self-ascribed identity.  
During the 1950s, the DP formalized this quest and re-interpreted Westernization as 
enhancing links with the West through NATO membership. In the Cold War context, Turkey 
managed to attain membership to many Western institutions without much questioning of its 
cultural identity. Among all other Western political and economic institutions the most stable 
of Turkey‘s institutional connections with the West has been its membership in NATO. 
Throughout the Cold War, Turkey enjoyed a relatively secure identity and an international 
role attached to it. The maintenance of the major narrative of the Cold War – that represented 
the Soviet Union as the other – helped to (re)produce Turkey‘s Western identity in the 
international system while ideological cleavages were masking Turkey‘s deeply-rooted 
identity issues at home.  
Nevertheless, towards the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself increasingly 
isolated in the new international environment. Moreover, rigid ideological conflicts were 
being replaced with the politics of identity. The rise of identity politics in Turkey is manifest 
most notably in the Islamist challenge to the dominance of Westernists. In this context, 
Turkish foreign policy has become a source of contestation between diverse sub-national 
identities with distinct readings of national interests and security. As noted above, the EU 
context after 1999 contributed to the transformation of Turkish identities and led to a short-
lived consensus in the first half of the 2000s. Nonetheless, rising uncertainty of future 
relations with the Union after 2005 broke this fragile consensus and indeed intensified the 
ideological and geographical polarization in the Turkish society and politics.  
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Even though developments after 2008 are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is useful 
to note that Turkey‘s polarization over lifestyle and value issues continues to this day as 
indicated by the municipal elections in 2009 and a recent referendum over constitutional 
reforms in 2010. In particular, the geographical distribution of ―yes‖ and ―no‖ votes in the 
2010 referendum showed how politically polarized Turkey has become. The existence of 
such a deep ideological and geographical division in the society further lessened the chances 
of forming a consensus on state identity which will bring stable foreign policy preferences. 
As mentioned in chapter one, if identity of a state is highly contested, its politics will be 
ambivalent and the resulting foreign policy preferences will be unstable. Contesting identity 
definitions of Turkey‘s two key political camps call for diverse behaviours and as a result 
Ankara has been pursuing an ambivalent foreign policy in the past two decades. This 
ambivalence which constrains Turkey‘s foreign policy capacity in the post-Cold War period 
is most evident in the country‘s relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East. Therefore 
the rest of the thesis will examine Turkey‘s relations with these countries/regions in greater 
detail.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
TURKEY‟S RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(EU): 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
 Turkey‘s relations with the EU constitute the main component of the country‘s 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Since the end of the Cold War, which had 
provided such a safe haven for Turkey in the Western camp, Ankara has been trying to 
improve its institutional links with the EU in order to secure its ambiguous position in the 
West. Nonetheless, Turkey‘s relations with the Union encountered serious complexities since 
they involve factors which are not easy to change such as culture and identity. For this 
reason, Turkey-EU relations should be examined in the context of Turkish and European 
identities. 
 Following this framework, this chapter will examine how Turkey‘s insecure/dual 
identity negatively influences the country‘s political development as well as its relations with 
the EU and thus complicates its bid to join the bloc. In doing so, it will firstly concentrate on 
the impact of insecure identity on the development of a European model of civil-military 
relations in Turkey and the position of the Turkish military regarding the country‘s EU 
membership. Subsequently, the discussion will shift to the perceptions and positions of 
diverse political/social camps in both Europe and Turkey regarding the Turkish accession to 
the EU. This section is composed of two parts. The first part will focus on the contestation 
between diverse political camps within the EU in regards to European identity and how this 
contestation brings an ambivalent policy towards Turkey. The second part will firstly 
demonstrate how Turkey‘s insecure identity impedes the development of cooperation 
between the country‘s diverse political camps even when they have common interests such as 
the EU membership. Subsequently, it will analyze how EU‘s decisions regarding Turkey‘s 
membership are interpreted by these camps and how these interpretations affect the 
formulation of Turkish foreign policy. The last two sections will analyze the role of civil 
society in Turkey‘s Europeanization process and Turkey‘s cultural policy which is central to 
the projection of Turkey‘s image abroad.  
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THE TURKISH MILITARY & THE EU: 
 The privileged role of the Turkish military in Turkey‘s domestic and foreign policies 
is still a case of major concern for the EU and continues to constitute a formidable barrier to 
Turkish membership into the union. Considering its importance, this section will analyze how 
Turkey‘s insecure identity prevents the development of a European model of civil-military 
relations in the country which will pave the way for a more democratic and successful foreign 
policy. In doing so, it will firstly examine the military‘s self-image due to Turkey‘s insecure 
identity and will show how its political powers have increased as the country‘s identity 
becomes less secure particularly since the 1980s. Subsequently, the focus will shift to the 
impact of the EU context on the Turkish military‘s identity and the internal debates within the 
institution regarding its role in Turkish politics. It will be argued that, the military‘s identity 
has started to change after 1999. Nevertheless, this transformation has been incomplete due to 
the EU‘s ambiguous attitude towards Turkey which makes the country‘s identity less secure. 
Due to this incomplete transformation, civil-military relations in Turkey are still far from 
being close to European standards. Unlike their counterparts in the EU, the Turkish military 
is still an autonomous institution which can strongly influence Turkish politics. This threatens 
Turkey‘s stability and is detrimental to its relations with the EU.  
Starting from the late nineteenth century, the military first became the object and then 
the subject of the Ottoman-Turkish Westernization project. Unlike civilian institutions, the 
Turkish army has never been dissolved therefore it has a well-established and mature 
structure. At the end of the First World War, they did not only save the country from the 
occupying powers but also built up a new, modern political structure. The military played a 
decisive role in the establishment of all other institutions in Turkey and in the drawing of all 
Turkish constitutions.
223
 All these institutions which were established by the military served 
to create a new nation with a European identity.  
Nevertheless, this identity which was imposed on the Turkish society has been 
insecure due to the factors mentioned earlier. Internal and external developments dating back 
as far as 1940s enhanced the insecurity of Turkey‘s Kemalist identity. As Turkey‘s Western 
identity became less secure, TSK‘s influence in Turkish politics became more and more 
evident. National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Teşkilatı, MGK), which was created after 
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the 1960 coup to offer information to the government was empowered to recommend 
measures in the 1970s. Following the 1980-83 intervention, the government was to give 
priority to whatever the MGK advised. Finally, in 1997 the institution has been instrumental 
in changing a government. 
However, the decision of the EU in 1999 to recognize Turkey as an official candidate 
which was followed by another positive decision in 2002 which suggested to open 
negotiations with the country ‗without delay‘ in case of Ankara‘s successful fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen political criteria enhanced the security of Turkey‘s Western identity. As a result, 
the Turkish military became less enthusiastic for interfering in Turkish politics and more 
willing to leave politics to civilians. They tolerated the rise of the AKP which has Islamic 
roots, and more importantly backed the EU-related reforms. Considering the previous powers 
of the military in Turkey, none of these reforms could be launched without their support. The 
seventh reform package which was passed from the Turkish parliament in 2003 openly aimed 
to limit the role of the military through reforms of the MGK.  
These reforms firstly emphasized that the MGK is only a consultative body. More 
importantly, the number of civilians in the council was increased and for the first time a 
civilian was elected as the secretary general of the MGK. Other reforms included the removal 
of military representatives from the boards of the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek 
Öğretim Kurumu, YÖK) and the Radio and Television High Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst 
Kurulu, RTÜK) and the abolition of the military courts. In addition, civilian governments are 
now given the authority to inspect military accounts. The Financial Times declared all these 
developments as nothing less than a ‗quiet revolution‘.224 A good question to ask at this point 
is why the Turkish military complied with the EU‘s demands even if doing so reduced its 
influence and power.    
First of all, one has to bear in mind that the Turkish military‘s aim has traditionally 
been transforming Turkey into a truly Western state and society. In this regards, although 
they intervened in politics several times, they never actually questioned democracy itself. 
Nevertheless, due to Turkey‘s insecure ‗Western‘ identity, the army found some deep-rooted 
issues such as Islamism, Kurdish separatism and Communism too critical to be left to 
civilians. This perception led to several interventions in 1960, 1973, 1980 and 1997. 
However, the military have always set their interventions a self-imposed deadline and all 
                                                          
224
 Financial Times, ‘A quiet revolution: Less power for Turkey's army is a triumph for the EU’, July 31st 2003. 
 103 
 
military interventions were followed by a swift return to civilian rule.  
In addition, the revival of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in the 1990s despite 
the military interventions forced the military to re-assess its success in securing Turkey‗s 
Western identity. This loss of self-confidence led to an identity problem in the Turkish 
military which paved the way for a search of a new identity and role as well as a change in 
their perception of the EU. In other words, the Turkish army have finally understood that its 
interference to politics fell short of securing Turkey‘s Western identity.225 As a result, the 
military became less persistent in regards to conserving its ideology in its present form and 
more enthusiastic to transform it in order to suit EU‘s new identity that emerged after the end 
of Cold War. This change of mind was expressed by General Özkök in one of his interviews 
where he said;  
‗The Turkish military is saddled with new and difficult tasks as a result of the 
reactionary and separatist movements. However new democratic values and changing 
concepts of sovereignty make it necessary that we come up with new ideas and doctrines. The 
Kemalist way of thought, which is free from dogmas and based on reason and science, can 
and should be reinterpreted to be able to guide light for the future generations too‘. 226 
In another interview, Özkök said ‗from now on, we should have greater trust in the 
people. We should have a new vision and our officers should have stronger intellectual 
capabilities‘.227  
The EU also played an important role, particularly after 1999, in shifting the power 
relations between different institutional actors. The context provided by Turkey‘s candidacy 
empowered civilian and non-dominant actors by altering the normative understandings of 
dominant actors, providing an external reference point for non-dominant actors and removing 
the restrictions on the freedom of speech. As a result, Turkish media and intellectual circles 
started to question the power and role of the Turkish military in domestic politics, which used 
to be a taboo. For example, in 2003 an academic drew attention to the absence of legislative 
oversight of policy concerning Northern Iraq. During 2004 and 2005, there were interesting 
discussions brought about by the revelation in the Turkish daily Hürriyet. The newspaper 
noted that the TSK was planning to update its basic security assessment without taking the 
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opinion of the parliament. Many articles in Hürriyet and other newspapers questioned the 
military‘s dominant role in drafting such an important document and argued that this was 
incompatible with European norms.
228
  
All these developments triggered change and the military and civilian authorities in 
the country started to bargain over alternative arrangements. As Fearon and Wendt stated, the 
logic of consequentiality (LOC) which refers to actors‘ expectations in terms of material 
interests and the logic of appropriateness (LOA) which refers to their anticipations in terms of 
ideational interests such as reliability and legitimacy coexist and indeed interact with each 
other during the bargaining process.
229
 In this context, actors do not only act tactically with 
the intention of realizing their material interests. As societal actors, they interact within a 
normative context. For this reason, they adjust their strategies to these external standards of 
legitimacy because non-compliance is likely to lead to certain social costs.
230
 
The bargaining process between the Turkish government and the military also took 
place within a normative context. Turkish military officials have been the prime Westernizers 
of Turkey and expressed their commitment to further Westernization through joining the EU 
and consolidating the democracy on several previous occasions. In this context, they had to 
consider the social cost of blocking the EU-related reforms and prioritize their ideational 
interests, namely military‘s legitimacy and credibility in the Turkish society. By accepting the 
reforms, which reduced its own powers, the military aimed to avoid ‗blame‘ for blocking 
further democratization in Turkey and its further integration with the EU. In other words, its 
traditional role in the Westernization of Turkey and its strong prestige among the Turkish 
public compelled the Turkish military to support the EU-related reforms. 
The role played by Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök and Prime Minister Erdoğan 
in this process is also worth mentioning. Özkök believed that the armed forces should stay 
out of day-to-day politics. On security matters, he favoured the resolution of conflicts 
between the military and civilian authorities by persuasion and accommodation, always on 
the awareness that the democratically-elected politicians should have the final say. In 
addition, he acknowledged that devout people can pursue secular politics. In an interview 
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with Hürriyet he said; ‘I respect people‘s religious beliefs and preferences as long as they are 
not carried to the public realm as a symbol of political Islam‘.231 On the other hand, Erdoğan 
tried to avoid situations where the military might feel responsible to challenge the 
government. For instance, he chose not to press certain issues such as the rights of religious 
Imam-Hatip (IHL, religious) schools‘ graduates. 
This new understanding on both sides and the positive incentives from the EU led to a 
consensus between the military and civilian authorities in the country. As mentioned earlier, 
the military tolerated the rise of the AKP and supported the launching of democratizing 
reforms even if doing so reduced its power significantly. Nonetheless, this consensus is 
unfortunately very fragile and is dependent on the progress in Turkey‘s accession talks with 
the EU. Without the EU prospect, the military once again will see itself as responsible to 
maintain the integrity and secure a Western identity of an even more fragmented nation 
thanks to the EU-related reforms.  
Since 2005 the EU started to pursue an ambivalent position towards Turkey‘s 
membership. In addition to its ambivalence towards full membership, the union is also not 
fully straightforward in its interaction with Ankara regarding the civil-military relations. In 
other words, Brussels has neither clearly expressed what Ankara should do to bring Turkish 
arrangements closer to European norms and practices nor provided constructive guidance in 
that process. The EU‘s ambivalence towards the question of Turkey‘s full membership and its 
complex interaction with Ankara regarding civil-military relations prevented the completion 
of TSK‘s identity transformation/Europeanization. This was manifested by the appointment 
of General Büyükanıt who is known for his strong commitment to secularism and his hard-
line stance in foreign policy issues to replace General Özkök who approved EU-related 
reforms and initiated the transformation of civil-military relations in Turkey. General  
Büyükanıt expressed military‘s suspicions towards the West by asserting that some members 
of EU and NATO have intentionally allowed the PKK acting against Turkey, to base and run 
operations in their own territories.
232
 Moreover, before the presidential election in 2007, with 
the encouragement of other secularist establishments including the main opposition CHP, the 
Turkish military issued a statement in its official website which included the following 
sentences;  
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‗The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on 
arguments over secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent 
situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those 
arguments, and absolute defender of secularism… The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their 
sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable 
characteristics of the Republic of Turkey‘233 
This statement was regarded by many as an electronic-coup and as a bullet fired at 
democracy in Turkey by Prime Minister Erdoğan. Nevertheless, the so-called e-coup only 
empowered the AKP in the early parliamentary elections in which many Turks used their 
vote to show their disapproval of any military intervention. The election results significantly 
damaged the self-confidence of the military which has traditionally been regarded as the most 
trusted institution in the country despite the previous takeovers. The e-coup also damaged the 
relations between the Turkish military and the EU. It confirmed the perception of many 
European politicians and journalists that armed forces in Turkey are like a ‗state within a 
state‘ for all practical purposes and empowered those who are against Turkish membership. 
In this context, the EU enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn warned the Turkish army not to 
interfere in politics following the e-coup and debates over presidential elections by saying 
‗this is a clear test case whether the Turkish armed forces respect democratic secularization 
and democratic values‘.234  
In brief, the revival of domestic challenges to Turkey‘s integrity and Western identity 
after the 1980s as well as the emergence of EU accession as a concrete possibility after 1999 
contributed greatly to the identity transformation of the Turkish military. However, the EU‘s 
ambivalence towards Turkey after 2005 prevented the completion of this transformation. This 
injured the consensus between the military and the civilians, brought instability and in this 
way reduced the speed of domestic political change. These internal developments 
complicated the definition of Turkey‘s national interests and led to an ambivalent and so far 
fruitless policy towards the aim of achieving full EU membership in the foreseeable future 
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THE POSITIONS OF DIVERSE POLITICAL CAMPS IN THE EU & 
TURKEY:  
This section will examine the perceptions and positions of diverse political camps in 
both Europe and Turkey regarding the Turkish accession to the EU. Since social identities are 
mutual constructions, an interactive analysis will be helpful to better understand the identity 
issue in Turkey and its implications for the country‘s political development and foreign 
policy towards the EU. Both Turkey‘s and the EU‘s identity are highly debated among 
diverse political and social camps. In this context, this section aims to demonstrate how the 
interaction of two contested identities leads to ambivalence in both side‘s policies towards 
each other and prevents them from developing further cooperation and integration. The first 
part of this section will focus on the contestation between diverse political camps within the 
EU in regards to European identity and how this contestation brings an ambivalent policy 
towards Turkey. The second part will firstly demonstrate how Turkey‘s insecure identity 
impedes the development of cooperation between its diverse political camps even when they 
have common interests such as EU membership. Subsequently, it will analyze how the EU‘s 
decisions regarding Turkey‘s membership are interpreted by these camps, how they influence 
the security of their identity and eventually how they affect the formulation of Turkish 
foreign policy. 
A) THE POSITIONS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL PARTIES:  
The European public disfavour in regards to Turkey‘s accession influences the 
perceptions of the European political elite who are still busy constructing the EU‘s identity. 
The EU is already experiencing problems in regards to its identity and legitimacy which is 
well reflected with its democratic deficit and European public disinterest for further 
integration. Its identity which entails both inclusive and exclusive characteristics is still under 
construction and contested between diverse camps. On one hand, we have those who 
highlight the exclusive aspects of EU identity based on geography and culture. On the other 
hand, we have those who highlight the inclusive aspects of EU identity based on democracy, 
liberty and human rights. In recent years, this contestation of the EU‘s identity became even 
more intense which was reflected by the harsh debates about whether to include a reference 
to Christianity in the European Constitution or not. 
The dualistic and contested nature of the EU‘s identity brought competing discourses 
on Turkey‗s accession. The emergence of Turkey‘s EU entry as a concrete possibility after 
the radical domestic transformation of the country since 1999 has triggered a hard debate in 
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Europe concerning the future of the EU‘s enlargement. A severe division between the 
member states of the EU as well as between different political camps within these states has 
emerged in regards to Turkish membership. While countries like the United Kingdom, Italy 
and Spain have been in favour of Turkey‘s admission, the current governments of France, 
Germany and Austria are leading the camp which proposes a privileged partnership to Turkey 
instead of full membership. Nevertheless, centre-left parties in Germany and France (that is 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Socialist Party (PS) respectively) took a more positive 
approach towards Turkish membership.  
In general, the centre-left political parties who highlight the inclusive aspects of the 
EU identity are more sympathetic towards Turkey‘s accession compared to those on the 
centre-right who highlight the exclusive aspects of the EU identity. For example, the centre-
right political parties of Turkey are denied membership of the European People‘s Party which 
is made up of Christian Democrat and conservative parties in EU countries and several times 
declared that Turkey does not belong in the European project. On the other hand, the leftist 
parties in the country have been accepted as associate members of the Party of European 
Socialists which is made up of social democrat parties in the EU. European leftist parties‘ 
sympathy towards Turkish membership is related to their social-democrat identity and 
ideology which supports a secular and socially progressive policy, immigration and multi-
culturalism and a foreign policy which promotes democracy,  protection of human rights and 
where possible effective multilateralism. 
In this context, these parties generally emphasize the importance of Turkey‘s 
accession for Europe‘s security and position in the international arena. In their view, the EU 
needs Turkey in order to be a true global player in international politics. Since they highlight 
the inclusive aspects of EU identity they represent Turkey as different only in terms of its 
socio-economic and political development level. As a result, they see Turkey as eligible for 
EU membership as long as it achieves a successful transition towards becoming more 
democratic and liberal. Moreover, they argue that Turkey‘s accession will eliminate the wide-
spread misperception of the EU as a ‗Christian club‘, will consolidate the EU‘s identity as a 
union of like-minded democracies and will contribute to the prevention of a potential clash of 
civilizations in the future. They particularly see the transformation of Turkish Islamists as an 
opportunity to spread Western-values among the Islamic world. With its conservative outlook 
and commitment to democracy and a liberal economy, the AKP is seen as an ideal role-model 
for democratization of the Middle East.  
 Regarding Turkey‘s accession former Foreign Minister of Germany from SPD 
 109 
 
Joschka Fischer said;  
‗To modernize an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would almost 
be a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror, [because it] would provide real proof that 
Islam and modernity, Islam and the rule of law... [And] this great cultural tradition and 
human rights are after all compatible‘235 
Former British Prime Minister Blair also expressed the importance of Turkey‘s 
accession for the identity of Europe by saying; 
‗the accession of Turkey would be proof that Europe is "committed not just in word 
but in deed to a Europe of diverse races, cultures, and religions all bound together by 
common rules and a sense of human solidarity and mutual respect‘236 
On the other hand, centre-right parties‘ such as the German Christian Democrats 
(CDU) led by Angela Merkel and the French Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) led by 
Nicolas Sarkozy opposes Turkey‘s full membership and proposes privileged partnership with 
Turkey instead. Their opposition towards Turkey‗s membership can be explained by two 
important factors. First of all, strong public reactions against Turkey‘s accession have made 
the enlargement an important issue for domestic power struggles in these countries. Mr 
Sarkozy made his opposition to Turkey‘s EU entry a central element of his presidential 
campaign. Right after becoming the official candidate of the UMP he made his strongest 
statement against Turkey‘s EU entry by saying;  
‗I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a 
vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place inside 
the European Union... Enlarging Europe with no limit risks destroying European political 
union, and that I do not accept‘.237 
Secondly, these parties are holding either a Christian Democrat or conservative 
identity. The supporters of these ideologies are often conservative on cultural, social and 
moral issues and generally oppose secularization. For this reason, centre-right parties in 
Europe emphasize the exclusive aspects of EU‘s identity, and are more likely to consider it as 
a ‗civilisational project‘ in which Christianity plays a unifying role. In this context, European 
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parties of the right perceive Turkey as a threat to the collective identity of the union as it 
subverts the boundaries of European identity and blurs the clear distinction between self and 
other. In other words, the possibility of Turkish entry into the EU weakens the right camp‘s 
claim to a distinct European identity based on a common cultural heritage.
238
 
As David Campbell suggested, foreign policy can sometimes be pursued as a 
boundary-producing practice which makes exclusion and tells people what to fear. In this 
context, Turkey‘s differences are represented within discourses of fear and danger. Most 
discussions regarding Turkey‘s accession to the EU include statements of the need to defend 
Europe. For example, former French President Giscard d‘Estaing expressed his opposition to 
Turkey‘s membership on the grounds that she is not a European country and argued that her 
accession will be the end of Europe.
239
 In a similar manner, in one of his interviews current 
President Sarkozy stated; ‗Turkey is an Asian state which has less European values then 
Lebanon and Israel…Therefore its membership would affect future enlargement plans and 
would bring membership demands from such countries or even from Morocco‘.240  
 In the context of this contestation over its collective identity, the EU pursues an 
ambivalent policy towards Turkey. Strong public support in Turkey for EU membership also 
contributed to this ambivalence by generating an assumption among the European political 
elite that Turkey cannot turn its back to the EU and will stay in the European sphere of 
influence regardless of the outcome of the talks. In this context, the eligibility of Turkey for 
joining the bloc is still openly debated both among the European elite and the public despite 
the fact that it was confirmed several times by the European Commission. It is no wonder that 
Turkey, although recognised as a candidate in 1999 and started accession talks in 2005, is 
still generally seen as being a long way far from full membership 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
238
  Rumelili, B. (2004), ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of 
Differentiation’, Review of International Studies, Volume 30, pp.27-47 
239
  BBC News, 8th November 2002, ‘Turkey Entry Would Destry EU’, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2420697.stm, [Accessed on 1 April 2008] 
240
 Turkish Daily News. 26th February 2005, ‘Sarkozy’s Formula: Turkey’s EU bid vs. EU Integration’, Available 
at: http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6908, [Accessed on 15 March 2008]  
 111 
 
B) THE POSITIONS OF TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES: 
In a country where national identity is highly contested between diverse 
social/political groups such as Turkey, inclusion or exclusion by the EU strongly influences 
the positions of actors not only through changing their rational means-ends calculations but 
also through influencing the security of their identities. This part will demonstrate how EU‘s 
decisions towards Turkish membership are interpreted by Turkey‘s diverse political parties, 
how these decisions influence the security of their identities and eventually how they affect 
the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. 
Secularist Kemalists, the prime modernizers in Turkey who have been dominant until 
recent years, have traditionally supported institutional links with the West as they strengthen 
the security of their self-ascribed ‗Western‘ identity. During the Cold War, security concerns 
have disguised the identity differences between Turkey and the rest of Europe. In this 
context, Turkey joined Western institutions such as the NATO and the Council of Europe 
without experiencing much questioning of its cultural identity. These institutional links with 
the West enhanced the security of Turkey‘s and Kemalists‘ self-ascribed ‗Western‘ identity 
and brought a determined and stable pro-Western foreign policy at the expense of good 
relations with the Islamic world. For example, Turkey was the first country with a Muslim 
majority which recognized the state of Israel shortly after its declaration of independence in 
1948. Furthermore, Ankara voted against Algerian independence in the United Nations (UN) 
during its anti-colonial war with France in 1955.    
 Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War eliminated the factors which had provided such 
a safe haven for Turkey in Western institutions. In order to secure its ambivalent position 
within the West after the end of Cold War, Ankara applied for EC membership in 1987.  
Nonetheless in an EC emphasising a collective identity based on shared civilisational values, 
Turkey‘s European credentials have been increasingly called into question. Although the EC 
did not directly reject Turkey on the grounds that it is not European, as they responded to 
Morocco‘s application, it expressed a great deal of hesitation to declare the country as a 
candidate.  
The EC‘s ambivalent response intensified the identity debates in Turkey after the end 
of the Cold War which is manifest in the rise of rival claims to national identity, most notably 
through of Islamists. The rise of Islamists destabilized the country since it was perceived by 
the secular authorities, notably the military, as a threat to Turkey‘s Western and secular 
identity. As a result, the military forced the collapse of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi, RP)-led government on 28 February 1997. The so-called ‗post-modern coup‘ 
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undermined democratic rights of Turkish citizens and introduced several security measures 
which repressed assertions of religious and ethnic identity, notably Islamic and Kurdish 
identities, in public space. 
  Rising instability and domestic developments which undermined Turkish democracy 
spoilt the relationship between Turkey and the EU as well. In this context, the European 
Council excluded the country from the list of candidates for EU membership at the end of 
1997. This decision engendered a sense of rejection and humiliation among the secular elite 
and severely weakened the security of their ‗Western‘ identity. Moreover it reduced EU‘s 
credibility in their eyes by reinforcing the perception that Turkey is subject to double 
standards when compared with other candidates in Central and Eastern Europe, because of its 
cultural differences.  
 The official response of the Turkish government was partial suspension of the 
political dialogue with the EU. Foreign minister Cem said that the full EU membership is no 
longer on the agenda of the Turkish state and implied a move from Western-oriented foreign 
policy to a more multi-dimensional approach. In one of his statements he said ―We don't 
intend to stand on the doorstep of the EU waiting to be invited in. Turkey is moving from 
being perceived as a peripheral power to being seen as a central power in Eurasia‖.241   
 In brief, the EU‘s ambivalent response to Turkey‘s application in 1989 decreased the 
security of Turkey‘s Western identity and intensified identity debates in the country by 
empowering rival claims, notably Islamists. The rise of Islamists in the first half of the 1990s 
and the Kemalists‘ response to it in 1997 slowed down Turkey‘s political development and 
spoilt its relationship with the EU. All these developments triggered the transformation of 
secularist (Kemalist) identity in Turkey. Kemalist elites, who were once the traditional 
supporters of the European integration, gradually started to shift to a Euro-sceptic position. 
 Only two years after the crisis of Luxembourg, the EU finally recognized Turkey‘s 
candidacy in the 1999 Helsinki European Council. The institution of EU candidacy with its 
conditions and incentives creates a strong momentum for identity change. Nevertheless, the 
primary impetus for change must come from domestic actors. Therefore, domestic actors 
should be convinced about the EU‘s credibility as well as the appropriateness of its laws, 
norms and practices. The decision to accept Turkey as a candidate in 1999 was mostly a 
symbolic gesture. Despite strengthening Turkey‘s damaged ‗Western‘ identity to a certain 
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extent, it did not eliminate the formal and the effective gap between Turkey and the other 
candidates. While all other candidates had a roadmap for accession and clear indications of 
their future roles in EU institutions, Turkey had neither. For this reason, this decision neither 
fully restored EU‘s damaged credibility in Turkey nor convinced the country‘s political elite, 
notably Kemalists, of the appropriateness of some aspects of ‗Europeanization‘, particularly 
with reference to minority rights.  
In this context, the weak and unstable coalition government which was composed of 
secularist (Kemalist) Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), centre-right 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi ANAP) and extreme-right Nationalist Movement Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) pursued a hesitant policy towards Europeanizing Turkey‘s 
domestic and foreign policies. DSP was ambivalent about the appropriateness of EU‘s 
conditions for opening the accession talks. Since the EU‘s decision to exclude Turkey from 
the list of candidates in 1997, they have been emphasizing Turkey‘s exceptionality in Europe 
in terms of its national security concerns and argued that EU-related reforms might 
undermine the secular identity of Turkey and its territorial unity. MHP as a far right party 
was strongly against implementing the EU-related reforms which would enhance the rights of 
minorities, notably Kurds, as well. The party traditionally supported developing closer ties 
with the Turkic states in Caucasus and Central Asia instead. ANAP which is a centre-right 
party supporting a liberal economic system was the most pro-European party yet remained 
the smaller partner within this coalition.  
 In this context, debates on Europeanization were made within the discourses of fear 
and the dangers of disintegration and religious fundamentalism. As a result, Turkey showed a 
slow performance in terms of implementing EU-related reforms. The first fundamental 
package of reforms which is called the ‗National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis‘ 
(NPAA) came two years after the confirmation of Turkey‘s candidacy. This package 
attempted to make a balance between the EU‘s demands and the unwillingness of the DSP 
and the MHP to implement reforms on the so-called ‗most sensitive issues‘ thus failed to 
show sufficient commitment to the process. This shows how the identity concerns of the 
biggest partners of Turkey‘s coalition government at the time prevented them from pursuing 
a determined policy towards Europeanization  
 Nevertheless, in the beginning of the 2000s, pro-EU circles led by influential business 
groups increased their pressure on the government. This pressure paved the way for the 
declaration of a new harmonization package in 2002. The package included sensitive issues 
such as the abolition of the death penalty, the right to broadcast and teach in languages other 
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than Turkish, and recognition of religious minority‘s property rights. Despite bringing 
significant change, the weak coalition government of DSP-ANAP-MHP lacked the cohesion 
and determination to adopt and implement political reforms required to fulfil EU‘s 
Copenhagen criteria. The role of the military, the cultural rights of minorities and the 
performance of the economy remained as the key areas where significant progress is required. 
In addition to these areas, the Cyprus Problem was another unofficial barrier on Turkey‘s 
further integration with the EU. For this reason, the European Council which met in 
Copenhagen on December 2002 did not give a clear date of opening accession talks with 
Turkey and declared that ―the EU would open negotiations with Turkey 'without delay' if the 
European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the 
Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria‖.242 
 This decision provided strong incentives for the Europeanization of Turkey‘s 
domestic and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the victory of the AKP in 2002 elections initially 
caused anxiety both in the EU and Turkey. After all, the AKP was founded by a reformist 
faction within the former Islamists Virtue Party (FP. Fazilet Partisi). Many of its key 
members come from the Milli Görüş (National Vision) movement which was against further 
rapprochement with Europe, consider the EU as a Zionist and Catholic project for the 
assimilation and de-Islamization of Turkey and called for closer co-operation with Muslim 
countries.
243
 Before the elections mainstream secular newspaper Hürriyet announced ‗Turkey 
obliged to say goodbye to the EU if the AKP comes to power‘.244 And after the elections the 
British daily the Independent wrote ‗Turkey‘s voters have delivered the ―wrong‖ result‘.245 
However, the AKP surprisingly committed itself to the EU process and started an ambitious 
reform program as soon as it came to power. Taking advantage of establishing Turkey‘s first 
single-party government in more than a decade, the AKP emerged as the champion of the EU 
process in the country.   
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As mentioned in chapter two, the transformation of political Islam in Turkey was 
initially triggered by punishment from the secular authorities. Islamist parties were banned 
from politics or were forced to leave office many times. Over time, they drew a valuable 
lesson from these experiences particularly from the so-called ‗post-modern coup‘ in 1997, 
and realized that they can only survive in a European-style democracy. Nonetheless, this 
transformation cannot be understood fully with an instrumental logic. Ever since Turkey 
officially became a candidate for EU membership in 1999, the West and the process of 
Westernization attained new dimensions. Europeanization involves more political and 
economic transformation than cultural change. More specifically, it requires the consolidation 
of Turkish democracy on the basis of European norms. Turkish Islamists have realized this 
reality by transforming their position towards the EU and supporting Turkey‘s full 
membership. They have understood that Europeanization meant a democratic, plural and 
open society emancipating their identity from the limits of Kemalism.  
When providing a justification for their EU preference, the AKP leaders used moral 
arguments and made reference to rights, which can be regarded just by all actors irrespective 
of their cultural identity. In an interview with Zaman, both Erdoğan and Arınç have stated 
their pro-EU ideas while declaring that they had ‗internalized democracy‘246 and ‗had no 
intention of founding an Islamic state‘.247 Nevertheless, the AKP leaders have avoided using 
the term ‗Westernization‘ but instead spoke of the commonality between Turkey and the EU 
in terms of universal values that are cherished by both when they argued in favour of Turkish 
membership of the Union.
248
 Similarly, the AKP leadership hardly spoke of Turkey as a 
member of the ‗European family‘.249  
The AKP‘s position towards the EU membership also reflected the changing demands 
of Turkey‘s Islamic social groups who had in the past opposed globalization and Turkey‘s 
integration with the West. Since the mid-1990s, these social groups, such as the so-called 
‗Anatolian bourgeoisie‘ and the Gülen movement, became increasingly exposed to and 
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demand participation in relations with the outside world, in the form of educational and 
business opportunities. Unlike the increasingly nationalist attitudes of the secularist 
establishment, the Anatolian bourgeoisie began to regard globalization as a process which 
expands their opportunities. The Gülen movement which opened educational institutions 
abroad has also constructed a pro-globalization and pro-Western attitude due to its interaction 
with international opportunity structures and its tolerant normative framework which 
emphasizes religious tolerance and inter-faith dialogue.
250
 Considering all these factors, the 
transformation of Turkish Islamists has been a discursive as well as a materialistic process. 
Indeed these two processes are not separable from each other.
251
 Social learning is not merely 
adapting to constraints, it is a long process whereby actors begin to redefine their self-
understanding and alter their preferences. 
 Adopting a pro-EU position enhanced the security of the Islamists‘ new identity 
which mingles democratic principles, economic liberalism and social conservatism. As a 
result, they managed to attain the support of Turkish liberals, civil society and big business 
groups and establish a new and powerful pro-EU bloc that cut across the secular-Islamist 
divide in Turkey. The enhancement in the security of the AKP‘s identity facilitated its 
internalization of European norms, rules and practices. In this context, the leaders of the AKP 
started to see the Copenhagen criteria as a means to transform Turkey‘s political and 
economic structure. They argue that Turkey should launch and implement all the reforms 
demanded by the EU even if the country will never join the club. In this regards, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan said ‗if the EU does not want us, then we'll replace the Copenhagen criteria 
with the 'Ankara criteria' and proceed along our own path‘.252 In line with this new 
understanding, 2003 and 2004 witnessed the highest intensity of EU-related reforms 
including another major constitutional reform, five additional legislative packages, a new 
penal code and several other laws and regulations. Moreover, the AKP adopted a conciliatory 
approach in Cyprus and encouraged Turkish Cypriots to approve the UN‘s re-unification plan 
in 2003.  
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As a result of all these developments, the European Commission confirmed that 
Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and the European Council which met in 
2004 decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. This decision 
was very much celebrated in Turkey and boosted the security of AKP‗s new identity. 
Mainstream paper Hürriyet declared ‗Dream of Turkey came true‘.253 Prime Minister 
Erdoğan was greeted at Istanbul Airport like a hero where he said ‗the target was full 
membership, and we took it. As a nation we achieved a silent revolution‘.254 The aim of the 
negotiations was clearly defined by the EU as full membership, despite Austrian efforts to 
include ‗privileged partnership‘ as an alternative.  
Nevertheless, the long-lasting quarrels between the EU members in the preparation of 
the negotiation framework and the fact that negotiations are kept open-ended in which 
membership is not guaranteed failed to restore the EU‘s credibility in the eyes of Kemalists. 
Moreover, the secular camp was very much worried that the AKP can take advantage of the 
EU-related reforms in order to implement a ‗hidden agenda‘ which would undermine 
secularism in Turkey. In other words, they were concerned about a ‗creeping Islamization‘ 
through the strategic use of the Europeanization process. The AKP leadership‘s avoidance of 
making references to Westernization and its reliance on moral arguments and rights for 
justifying its EU preference further strengthens secularists‘ suspicions. As mentioned in 
chapter one, ethical-political arguments which indicate common cultural values have been 
more effective in mobilizing support for enlargement as revealed by the EU‘s prioritization of 
the CEECs over Turkey in its enlargement policy. In this context, the CHP started to question 
the intentions of the EU as well as its increasing influence on Turkish domestic politics. They 
insisted that if full membership will not be achieved, EU-related reforms guaranteeing 
individual and minority rights will create a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism and 
separatist terrorism. The CHP‘s leader Deniz Baykal went even further and suggested the 
suspension of the negotiations and said, ‗the EU members are not determined to accept 
Turkey. The EU is unfair towards us. Open-ended negotiations are not acceptable. At this 
point we suggest the suspension of the talks‘.255   
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Developments in Europe after 2005 strengthened the CHP‘s concerns while 
weakening the AKP‘s security and confidence. Turkey‘s possible entry to the EU has become 
a subject of many EU countries‘ domestic politics. France went even further and decided to 
hold a referendum on Turkey‘s EU entry and criminalized the denial of the ‗Armenian 
genocide‘. Centre-right parties who support a privileged partnership for Turkey instead of 
membership came to power in the most influential members of the EU i.e. France and 
Germany. The results of the referenda on the EU Constitution especially the ‗No‘ votes in 
France and the Netherlands have been harmful to Turkey's EU bid as well. In this context, the 
EU Commission began to emphasize the open-ended nature of the talks, permanent 
derogations and EU‘s absorption capacity. Moreover, Turkey was told to recognize the Greek 
Cypriot government and open its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels.  
 All these developments damaged AKP government‘s self-confidence and the EU‗s 
credibility in their eyes. Moreover, they empowered those in Turkey who opposed the 
implementation of the democratic reforms. In this context, the AKP slowed down the reform 
process and rejected opening Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and vessels 
before the EU ends its isolation on Turkish Cypriots who approved the EU-backed 
unification plan in 2003. In response, the EU leaders who met on December 2006 agreed to 
freeze negotiations with Turkey in eight of the thirty five chapters and delay completing any 
chapter before Turkey opens its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and aircrafts. During the 
negotiations some countries like Germany and France supported freezing as many as 
seventeen chapters, while the UK insisted on freezing three chapters only. This caused 
disillusionment in Turkey but Turkish chief negotiator Mr Ali Babacan said;  
‘there would be no progress on the ports and airports issue until the European Union 
honoured a 2004 decision to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
community…Nevertheless, we will be announcing a programme by which we will be 
continuing our reforms and this programme will cover all the 35 chapters, even those 
chapters which will not be opened because of issues…relating to Cyprus‘.256 
This outcome has not been considered as a ‗train crash‘ in EU-Turkey relations. It 
certainly slowed down the process yet both sides tried not to alienate the other. For instance, 
when Turkey failed to meet its commitments for implementing the Ankara Protocol, the EU 
had the option of breaking the negotiations as a whole and offering an alternative to 
membership. Yet they preferred to freeze only eight chapters. Furthermore, after three 
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months from the partial freeze, the EU has opened two new chapters on enterprise and 
industrial regulations with Turkey. Similarly AKP‘s decision to continue the reforms despite 
the partial freeze reveals their commitment to the process.  
Nevertheless, in 2007 French President Nicolas Sarkozy managed to block the 
opening of talks in the vital area of economic and monetary policy although the chapters on 
statistics and financial control have been opened. This decision was naturally condemned by 
the Turkish government however Foreign minister Ali Babacan stated ‗whatever they say, we 
will continue our path. For us the important thing is that the negotiation process with Europe 
remains on track‘.257  
However, due to the ambivalent attitude of the EU, Turkey entered into a period of 
instability over the presidential elections in 2007. On 14
 
April 2007, two days before the start 
of the nominations announcement for the presidential elections, over 300,000 protesters 
marched in the centre of Ankara chanting slogans such as 'Turkey is secular, and it will 
remain secular', and 'We do not want an Imam for President' to protest against the possibility 
of Prime Minister Erdoğan or another member of the AKP standing in the presidential 
elections. This protest was followed by six other massive rallies in various Turkish cities with 
the participation of millions of people.  
The armed forces also became involved in the elections. General Yaşar Büyükanıt, 
then Chief of the Turkish General Staff, said that the new president should be loyal to 
republic principles not only by words but also by heart on 12 April 2007. Moreover, 27 April 
2007, the Turkish Armed Forces issued a statement of its interests. The European Union has 
warned Turkish military not to interfere in politics. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn 
said: 
‘This is a clear test case whether the Turkish armed forces respect democratic 
secularization and democratic values... The timing is rather surprising and strange. It's 
important that the military respects also the rules of the democratic game and its own 
role in that democratic game.‘258 
The first round of voting took place on 27 April 2007, which resulted in the victory of 
Abdullah Gül, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the official candidate of the AKP. 
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However, the opposition party CHP filed a claim to the Supreme Court, seeking a declaration 
of nullity in relation to the first round of voting. The constitutional court ruled in favour of 
the CHP and declared the first round annulled. On 9 May 2007, the presidential elections 
were postponed due to the lack of a candidate after the pullout of Abdullah Gül. The 
following day, Tayyip Erdoğan called for an early general election. In the elections, AKP 
achieved a landslide victory by getting 46.6 percent of the vote. Moreover the AKP‘s 
candidate Abdullah Gül was eventually elected President on 28 August 2007. 
Nonetheless the secularist camp did not give up in its struggle against the AKP. On 14 
March 2008, the senior prosecutor Abrurrahman Yalçınkaya has asked Turkey‘s 
constitutional court to ban the AKP and introduce a ban on 70 officials of the party (including 
PM Erdoğan and President Gül) by arguing that it has become ‗a centre for anti-secular 
activities‘. The AKP responded to secularists by using the Ergenekon affair, which 
investigates claims regarding the existence of a terrorist group called Ergenekon within the 
state and military structure, to intimidate its opponents. 86 suspects belonging to Turkey‘s 
secular elite, including retired army officers, anti-government journalists and intellectuals 
were arrested by the police and were blamed with various crimes including ―membership in 
an armed terrorist group,‖ ―aiding and abetting an armed terrorist organization,‖ ―attempting 
to destroy the government of the Republic of Turkey or to block it from performing its 
duties,‖ and other similar crimes.259   
In this context, Ankara has lost its reformist enthusiasm that amazed the Europeans in 
the years between 2002 and 2005. EU officials have called on Turkey to return to the path of 
vigorous reforms, but so far there have been little more than promises from AKP that new 
reform projects will be put on the agenda soon. Moreover, work on several reform bills has 
been held up by bitter arguments between government and opposition deputies in the Turkish 
parliament (TBMM). Under these circumstances, the chances for the Turkish government to 
pass key legislation to push its EU bid forward and make the country ready for full 
membership in the near future have become increasingly slimmer. 
All these developments show that EU decisions strongly influence Turkey‘s domestic 
transformation through affecting the security of domestic actors‘ identities. Cooperative 
decisions from the EU accelerate the reform process through securing the national identity, 
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strengthening the reform-minded segments and contributing to the emergence of a consensus 
between diverse political camps. On the other hand, uncooperative decisions and messages 
from the EU revitalizes doubts and fears that trigger the rise of nationalism and Euro-
scepticism and slows down or reverses the reforms. For example, positive messages from the 
EU after 1999 empowered reformists in Turkey and led to emergence of a social cohesion 
between the country‘s diverse political camps, as well as between civilian and military 
authorities between 2002 and 2005. Nevertheless, the EU‘s ambivalence and its emphasis on 
conditions and ‗negative incentives‘ after 2005, decreased the security of AKP‘s pro-
European and democratic identity and makes its future policies less predictable. They also 
empowered the opponents of democratic reforms and prevented the completion of the 
Europeanization of their identity. All these factors, enhanced the polarization between diverse 
camps in the country, brought instability, reduced the speed of domestic political change and 
complicated the definition of Turkey‘s national interests. And this led to an ambivalent and 
so far fruitless policy towards the aim of achieving full EU membership in the foreseeable 
future.  
 
THE POSITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY & BUSINESS GROUPS: 
The role of civil society in Turkey is another important political issue which influences 
the perceptions of the EU‘s political elite and public in regards to the country‘s full 
membership. For this reason, this section will focus on the relations between the civil society 
and the state in Turkey in the context of identity. It aims to demonstrate how Turkey‘s 
insecure identity impeded the development of a strong and independent civil society in the 
country which will consolidate Turkey‘s democracy and make it a stronger candidate for the 
EU membership. In so doing, it will firstly focus on the state‘s perception of the civil society 
as a potential threat for its own legitimacy. Subsequently, it will examine the influence of the 
EU context on state-society relations in Turkey. In keeping with the theoretical interest in 
how institutions may shape and alter notions of identity and privilege some over others, 
special focus will be on how this process changed mutual perceptions and transformed the 
identities of important civil society organizations, particularly business groups, in the 
country. This transformation has strengthened the standing of civil society organizations on 
the domestic scene and increased their influence in foreign policy decision-making. Finally, 
the focus will shift to the EU‘s ambivalence towards Turkey‘s membership and how this 
situation damaged the cooperation between the Turkish government and civil society for the 
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sake of EU membership goal.  
 Turkish civil society remained very weak until recent years due to Turkey‘s insecure 
national and social identity. Traditionally, a deep mistrust existed between the Turkish state 
and society since the latter has not sufficiently adopted the identity which was imposed on it 
by the former. For this reason, the state did not encourage the development of a civil society. 
In contrast, it attempted to de-politicize the society in order to prevent the rising political and 
identity-related fragmentation and polarization in the country. 
 The Turkish state has particularly perceived interest organizations as a potential threat 
for its own legitimacy and therefore preferred to develop corporate relations with semi-
official organizations. These organizations have functioned under the supervision of the state 
and state regulated and controlled political and economic life through the medium of 
nongovernmental organizations, but always placed itself at the top. In addition, the state 
allocated public resources to the business community on a selective rather than collective 
basis.
260
 The most important criterion of this selection process was identity. In this context, 
the members of the TÜSİAD, the representative of leading secular businessmen, enjoyed 
monopoly on access to state resources. TÜSİAD members benefited greatly from their 
clientelistic links with the state. Moreover, since the military has been an important element 
of the state structure many business groups were dependent on military contracts for 
survival.
261
 In this context, they had prioritized stability and economic concerns and distanced 
themselves from other political issues. 
However neo-liberal globalization and the establishment of closer ties between 
Turkey and the EU especially after the Customs Union, the dependence of business groups on 
state resources have diminished. Especially the members of TÜSİAD have become very 
much integrated into the global economy and in particular the EU market. Moreover, Turkish 
business organizations have joined pan-European business associations after Turkey‘s 
application to join the EU. TÜSİAD  and Turkish Confederation of Employer‘s Associations 
(TİSK) joined the Union of Industrial and Employer‘s Confederation of Europe (UNICE)262 
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as full members while The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 
(TOBB) has elevated its position within Eurochambers.
263
 Sector-specific associations such 
as ITKIB (Istanbul Association of Textile Exporters) and IMMIB (Turkish Association of 
Metal producers) have also integrated themselves in EU-wide organizations by joining 
Euratex and Eurofer respectively.  
This interaction enabled Turkish business groups to establish closer ties and 
commercial links with their European counterparts independent of the state. Interaction also 
helped them in Europeanizing their internal structures.
264
 In this process, they understood the 
importance of transparency and accountability whilst realizing the limits of the Turkish 
military for maintaining stability in the country. Moreover, they began to see the EU as a 
mechanism which provides the necessary incentives and discipline for good governance 
which is essential not only for political stability in Turkey but also for development, 
economic growth and investment. In this context, Turkey‘s peak business associations have 
transformed themselves from narrowly based interest organizations and began to demand the 
enhancement of democracy in Turkey.
265
 This transformation was achieved through their 
interaction with Europe which altered their values and shaped their interests. Consequently 
the rules of partly democratic system in Turkey neither match the values of business groups 
nor serve their interests anymore.  
In this context, most civil society organizations are not only in favour of EU 
membership but also are pro-actively working towards it. Particularly business groups led by 
the TÜSİAD developed their own pro-active strategies for Turkey‘s democratization and EU 
accession. Firstly, they started to press on the Turkish government for launching the reforms 
necessary for the start of accession talks with the EU. For instance, in 1997 they published a 
report on the democratization of Turkey which incorporated strong criticisms of the state 
ideology. The report also included recommendations on many taboo issues including civil-
military relations, status of the National Security Council (MGK), and freedom of expression, 
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minority rights and the treatment of prisoners.
266
  
The decision of the EU to recognise Turkey as an official candidate in 1999 made the 
country‘s ‗Western‘ identity more secure and in this way significantly changed the state‘s 
perception of the civil society. The EU prospect presented a political discipline which 
increased public mobilization and allowed civil society organizations to increase the pressure 
on the politicians for democratization and good governance. Since 1999 Ankara has made a 
substantial amount of progress regarding the legal environment in which Turkish civil society 
operates. Harmonization packages included important changes in the law of association 
including the easing of the procedures enabling international organizations to open branch 
offices in Turkey, the extension of the scope of activities allowed for student associations and 
the establishment of a shorter examination process of by-laws submitted to concerned 
authorities.
267
 In brief, the EU emerged as a strong external supporter of Turkish civil society 
in its struggle for a more democratic Turkey. 
In this context, TÜSİAD initiated the establishment of a civil society alliance that is 
―The movement for Europe‖ in 2002 in order to urge the government for the realization and 
implementation of EU-linked reforms. Besides, whenever there is a delay or slow-down in 
the reform agenda, business groups did not hesitate to warn the government publicly. Owning 
the key media outlets in Turkey facilitated their monitoring power on the government. Apart 
from their pressure on the Turkish government, business groups began lobbying for Turkish 
membership in EU institutions and governments as well. In this regards, TÜSİAD, TOBB 
and ITKIB opened offices in Brussels and developed good relations with EU institutions.  
  Another important business organization which took its place in the pro-EU coalition 
in Turkey is the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD). This 
organization was founded in 1990 as the representative of the newly-emerged Anatolian 
bourgeoisie and advocates a different model of economic and social model of development 
based on a certain interpretation of Islam. Compared to TÜSİAD its membership includes a 
greater diversity in terms of size and geographic location. MÜSİAD members support the 
AKP government and have obtained influence on the government‘s policy agenda. They 
show an increasing interest in EU accession joining the mainstream expectation in the 
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fulfilment of membership obligations for achievement of national political and economic 
stability.  
Apart from business organizations, several think tanks such as the Economic 
Development Foundation (İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfi, İKV), the Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfi, TESEV) and the ARI 
Movement and several human rights NGOs which work on Turkey-EU relations have 
obtained influence in the debates of public and foreign policy. They influence policy-making 
through publishing reports, organizing conferences and actively lobbying the government to 
implement EU-related reforms. They also do research and publish with respect to foreign 
policy issues. For example, the TESEV actively supports the solution of the Cyprus problem.  
As the above discussion showed, the EU‘s approval of Turkey‘s candidacy reduced 
the insecurity of Turkey‘s identity. By doing so, it improved the relations between state and 
society by reducing mutual threat perceptions and enhanced civil society‘s role in domestic 
and foreign policy-making. Initially, some civil society organizations were worried about the 
long-term objectives of the AKP government due to its Islamic background. However, the 
party‘s strong political will and dedication to implementation of the EU-related reforms 
reduced such concerns and led to cooperation between the AKP government and civil society 
in the first half of the 2000s, cutting across Turkey‘s Islamist/secular divide. As Göksel 
pointed out NGOs which under different conditions might not have supported the party, have 
done so in order to complete the Europeanization process in Turkey.
268
 This cooperation 
enhanced the self-confidence of the AKP, facilitated the adoption and implementation of the 
EU-related reforms and allowed the government to pursue a determined foreign policy.  
Nevertheless, ambivalent messages from the EU after 2005 in regards to Turkish 
membership destabilized the country by intensifying the tension between secularists and 
Islamists as well as between the government and the military. This unstable environment 
reduced the self-confidence of the AKP, slowed down the reform process and eventually 
threatened the cooperation between the AKP and the civil society which cut across the 
Islamist/secularist divide. In an attempt to restore its self-confidence, the AKP government 
has announced its plans to redraw Turkey‘s 1981 constitution in order to give more power to 
the people (which includes direct presidential elections) as well as launching more freedom 
of speech and religion. However, their first step in redrawing the Turkish constitution ordered 
                                                          
268
  Göksel, D. and Güneş, R. (2005), “The Role of the NGO’s in the European Integration Process: The Turkish 
Experience”, South European Society & Politics, Vol.10, No:1, p.63 
 126 
 
an end to the ban on wearing Islamic headscarves in universities. This issue is quite sensitive 
in the country since the secular circles perceive the headscarf as the symbol of political Islam. 
Moreover it is considered as internal by the EU. For this reason, it disappointed the liberal 
circles and civil society who were expecting improvements on more serious human rights 
issues such as freedom of speech and revitalized their anxieties about the AKP‘s real 
intentions and future plans. In brief, the EU‘s attitude towards Turkey after 2005 enhanced 
the insecurity of Turkey‘s identity. Combined with the AKP‘s attempts to repair its self-
confidence among its conservative voter base, this has damaged the cooperation between the 
government and the civil society, destabilized the country and paved the way for an 
ambivalent policy towards the EU. 
 
TURKEY‟S IMAGE IN EUROPE & ITS CULTURAL POLICY:  
Cultural policy is central to the projection of Turkey‘s image abroad. Bearing this in 
mind, this final section aims to demonstrate how Turkey‘s insecure and dual identity prevents 
the formulation of an effective cultural policy and publicity abroad which eventually can 
positively transform Turkey‗s national image in the EU countries. National image expresses 
personalized feelings of what people know and think about a country and is developed by 
representative products, national characteristics, economic and political background, history, 
tradition etc.
269
 In the age of globalization, possessing a positive national image abroad has 
become an important tool of pursuing a successful foreign policy. It does not only enhance a 
state by contributing to the development of tourism and international business links but also 
increases the chances of a state to influence public opinion in other countries. In all 
Anholt/GMI‘s nation brand index reports published so far, Turkey has never managed to 
leave the last rank of the list. This indicates that the country suffers from a serious image 
problem abroad particularly in Europe.
270
 
Public opinion in the EU countries generally opposes Turkish membership for 
different reasons. According to a poll which was conducted by Eurobarometer in autumn 
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2005, 55 percent of the EU population perceive Turkey to be culturally too different to fit in 
the union.
271
 Among all the potential members of the EU, Turkey is the least-supported 
country by the European public. A survey of some 6,000 people in the EU's six largest 
countries revealed greater support for Ukrainian membership (55 percent), which does not 
even have a membership perspective, than for Turkey (45 percent).
272
 The highest opposition 
to Turkish membership is in Austria where 75 percent of 15 to 24 year-olds and 82 percent of 
people over 55 is against.
273
 According to the 2005 Transatlantic Trends (2005) survey, 43 
percent of French and 40 percent of Germans think that Turkey‘s EU membership is a bad 
thing.  
This negative image can be attributed to two key factors. Historically, European 
identity (like any identity) was constructed with the creation of an ‗other‘. According to 
Neuman and Welsh, the Ottoman Empire or ―the Turks‖, constituted Europe‘s main ‗other‘ 
for centuries and consolidated the formation of a collective European identity.
274
 The 
historical prejudice and negative image of Turkey was unfortunately intensified with the 
Turkish labour migration to Western Europe which started in 1960‘s. Most of the Turkish 
immigrants came from the poorest parts of Turkey (mostly Kurdish-speaking Eastern 
Anatolia) where the Westernizing reforms of Atatürk never actually reached. They were 
mostly uneducated, unqualified workers who had traditional Islamic and rural lifestyles. Even 
if this migration had economic benefits for Turkey (since it reduced unemployment, and 
increased foreign currency which has been very important for Turkey‘s balance of payments) 
its unintended consequence was the enhancement of European perceptions that Turkey is 
culturally very different from Europe.
275
 Regarding the image of Turkey in the West, Simon 
Anholt said; 
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―Turkey suffers from an image which has been forged during an earlier and very 
different political era, and which now constantly obstructs its political, economic, cultural 
and social aspirations. In many ways, Turkey‘s brand image today in the West is in the same 
as if Atatürk had never lived.”276 
Since Turkey‘s accession to the EU will necessitate ratification by all member states, 
the country‘s negative image constitutes an important barrier for its aim of joining the bloc. 
Indeed it may even block Turkish membership by itself since reducing perceived cultural 
differences is more difficult than reducing economic and political differences. As İçener 
pointed out this lack of European public support for Turkey‘s admission can entirely change 
the debates on enlargement from focus on full membership to focus on alternative 
relationships such as ‗privileged partnership‘.277 For this reason, as President of the European 
Commission Jose Manuel Barroso said ‗Turkey must win the hearts and the minds of the 
European citizens‘278 in order to secure full membership.   
Despite being difficult, a country can influence how it is perceived by others at least 
to a certain extent. Considering that, countries with far greater image problems such as 
Germany after the Second World War, managed to repair their images, it should be possible 
for Turkey to at least improve its image. Nevertheless, this requires a coordinated cultural 
policy and publicity abroad which has a clear vision of presenting the European and modern 
aspects of Turkey‘s identity. This will provide EU citizens an alternative discourse on Turkey 
and will allow them to think of the country in a new way.
279
 Nevertheless, intense debates 
over Turkey‘s national identity between its diverse social camps leads to an array of 
contradictory and often confusing publicity of the country abroad.  
Fully aware of the weak public support for Turkish membership across the EU, 
influential business groups such as TÜSİAD and TOBB have made increasing efforts to 
contribute to the solving of Turkey‘s image problem. In this context, both organizations 
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opened offices in Brussels and constructed good relations with EU institutions. In addition, 
representatives of TÜSİAD have met government leaders in Germany and France (where 
public support for Turkish membership is quite low) and invited several important European 
journalists to Turkey to demonstrate the Western character of modern Turkish society and 
culture.
280
 TÜSİAD‘s publicity focused on contemporary aspects of Turkish culture including 
contemporary Turkish art, fashion & music. 
Unfortunately, the Turkish government have so far not managed to pursue an 
effective cultural policy to support the efforts of business actors in terms of presenting an 
alternative discourse on Turkey in Europe. The official publicity of the country has so far 
been focusing on the traditional aspects of the Turkish culture. The engineers of Turkey‘s 
official cultural policy have been neglectful in addressing their country's modern era, which 
was strongly influenced by Atatürk and his successors. In order to promote tourism, the 
Turkish state is portraying a very traditional image of Turkey. For example, at the official 
website of Turkey‘s Ministry of Culture and Tourism, there are strong references to ‗minstrel 
and dervish literature‘, ‗folk knowledge‘. ‗Folk dances‘, and ‗costume, traditional arts and 
crafts, folk paintings‘ under the headline of Turkey‘s culture. In addition, cultural events 
organized by Turkish embassies abroad mostly emphasize Turkey‘s traditional culture. For 
example, the Berlin Embassy stages performances of Turkish classical music, opera, ballet as 
well as exhibitions of Turkish painting and sculpture with the goal of conveying an idea of 
the traditional values of Turkey‘s culture.281  
This publicity which puts a strong emphasis on Turkey‘s traditional and ‘Eastern‘ 
characteristics was intensified since the AKP came to power in 2002. After all, the founding 
members of the AKP comes from the ‗National Vision‘ (Milli Görüş) movement which 
rejects Turkey‘s belonging to Europe and argues that geographically, culturally and 
historically Turkey is closer to the Islamic world. Due to the transformation of Islamic 
identity in Turkey, the AKP government represents an alternative image through which 
Turkey embodies a progressive, democratic and Muslim state. In other words, Turkey‘s 
Muslim identity has become increasingly marketable after 11 September 2001, particularly 
under the stewardship of the AKP which is conservative democratic party with Islamist roots 
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and indicates the possibility of a successful marriage between secular state and Islamic 
traditions.
282
    
In this context, the Turkish government and various moderate Islamic groups such as 
Gülen movement started to publicize Turkey‘s Muslim identity in the West. The AKP put a 
strong emphasis on the signal that Turkey‘s membership of the EU would send to Muslim 
communities within the EU members as well as to the Islamic world in general. For example 
Abdullah Gül and Tayyip Erdoğan both argued at the Copenhagen Summit in December 
2002 for the inclusion of Turkey in the EU, based on its Muslim identity.
283
 This was in 
contrast with the publicity of former governments and business groups who had based 
membership application on Turkey‘s supposedly Western identity.  
In brief, while the secular groups highlight the modern aspects of the Turkish identity 
and try to show Turkey‘s similarities with the West in their publicity, the government and 
Islamist groups put a strong emphasis on Turkey‘s traditions and Muslim identity ironically 
to get closer to the West. This duality in the public representation of Turkey causes confusion 
in the minds of Europeans and weakens the efforts to improve Turkey‘s image in the EU. For 
this reason, Turkey needs to pursue an integrated cultural policy and publicity abroad which 
puts emphasis on the modern aspects of its culture and its similarities with Europe while 
providing justification for its differences. This will provide EU citizens an alternative 
discourse on Turkey and will allow them to think of the country in a new way.
284
 EU citizens 
will be able to perceive Turkey culturally less different and more similar only if Turkey 
shows its similarities to them. An alternative discourse is necessary. Otherwise EU citizens 
will not be able to talk, think or perceive Turkey differently. The eastern aspects of Turkish 
identity can contribute to Turkey‘s tourism. However, these aspects are already well-known 
in the West. Hence, Turkey‘s cultural policy and publicity should be able to surprise 
Europeans and provide them an alternative discourse on the country. Nevertheless, in order to 
pursue such an integrated and effective cultural policy and reduce its image problem abroad, 
Turkey first needs to stabilize its self-image/identity at home. 
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CONCLUSION: 
` As the above discussion illustrated, Turkey‘s insecure identity has impeded the 
country‘s political development as well as its further integration with the EU. In order to 
illustrate this argument, this chapter firstly examined the negative influence of Turkey‘s 
insecure identity on the development of a European model of civil-military relations and the 
position of the Turkish military concerning Turkey‘s EU membership. Afterwards, the 
discussion turned to the positions of diverse political parties both in the EU and Turkey. It 
was argued that both Turkey and the EU suffer from contested identities. In this context, I 
tried to demonstrate how the interaction of two contested identities leads to ambivalence in 
both side‘s policies towards each other and prevents them from developing further 
cooperation and integration. Special focus was on the impact of EU decisions regarding 
Turkey‘s accession on the security of diverse actors‘ identities in the country and how this 
affects the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. The chapter is concluded with an 
examination of the role of civil society in Turkey‘s Europeanization process and the 
country‘s cultural policy which is essential for the improvement of its image in Europe.  
As a conclusion, Turkey has been in the waiting room of Europe since 1987. 
Although recognised as a candidate in 1999 and started accession talks in 2005, it is still 
generally seen as being a long way far from full membership. This is the most concrete 
evidence of Turkey‘s unsuccessful foreign policy after the end of Cold War. As this chapter 
showed, this failure is very much related with the country‘s insecure identity. EU‘s 
ambivalent attitude towards Turkey‘s membership further intensified the identity issue in the 
country and deepened the polarization between Turkey‘s diverse camps. This polarization 
threatens Turkey‘s stability, reduces the speed of domestic political change and complicates 
the definition of Turkey‘s national interests. And this brings an ambivalent and so far fruitless 
policy towards the aim of achieving full EU membership in the foreseeable future.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
TURKEY‟S RELATIONS WITH GREECE: 
  
INTRODUCTION:  
 For rationalists the historically poor relations between Greece and Turkey are 
connected to competing economic and security interests but for constructivists the source of 
these disagreements is the perceptions of the ‗other‘ as a threat or a challenge to its own 
identity and their interpretation of the other‘s behaviours accordingly. As Volkan and 
Itzkowitz put it ‗economic, political and military events can be so fixed in the minds of the 
actors that it becomes impossible to explain the reasons of conflict and offer solutions to end 
it without understanding the large group psychology‘.285  
 NATO membership could neither eliminate the mutual feelings of mistrust and threat 
perception between Greece and Turkey nor create a strong collective identity between the 
two allies. In this context, decision-makers in Athens and Ankara perceived NATO as a 
strategic instrument to serve their predetermined national interests, rather than an institutional 
platform to realize their collective security interests. Due to the prevalence of this perception 
in both countries, NATO failed to prevent the two allies from engaging in a war in Cyprus in 
the summer of 1974. 
 Nevertheless, the EU strongly influenced the identity security of both Greece and 
Turkey and in this way contributed to the transformation of domestic structures and social 
identities in both countries. In Turkey the EU prospect significantly reduced the political 
power of the military while consolidating Turkish civil society and democracy. In Greece, the 
EU membership provided economic and political stability since 1981 while strengthening the 
transformation towards a more tolerant and civic-minded society and state. Apart from 
transforming the domestic structures, the EU context also brought a significant change in 
mutual public and elite perceptions in both Greece and Turkey. Changing perceptions of 
threat legitimized and expanded the commercial, social, educational and political cooperation 
between the two neighbours. This intense interaction transformed both countries‘ foreign 
policy towards each other and paved the way for the Greek-Turkish détente after 1999.  
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 This chapter aims to demonstrate how different institutional contexts influenced the 
development of Turkey‘s identity and re-shaped its foreign policy towards Greece and 
Cyprus. As previously, the chapter examines the positions of the military, political parties, 
civil society and business groups as well as societal perceptions. In doing so, the special 
focus will be on the Cyprus problem and the peace talks on the island between 2001 and 
2004. There are two main reasons for the choice of Cyprus as the main focus of this chapter. 
First, it is still the most important issue between Greece and Turkey whose solution is 
essential not only for the normalization of bilateral relations but also for the acceleration of 
Ankara‘s EU accession process. Second, it is a very important issue for Turkish domestic 
politics and constitutes a good case study to demonstrate how identity security influences its 
foreign policy choices.  
 
THE POSITION OF THE MILITARY: 
 As noted in the previous chapter, Turkey‘s highly insecure identity prevented the 
development of a European model of civil-military relations in the country. The Turkish 
military continues to play an active role in the formulation of both public and foreign policy 
of Turkey. Bearing this in mind, this section will examine the Turkish military‘s position in 
regards to relations with Greece and Cyprus. It aims to demonstrate how the military‘s 
position regarding these areas is strongly influenced by the fluctuations in the identity 
security of Turkey within the institutional contexts of NATO and the EU.  
 To better understand the position of the Turkish military on relations with Greece and 
Cyprus, one needs to bear in mind the importance of the Cyprus problem for Turkish 
domestic politics. With the exception of Turkey's participation in the UN force in Korea, the 
Cyprus intervention in 1974 was the first overseas military operation in the history of 
republican Turkey. The operation which ended up with a military victory reinforced the 
prestige of the Turkish military. After the operation, Cyprus was portrayed as a vital point in 
Turkey's perceived axis of enemy neighbours ranging from cold-war Bulgaria to Greece, 
Syria, Iran and the Soviet Union. Through this process of securitisation, the Cyprus question 
served as an instrument for the promotion of the military‘s role in Turkish politics as the 
guardian of Kemalism against alternative claims to national identity, notably ethnic 
nationalism and political Islam. For this reason, the Cyprus problem has been a very 
important dimension on the military‘s foreign policy agenda and the military remained the 
dominant actor in the formulation of Turkey‘s Cyprus policy until recent years.  
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 Nevertheless, the changing security environment after the end of Cold War and the 
EU context paved the way for questioning the military‗s position towards Cyprus. Since then, 
the Cyprus issue became a source of contestation between the civilians and the military in 
Turkish politics. Due to this contestation, Ankara has been pursuing an ambivalent policy 
towards Cyprus since the mid-1990s. To better understand the dynamics of Turkey‗s 
ambivalent Cyprus policy, one has to consider the historical and institutional context of 
NATO and the EU which deeply influences the identity security of the country and in this 
way the course of its civil-military relations. 
 Turkey joined NATO in 1952. NATO membership strongly influenced the identity 
security of Turkey and in this way the course of civil-military relations in the country as well. 
This influence was particularly strong as far as Turkey‘s social identity is concerned since it 
was perceived by the country‘s military elite as the recognition and approval of Turkey‘s 
‗Western‘ identity by the West. In the context of rising identity security, the military allowed 
the liberalization of Turkey‘s political system and the relaxation of the restrictions on the 
control of religious activity in the Turkish society. Nevertheless, NATO is a military alliance 
whose main concern is security rather than promoting democracy or a collective identity. For 
this reason, the dominant actor of NATO, namely the USA, did not hesitate to cooperate with 
the Turkish military, which interfered into politics several times, during the tensest periods of 
the Cold War. Furthermore, as noted in chapter two, the Western alliance created a secret 
group within the Turkish military, similar to other secret armies throughout Europe such as 
Gladio in Italy, charged with waging sabotage campaigns and resistance in the case of a 
Soviet invasion. This group which eventually emerged as the so-called ‗deep-state‘ became 
prone to corruption, interference with domestic politics and society, and were in some cases 
involved with brutality against the Turkish citizens.
286
 All these developments led to the 
strengthening of the reactionary forces in Turkey which paved the way for military coups and 
intensified tension and conflicts in the country.   
 NATO‘s influence on the course of civil-military relations in Greece has been quite 
similar to its influence on Turkey. To some extent, NATO membership served to 
institutionalize the military‘s concentration on national security and away from the matters of 
civil order. Nonetheless, the CIA and the Greek military began to work closely, after 
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Greece‘s accession to NATO in 1952. Hellenic National Intelligence Service (Ethniki 
Ypiresia Pliroforion, EYP) and the Mountain Raider Companies (Lohi Oreinon Katadromon, 
LOK) which became actively involved in the 1967 coup maintained a very close relationship 
with their American counterparts. In addition to preparing for a Soviet invasion, they agreed 
to guard against a left wing coup. The LOK in particular were integrated into the Gladio 
European stay-behind network.
287
 In brief, NATO membership consolidated the position of 
the military in both countries and failed to hinder the breakdown of Greek and Turkish 
democracies in 1967 and 1971 respectively.
288
 In this context, decision-makers in Athens and 
Ankara perceived NATO as a strategic instrument to serve their predetermined national 
interests, rather than an institutional platform to realize their collective security interests. Due 
to the prevalence of this perception in both countries, NATO failed to prevent the two allies 
from engaging in a war in Cyprus in the summer of 1974.  
 This war strongly influenced civil-military relations in both countries. Military defeat 
undermined the credibility of the Greek military and brought about the fall of the Greek junta. 
Moreover it created a perception in the Greek political elite as well as the Greek public that 
NATO is unable to play the role of guarantor between Greece and Turkey.
289
 In this context, 
the European Community (EC) was seen as a stronger system of political solidarity which 
could provide security for Greece especially against its main local rival Turkey. Eventually 
Athens applied for EC membership and became a full member of the community in 1981.  
 As noted in previous chapters, EU membership does not only affect the social identity 
of a state by providing recognition, but also affect its corporate identity by transforming its 
domestic structure and foreign policy behavior. In the EU context, Greece experienced a 
complete devolution of responsibility from the military to the civilians at all levels of 
government. The Greek foreign policy has also started to be Europeanized, which is 
manifested with the abandonment of enosis (Cyprus‘ union with Greece) as a foreign policy 
objective.
290
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On the other hand, military victory in the Turkish side boosted the prestige of the 
Turkish military and legitimized its interference in politics. Due to the military‗s enhanced 
prestige and power after the Cyprus operation in 1974, most Turkish governments perceived 
giving concessions in Cyprus as a risky option in terms of maintaining their position and 
legitimacy. As a result, Ankara remained reluctant to solve the Cyprus problem and perceived 
the status-quo as an advantage during the 1970s and 1980s. According to the popular saying 
of those days in Ankara "the lack of a solution is the solution."   
 Nevertheless, the end of Cold War undermined the security of Turkey‘s Western 
identity and changed its security environment. In a context where NATO became 
increasingly ‗Americanized‘291, Ankara attempted to secure its identity by seeking 
membership of the EU. Taking the Copenhagen criteria into account, the EU could have 
transformed the civil-military relations in Turkey as well as its foreign policy towards Greece 
and Cyprus during the early 1990s. Nevertheless, this transformation did not take place until 
recent years due to the EU‘s hesitancy in declaring Turkey an official candidate. This 
hesitation triggered the rise of nationalism and political Islam in Turkey. The Islamic Welfare 
Party emerged as the biggest party after the general elections on 24 December 1995 and 
established a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, 
DYP). Necmettin Erbakan became the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey and attempted 
to re-orient Turkish foreign policy towards the Islamic world by initiating several new 
institutions including an Islamic common market and an Islamic security community.  
 These developments were perceived by the military as a threat to Turkey‘s Kemalist 
identity and paved the way for the so-called ‗soft coup‘ in 1997 where Erbakan‘s government 
was forced by the military to resign. This was followed by the decision of the European 
Council which met in Luxembourg in December 1997 to reject Turkey‘s candidacy one more 
time while deciding to open up accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. This 
decision further undermined the security of Turkey‘s Kemalist identity and in this way 
reinforced the power of the military in Turkish politics. In this context, Ankara pursued a 
provocative policy towards Greece and declared that the extension of Greek territorial waters 
to 12NMS would be considered as casus belli. In addition, the Turkish Cypriot President 
Rauf Denktaş was encouraged to announce that he would no longer accept federation as a 
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basis for a settlement and he would only be prepared to negotiate on the basis of a con-federal 
solution. Denktaş has also stated time and again that unless the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) is recognised there will be no talks. In the mean time Ankara declared 
Cyprus‘ EU entry as illegal and threatened to annex the TRNC if the EU accepts the Greek 
part of Cyprus as a full member before a solution on the island.  
 Nevertheless, the emergence of membership as a solid possibility reduced the identity 
concerns of the military and paved the way for the adoption and implementation of important 
political reforms to meet the EU‘s accession criteria. These reforms empowered Turkish civil 
society and altered the balance of power between the civilian and the military authorities in 
the country. In the meantime, we witnessed the Europeanization of important domestic actors 
in the country including former Islamists, big business groups and many NGOs which led to 
the creation of a strong pro-EU coalition in the country. All these developments intensified 
the struggle between the pro-EU and Euro-sceptic circles within the military and the 
government. In this context, foreign policy, especially towards Cyprus and Greece, has 
become the subject of severe debates between these diverse camps. Euroskeptics started to 
claim that the EU will never admit Turkey as a full member; therefore there is no need to give 
any concessions in foreign policy, especially in regards to Cyprus and Greece, with the hope 
of getting closer to the EU. On the other hand, pro-EU circles started to accept the idea that 
Turkey needs to solve its problems with Greece over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus before 
joining the EU. 
Due to the enhanced security of Turkey‗s European identity and the restored 
credibility of the EU after 1999, pro-EU circles became dominant and the Turkish military 
moderated its adamant position in regards to Cyprus. Consequently, Ankara attempted to 
show good marks that it is trying to settle problems with Greece and Greek Cypriots. The 
first sign of this attempt was the decision to abandon the ‗two-states‘ thesis in Cyprus and 
encourage Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş to initiate a negotiation process with his 
Greek Cypriot counterpart Glafcos Klerides. The negotiations started under the auspices of 
the United Nations (UN) on 14 January 2002 with the aim of finding a solution to the Cyprus 
problem by the start of 2002. 
While the negotiations were going on between Denktaş and Klerides, two important 
developments took place in Turkey. Firstly, Hilmi Özkök, who was known for his strong 
support for Turkey‘s alignment with the EU, took up the post of the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces. Secondly, the AKP which initiated a transformation of 
political Islam and emerged as the strongest supporter of the EU membership won the general 
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elections in Turkey with 34.28 percent. As soon it came to power, the AKP initiated an 
impressive track record of EU-related political reforms which further weakened the role of 
the National Security Council, through which the military influences Turkish politics. As 
noted in the previous chapter, these reforms were made possible by the military‘s, notably 
Özkök‘s, support. 
 As far as foreign policy is concerned, AKP‘s leader Erdoğan declared his party‘s firm 
commitment to undertake all necessary steps to get a date for starting membership 
negotiations with the EU. In this context, transforming Turkey‘s Cyprus policy became the 
first issue on AKP‘s foreign policy agenda.292 Nevertheless, in order to achieve this, the new 
government had to overcome the veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş who has had a 
reputation for being a hard-liner and appeared less flexible than some Turkish leaders in 
negotiating a federal settlement for Cyprus.   
It was expected that the military would support Denktaş and prevent the restructuring 
of Turkey‘s Cyprus policy. In fact, some top ranking commanders within the military such as 
the Commander of the Land Forces General Aytaç Yalman has tried to do so and expressed 
their support for Denktaş. However, chief of the General staff Hilmi Özkök preferred to leave 
the political responsibility to the government. Concerning the Turkish Armed Forces views 
on Cyprus, General Özkök said, ‗On no other issue have our reason and our feelings been at 
such odds. We should follow our reason.‘293 He also stated that the Turkish Cypriots and the 
Turkish Parliament should have the final say regarding the issue. In the end, fading popularity 
of Denktaş in North Cyprus, the determination of the AKP government to remove obstacles 
to Turkey's EU accession and the democratic attitude of General Özkök enabled a new 
interpretation of the Cyprus issue which paved the way for Turkey's conciliatory approach at 
the end of the re-unification talks. 
As the above discussion showed, Turkey‘s institutional links with the West in the 
context of NATO and the EU has had a strong influence on the identity security of the 
country which strongly affected the position of the military in regards to relations with 
Greece and Cyprus. The position of other important foreign-policy actors in Turkey such as 
the political parties, the foreign ministry and the bureaucracy and the details of the 
                                                          
292
   Kınacıoğlu, M and Oktay, E. (2006), ‘The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: Implications for 
Turkey’s Accession to the European Union’, Turkish Studies, Vol.7, No:2, p.263 
293
   Sazak, D. ‘Military and Civilians’, Milliyet, 16 April 2004. [online] Available at: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2004/04/04x04x16.HTM 
 139 
 
negotiation process in Cyprus will be examined in the third section. Before that, let us briefly 
talk about the policy positions of a range of key political actors in Greece and the 
transformation of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey in the context of rising identity 
insecurity from the early 1990s. This is essential to understand the dynamics of the 
transformation of Turkey‘s policy towards Cyprus and Greece after 1999 and will lead to a 
greater interactive analysis of future prospects of Greek-Turkish relations. 
  
THE POSITIONS OF DIVERSE POLITICAL CAMPS IN GREECE: 
 This section aims to show how the fluctuations in Greek national identity influences 
the position of Greek political parties in regards to relations with Turkey. From 1974 until the 
mid-1990s when Greece enjoyed a relatively secure identity, there has been a united policy 
between diverse political parties and actors in Athens towards Turkey. According to Ifantis 
this policy had two dimensions: it has been both a policy of deterrence, and a policy of 
political de-escalation.
294
 There was a widespread assumption among the actors that stalemate 
in Turkish-Greek relations will remain since Turkey is unlikely to democratize due to its 
political tradition of Kemalism. In this context, there was a consensus in Athens that the best 
strategy to deal with Turkey is trying to prevent its political, economic, and diplomatic power 
relative to that of Greece. This would entail efforts to slow down the development of 
Ankara‘s further relations with the EU.      
 Nonetheless, the end of Cold War eliminated the factors which had provided such a 
safe haven for Greece in Western institutions. During the early 1990s, Greece became the 
subject of severe criticism within the EU for being a drag on the European economy and for 
its inability to act in a communal manner while adopting policy positions outside the general 
EU consensus such as imposing a uni-lateral trade embargo against the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Moreover other members started questioning the original 
decision to admit Greece to the EC.
295
 
All these developments undermined the security of Greece‘s European identity and 
paved the way for the transformation of Greek domestic and foreign policy since the second 
half of the 1990s. This transformation took place under the leadership of pragmatic Kostas 
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Simitis who replaced Andreas Papandreou in 1996. Simitis attempted to repair the damaged 
prestige of his country within the EU and secure its European identity. In this regard, he 
pursued a modernizing domestic reform program which consolidated Greek democracy and 
economy while improving human rights conditions (including minority rights) in the country.  
In a relatively short-time, Simitis achieved to overcome chronic problems of the 
Greek economy and thus achieved the admittance of Greece into the Eurozone. During the 
period of his governance, inflation has decreased from 15 percent to 3 percent while public 
deficits diminished from 14 percent to 3 percent. GDP started to increase at an annual 
average of 4 percent and factual labour incomes have increased at a rate of 3 percent per year. 
The most notable example of enhanced human rights during this period was the abolition of 
controversial article 19 of the Citizenship Law in 1998 which stated that ‗a person of non-
Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece may be declared as having lost his Greek nationality‘. 
This article allowed the state to strip approximately 60,000 non-ethnic Greeks (50,000 of 
them belonging to the Muslim -originally referred to as Turkish- minority) of their citizenship 
between 1955 and 1998.
296
  
This domestic reform program was followed by attempts to ‗Europeanize‘ Greek 
foreign policy in order to secure Greece‘s position within the EU. This paved the way for an 
intense debate on what strategy can best achieve Greek national interests in regards to 
Turkey. Patriotic nationalists who favour a large state, economic protectionism and an ethno-
centric definition of Greek national identity argued that best strategy to deal with Turkey is 
trying to isolate it by all means and costs. On the other hand modernizing reformists who 
favour a smaller role for the state in the economy and a more civic definition of Greek 
national identity sought to maintain and improve relations with Turkey.
297
 These two camps 
were not to be found among but rather within the political parties. For example, although 
Kostas Simitis who led Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima, 
PASOK) as well as the Greek government from 1996 to 2004 was a reformist and sincerely 
believed in a Greek-Turkish accommodation, a vast majority of PASOK‘s rank and file and 
most members of his cabinet were quite conservative in their foreign policy outlook and 
sceptical for improving ties with Turkey.  
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 At this point, one has to bear in mind that while debates were intensified in Greece 
regarding how to approach Turkey, the leaders of the most influential EU members including 
those of France and Germany, namely Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder, were in favour 
of Turkey‘s accession into the EU.298 In this context, debates on Turkey between Greek 
politicians have been made sense of within the discourse of Europeanization.
299
 In order to 
convince the opponents of approaching Turkey within PASOK, Simitis and other reformists 
such as the foreign minister George Papandreou encouraged a shift from monolithic to more 
pluralist perceptions and representations of Turkey. Zoulas wrote in the Greek daily 
Kathimerini that ‗Greek foreign minister is deeply convinced that there are two Turkey‘s. 
One is the Turkey of civilians: pro-European, moderate and flexible. The other is that of the 
military: typically eastern, intransigent and aggressive‘.300 The representation of Turkey as 
pluralistic and changeable enabled its portrayal as open to Europeanization.  
 In addition, from 1996, deliberate efforts were made to formulate Greek foreign 
policy, particularly in regards to Turkey, in the discourse of interests rather than rights. This 
was a significant development since political discourse in Greece have traditionally 
emphasized Greek rights which are thought to extend back to ancient times rather than 
interests and portrayed relations with Turkey as a matter of justice. Some important 
developments during the 1990s allowed pragmatic leader Simitis to convince the 
conservative camp within the PASOK that conflict with Turkey is jeopardizing Greek 
national interests and a ‗European‘ Turkey is less likely to be a threat for Greece. Firstly, the 
dispute regarding the sovereignty rights over a small islet in the Aegean called Kardak/Imia 
following the occasion of a naval accident brought the two countries to the brink of war in 
1996.  
Secondly, Abdullah Öcalan, the head of the Kurdish Workers‘ Party (Partiya 
Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK), was captured in Kenya on 15 February 1999, while being 
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transferred from the Greek embassy to Nairobi international airport. The capture of Öcalan in 
the Greek embassy in Nairobi revealed the connection between Greece and the PKK, which 
is designated as a terrorist group by both the United States and the EU. This has damaged the 
prestige of Greece by depicting it as a state harbouring terrorism and in this way undermined 
the security of Greece‘s European identity. Finally, the positive atmosphere provided by the 
solidarity after the two devastating earthquakes in both countries in the summer of 1999 
legitimized cooperation in the eyes of Greek public.  
Combined with the EU context, these developments allowed Simitis to redefine the 
national interests of Greece and transform the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey despite 
the existence of a strong resistance. The clearest sign of this transformation was Greece‘s 
behaviour during the Helsinki European Council in 1999 where it lifted its veto of releasing 
aid to Turkey and began to support Turkish membership in the EU.  Considering the dangers 
of excluding Turkey from the EU orientation and losing ground for resolving the bilateral 
issues, Athens decided to pull Turkey further to the European norms trough invigorating its 
EU prospects which received a deadly blow after the 1997 Luxembourg summit. 
 This was a surprising development since Greece has been one the strongest opponents 
of Turkey‘s EU accession and has traditionally emphasized the ‗non-European‘ aspects of the 
Turkish identity in order to block its entry into the bloc. Nevertheless this support was not 
unconditional. Simitis defended the insertion of two conditions, which are; (i) The Aegean 
Dispute should be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication, (ii) the 
Cypriot accession should not be delayed for the sake of an eventual political settlement
301
. In 
the end, December 2004 was set as a deadline by the EU for the resolution of Greek-Turkish 
disputes either through an agreement between the two countries or via the compulsory 
reference of the disputes to ICJ.  
 As the above discussion showed, fluctuations in the identity security of Greece within 
the EU context, strongly influences the position of Greek political actors towards Turkey. 
The conditionality of European financial assistance, the criticism of EU institutions and the 
rise of debates regarding the European credentials of Greece during the early 1990s, 
undermined the security of the country‘s identity and compelled Athens to transform its 
domestic structure and eventually re-define its national interests. In this context, Greece lifted 
its long-standing veto on EU‘s financial aid to Turkey and approved Ankara‘s EU candidacy 
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in 1999. By doing so, Athens showed that it can behave in a collective manner with other EU 
members and thus enhanced the security of its European identity. In this context, Simitis 
managed to pursue a successful foreign policy and install Turkish-Greek disputes onto the 
European level, where Greece enjoys a comparative advantage as a full member.  
 Enhanced prestige of Greece within the EU and the Europeanization of its foreign 
policy towards Turkey after 1999 contributed to the collapse of the consensus between 
diverse political parties and other actors in Ankara regarding the Cyprus problem and 
relations with Greece. Combined with Turkey‘s greater prospects of joining the EU, it 
triggered a severe internal debate on how to re-formulate Turkey‘s Cyprus/Greece policy. Let 
us now focus on the position of political parties and other important foreign-policy actors in 
Ankara such as the foreign ministry and the bureaucracy in regards to relations with Greece 
and the Cyprus problem. 
 
THE POSITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY: 
 In a similar manner to Greece, there was a consensus among diverse political parties 
and the military in Ankara regarding the Cyprus problem during the Cold War when Turkey‘s 
identity was relatively more secure. As noted earlier, military victory in 1974 war boosted the 
prestige of the military and legitimized its interference in politics. Furthermore, the great 
number of casualties and losses during the military operations created a symbolic connection 
to Cyprus in the Turkish public. Since then the Cyprus issue, which has been an important 
legitimizing factor, was seen as a ‗national cause‘ by all political parties in the country. 
Giving concessions in Cyprus for the sake of the re-unification of the island has been 
regarded by all parties as a risky option. As a result, all parties maintained a good relationship 
with Turkish Cypriots‘ veteran President Rauf Denktaş who has always been a hard-liner in 
negotiating a federal settlement for Cyprus.   Nevertheless, as noted earlier the end of Cold 
War undermined Turkey‘s ‗Western‘ identity. Hence Ankara attempted to secure its identity 
by seeking membership in the EU under the premiership of Turgut Özal from the centre-right 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). Turkey‘s aspiration to join the EU has damaged 
the consensus between diverse political parties, the military and the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership regarding the Cyprus issue. Since then the political parties of the centre-right, 
which have been the strongest supporters of Turkey‘s EU membership, have diverged from 
the official Cyprus policy and adopted a more conciliatory approach. For example, Özal 
believed that a Cyprus settlement was essential for Turkey‘s entry. He did not fully trust 
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Denktaş, and sought to ensure that the Turkish Cypriot leader did not evade negotiations that 
could yield a settlement.
302
   
 Ms Tansu Çiller, the leader of centre-right DYP who served as Turkish Prime 
Minister between 1993 and 1996, has had a similar viewpoint on Denktaş. The two leaders 
had major policy differences in regards to the acceptance of confidence-building measures 
presented by the UN in 1993/94. In the meantime, EU‘s hesitation to declare Ankara as a 
candidate triggered the rise of political Islam and nationalism in Turkey. In this context, 
Çiller needed a success against the supporters of a more Islamic orientation in foreign 
policy.
303
 As a result, she decided to initiate the establishment of a customs union with the 
EU. During the negotiations which led to the signing of the agreement, Ms. Çiller had to 
approve the beginning of the accession negotiations between the EU and the Greek Cypriots, 
who applied for full membership in 1990, in order to eliminate the Greek veto to the customs 
union with Turkey.  
 However, these developments did not necessarily show that Çiller was prepared to 
accept a settlement for Cyprus that differed significantly from Denktaş. Indeed, Çiller 
subsequently adopted a populist line and exploited both Cypriot and Aegean tensions to 
bolster her popularity at home. She visited North Cyprus in September 1996 to attend the 
funeral of a Turkish Cypriot soldier who lost his life during the violence along the Green 
Line.
304
 Earlier in January 1996, she risked a war with Athens during the crisis over 
Kardak/Imia.  
  The real end of the consensus between a diverse range of political parties, the 
military and Denktaş in regards to Turkey‘s Cyprus policy took place with the transformation 
of Turkish Islamic identity and the establishment of the AKP in 2001. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the AKP initiated a transformation of political Islam in Turkey and emerged 
as the strongest supporter of the EU in the country. Nevertheless, the party‘s new identity was 
largely undefined then. For this reason, Islamists‘ transformation was approached 
suspiciously by the secular Turkish establishment as well as the EU. In this context, adopting 
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a conciliatory approach towards the Cyprus issue was seen as an ideal way to obtain 
European support and secure the party‘s new and unapproved identity at home.  
 Apart from the need to secure its new identity, there are some other factors behind the 
AKP‘s position on Cyprus. First of all, one has to bear in mind that Turkish ideological 
attachment to the island was principally based on Turkish nationalism. Since nationalism is 
not an integral part of the AKP‘s identity, its ideological and emotional attachment to Cyprus 
is weaker. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot community is one of the most secularized 
Islamic people in the world. They embraced Kemalist reforms during the 1920s very easily 
and quickly and cooperated traditionally with the nationalist-secularist parties and the 
military in Turkey since then. As a result, Islamist parties find little, if any, electoral support 
among the secular Turkish Cypriot Diaspora living in Turkey. Finally, identity fluctuations 
and growing anti-Turkish activism in North Cyprus generated a negative image for Turkish 
Cypriots in Turkey. It gradually changed the perception of the Cyprus problem in the country 
and undermined the Turkish public‘s sensitivity over the issue.  
 In this context, the AKP undoubtedly modified Islamists‘ position in regards to 
Cyprus which has traditionally been influenced by Neo-Ottomanist ideas and accelerated the 
transformation of Turkey‘s Cyprus policy. The first signal of the change in the Islamists‘ 
position towards Cyprus was revealed by the AKP leader Erdoğan in his interview with the 
Greek national television NET in 2002. In this interview, Erdoğan stated that AKP approved 
the adaptation of the ‗Belgian model‘ which includes a strong central government to the 
island of Cyprus.
305
 Erdoğan‘s statement received diverse responses in Greece and Turkey. 
The Greek side saw this as a pleasant surprise. Commenting on Erdoğan‘s statement, the 
Greek foreign minister said ‗for the first time we heard that a Turkish politician is talking in 
favor of a ‗European‘ model in regards to the solution of the Cyprus problem. If he genuinely 
meant it, there is a historical opportunity for the island‘.306  
 On the other hand, Erdoğan‘s statement received a strong reaction from the secularist 
camp at home which became increasingly Euro-skeptic after 1997. The main representatives 
of the secularist camp such as President Sezer, the Foreign Ministry, the bureaucracy, and the 
main opposition Republican People‘s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) advised Erdoğan 
to take a briefing on the Cyprus issue and compelled him to abandon his plans to visit Greece 
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after the victory of his party in the 2002 elections. Eventually Erdoğan delayed his trip to 
Greece and instead went to North Cyprus in order to attend the independence celebrations of 
Turkish Cypriots on 15 November 2002. This was regarded by many as the submission of 
Erdoğan to the secularist camp in Turkey.  
  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU‘s symbolic approval of Turkey‘s 
candidacy was not sufficient to restore the union‘s damaged credibility in the eyes of 
Kemalists. Moreover, the victory of the AKP was perceived as a threat to Turkey‘s identity. 
The party‘s swift and unexpected policy change towards the EU generated suspicions among 
the secularists who were very much worried that the AKP can take advantage of the EU-
related reforms in order to implement a ‗hidden agenda‘ which would undermine secularism 
in Turkey. In this context, Erdoğan‘s efforts to dramatically change Turkey‘s Cyprus policy 
without consulting the secularist establishment and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, has 
intensified the secularists‘ suspicions regarding the party‘s future intentions. In this context, 
the secularists opposed giving any concessions in Cyprus with the hope of getting closer to 
the union and supported Denktaş‘s con-federal proposition based on the Swiss model.  
 However, Erdoğan was determined to transform Turkey‘s Cyprus policy swiftly. In 
fact, resolving the Cyprus problem emerged as the first thing on the AKP‘s foreign policy 
agenda. To this end, Erdoğan started a public fight with the hard-liner Turkish Cypriot 
President Denktaş and blamed him for the lack of a solution on the island. In one of his 
statements, Erdoğan said that he was ―not in favor of following the Cyprus policy that has 
been followed for the last 30 or 40 years. This is not Mr. Denktaş‘s personal business‖.307 In 
return, Denktaş blamed the AKP for sacrificing Cyprus for Turkey‘s EU membership. This 
direct and public quarrel between the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot leader, 
who was supported by the secularists, was exceptional in Turkish history and illustrated how 
Cyprus has become another source of polarization and power struggle between the two 
opposing political camps in Turkey.   
 While all these developments revealed the existence of extreme internal divisions in 
the Turkish side, the UN‘s Security Council agreed that the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 
should present the two parties in Cyprus with a proposal which would form the basis of 
further negotiations. The original version of the UN peace plan, unofficially knows as the 
‗Annan Plan‘ was presented to the two sides on 11 November 2002. A little under a month 
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later, and following the modifications submitted by the two sides, it was revised. It was hoped 
that this plan would be agreed by the two sides on the margins of the European Council, 
which was held in Copenhagen on 13 December 2002.  
 While the parties were evaluating their positions on the plan, Erdoğan started a 
comprehensive tour of EU capitals in order to obtain the support of Europeans and secure its 
new identity which would consolidate its domestic position. During the visits, Erdoğan 
assured European leaders that the AKP government is determined to solve the Cyprus 
problem. In fact, he became the first Turkish leader who explicitly acknowledged the 
relationship between the Cyprus problem and Turkey‘s EU membership prospect. In one of 
his interviews Erdoğan said ‗Turkey should be given a date for the start of accession talks in 
the Copenhagen European Council. Afterwards, we can accept the negotiability of the Annan 
Plan for Cyprus‘.308 
 Before the EU summit, the AKP government put pressure on Denktaş to make 
concessions and sign a framework treaty with his Greek Cypriot counterpart.
309
 Nonetheless, 
the veteran Turkish Cypriot leader, who was recuperating from major heart surgery, refused 
to do so and declined to attend the summit. As a result, the Copenhagen Council confirmed 
the membership of Cyprus into the EU on 1 May 2004 while delaying the decision on a date 
for Turkey‘s accession talks until December 2004. The EU also expressed its preference for a 
united Cyprus and encouraged the two parties to continue negotiations and find a solution 
until 28 February 2003. Greece saw the decision as a triple triumph as it succeeded in 
inducting Cyprus whole into the EU, depicted the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as reluctant to 
reach a compromise on the island, and maintained its detente with Turkey by not blocking the 
EU‘s collective decision regarding the accession talks.310  
 These developments seriously reduced the identity security of the Turkish government 
and generated swift and reckless statements from the AKP leaders. In an interview, Erdoğan 
said that Turkey should not be seen by the world as the side which is blocking the re-
unification of Cyprus.
311
 Moreover, he treated issues which were the subjects of severe 
arguments between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, such as the compensations, territorial re-
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arrangements and the number of immigrants simply as details. The Turkish foreign minister 
Yakış also stated that if a settlement were not achieved by the deadline, the Turkish military 
would be in a position of an occupier of EU territory since the Greek Cypriots would by then 
have joined the union as the representative of the entire island.
312
 These statements created an 
impression that Ankara was ready to approve any plan regardless of its contents.  
 Meanwhile, the AKP government intensified pressure on Denktaş to negotiate the 
plan and sign it before the deadline. Furthermore it began to cooperate with the growing 
Cypriotist/leftist opposition in North Cyprus, most notably the Republican Turkish Party 
(Cumhuriyetci Türk Partisi, CTP). During the negotiation process, the leftist parties 
cooperated with various NGOs and trade unions and received massive financial assistance 
from the EU in order to mobilize Turkish Cypriots against Denktaş. While the AKP started to 
cooperate with the Turkish Cypriot opposition, some top-ranking generals within the military 
and secularist CHP gave a loud and clear signal of support to veteran Turkish Cypriot leader. 
In one of his interviews, CHP‘s vice-President Onur Öymen said; ‗it is very unlikely to reach 
a settlement until 28 February. This deadline is imaginary and has nothing to do with 
Turkey‘s EU bid. The philosophy of the UN plan will eliminate bi-zonality, thus is 
unacceptable as far as the Turkish side is concerned‘.313   
 In the mean time, Kofi Annan made a second visit to the island and a further revision 
of the re-unification plan took place in February 2003. During his stay Annan called on the 
two sides to meet with him again the following month in The Hague where he would expect 
their answer on whether they were prepared to put the plan to a referendum. On 10 March 
2003, this most recent phase of talks collapsed in The Hague, Netherlands, when Denktaş 
told the Secretary-General he would not put the Annan Plan to referendum. Subsequently, 
Greek Cypriots formally signed the EU Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003 at a ceremony 
in Athens. 
Throughout the rest of the year there was no effort to restart negotiations. In the mean 
time, the pro-solution CTP won the parliamentary elections in North Cyprus on January 
2004. This paved the way for the Turkish government to push for new negotiations. After a 
meeting between Erdoğan and Annan in Switzerland, the leaders of the two sides agreed to 
start a new negotiations process which initially took place in Cyprus and eventually 
continued in the Swiss city of Bürgenstock. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş refused 
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to attend these talks. Instead, Serdar Denktaş and Mehmet Ali Talat, leaders of the two parties 
which established the new coalition government in the TRNC after the elections, attended in 
his place.  
The fourth version of the plan was presented to the parties in Bürgenstock. However, 
this was short-lived. After final adjustments, a fifth and final version of the Plan was 
presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004. Eventually, Turkish and Greek sides agreed to 
organize simultaneous referenda on both sides of the island based on the fifth version of the 
UN proposal. The final version of the UN plan proposed the creation of the United Cyprus 
Republic consisting of two component states joined together by a loose federal government 
apparatus. This federal level would have incorporated a collective presidential council, 
alternating presidency, bicameral legislature and a supreme court composed of equal numbers 
of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges.  
During the referendum campaign, the AKP explicitly encouraged Turkish Cypriots to 
deliver a ‗yes‘ vote while Denktaş and secularists in Turkey strongly opposed the plan. The 
reciprocal criticisms between Erdoğan and Denktaş were intensified as the referendum date 
approached. Çelenk wrote; ‗the relations between Denktaş and the Turkish government 
become so tense that Prime Minister Erdoğan demanded censorship of statements made by 
Denktaş during the negotiations on the island from the press‘.314    
In the context of rising polarization on the Turkish side, many Greek Cypriots saw the 
status-quo as an advantage and preferred to join the bloc alone so their government can 
increase pressure on Turkey via the EU for a more-favourable solution for the Greek side. For 
example, EU‘s directives can prevent the possible Turkish Cypriot demands in a future united 
Cyprus for restrictions on the freedom of movement and settlement. On 7 April 2004 Greek 
Cypriot President Papadopoulos spoke out against the plan in an emotional speech broadcast 
live on television. He said ‗I was given an internationally recognized state and I am not going 
to give back a community without say internationally and in search of a guardian‘.315 Two 
days before the referendum even the Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotikó 
Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú, AKEL), which has traditionally been a supporter of united 
Cyprus and Cypriotist ideology decided to reject the Annan Plan because of its perceived 
bias.  
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In Greece, new Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis of the New Democracy Party 
decided to maintain a "neutral" position over the plan, while his rival George Papandreou of 
PASOK who initiated low politics cooperation with Turkey after 1999, pushed for a ‗yes‘ 
vote from Greek Cypriots. Although, some criticized Karamanlis for not doing enough for a 
solution, his choice of maintaining neutrality enhanced the perception that the issue is 
between the ‗independent and democratic Cyprus‘ and Turkey while Greece is not a party.  
In the end, the plan was rejected by an overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots (75 
percent) whereas Turkish Cypriots approved it with 64 percent. Despite their rejection, Greek 
Cypriots entered the EU on May 2004 as the only legitimate representative of the entire 
island. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots were left out despite their approval of the EU-
backed Annan Plan. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots celebrated the ‗yes‘ vote since many 
European and American leaders promised that North Cyprus would no longer be isolated if 
the re-unification fails because of the Greek side.
316
 So far, these promises have proved 
empty and North Cyprus is still isolated despite the call from the UN to lift the embargoes. 
Although the positive attitude of the Turkish government towards the reunification plan in 
Cyprus eased the start of accession talks between the EU and Turkey, the negotiations are 
open-ended in which the full membership is not guaranteed. Moreover Turkey is still 
expected to make concessions in Cyprus.  
As the above discussion showed, Turkey‘s policy during the Cyprus peace talks has 
become another source of polarization and power struggle between diverse political camps of 
the country which were trying to secure their identities at home by exploiting foreign policy 
issues. This complicated the definition of Turkey‘s national interests, led to an ambivalent 
and ‗double-headed‘ foreign policy and caused confusion about Turkey‘s exact position on 
the matter. AKP‘s commitment to solve the Cyprus problem at all costs, created an 
impression that Ankara is ready to approve any plan regardless of its contents. On the other 
hand, Denktaş‘s unconditional support from the CHP and other secularist establishments such 
as the foreign ministry, bureaucracy and President Sezer encouraged him to abandon the 
negotiations instead of analyzing the options properly and reaching an agreement before the 
Greek Cypriots lost their final incentive to share power with their Turkish Cypriots 
compatriots by joining the EU in 2004.  
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As noted earlier, another important factor which paved the way for the Turkish side‘s 
ambivalent policy during the peace talks was the fading popularity of Rauf Denktaş in North 
Cyprus and the rising identity insecurity among the Turkish Cypriot community. The next 
section will demonstrate how the fluctuations in the security of Turkish Cypriots‘ identity 
influenced Turkey‘s bargaining power during the Cyprus negotiations.  
 
IDENTITY DEBATES IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY: 
 Until recent years, Turkish nationalism was the dominant conception of identity 
among the Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless, this particular identity has become increasingly 
insecure in recent years, as manifest in with the rise of alternative identity conceptions. This 
situation had two important implications for the position of the Turkish side at the negotiating 
table. Firstly, it alienated Turkish Cypriots from their political leadership as well as their 
‗motherland‗, jeopardized the legitimacy of the unrecognized TRNC and threatened its 
stability. Secondly, it created a negative image for Turkish Cypriots in Turkey and altered the 
perception of the Cyprus issue in the country.  
 Saving the lives of the Turkish Cypriots and safeguarding their rights has been the 
main justification for Turkey‘s intervention on the island. In this regard, the relationship 
between native Turkish Cypriots and Turkish governments is very important as a legitimizing 
factor for Turkey‘s presence on the island. Therefore, any factor which damages the relations 
between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots has a negative influence for the Turkish side at the 
negotiation table. At this point, let us briefly examine the identity construction among the 
Cypriot communities in a historical setting. This is essential to understanding the relationship 
between the level of Turkish Cypriots‘ identity security and the negotiating power of the 
Turkish side in Cyprus peace negotiations. 
 As Mavratsas put it ‗nationalism has undoubtedly been the dominant ideology in the 
modern history of Cyprus‘.317 Greek Cypriots who have always been the majority on the 
island see themselves as the true native inhabitants of Cyprus. At the same time, they see no 
contradiction between being Cypriot and Greek as they traditionally perceived Cyprus to be 
an extension of Greece. In other words, they associated Cypriot identity with the Greek 
language and the church and in this way excluded the Turks of Cyprus from the Cypriot 
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identity. Towards the end of British rule, Greek Cypriots started to demand enosis, the union 
of the island with Greece. As a response, Turkish Cypriots adopted Turkish nationalist ideas 
and started to demand taksim, the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. The 
bloody inter-communal conflicts during the 1950s and the 1960s further popularized the 
nationalist ideas among both communities.  
 Three years of common administration under the umbrella of the bi-communal 
Republic of Cyprus from 1960 to 1963 was too short to permit a nation-building process on 
the island similar to other countries in Europe.
318
 As a matter of fact, the political elite did not 
have any intention of promoting a common identity between the island‘s two ethnic 
communities anyway. Right after the establishment of the republic in 1960, its first President 
Archbishop Makarios, is reported to have said ‗the agreements have created a state but not a 
nation‘.319  Even the Communist Party AKEL who is regarded as the architect of the 
Cypriotist ideology pursued a pro-enosis stance between 1963 and 1966. In this context, both 
communities continued to associate themselves with Greece and Turkey which paved the way 
for a civil war and the events of 1974 when the Turkish army intervened in the wake of a 
Greek military coup. This intervention resulted in the partition of the island and the 
establishment of two de facto states in homogenized territories.     
 The impact of Turkey‘s intervention on the identity security of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots have been enormous. Military defeat on the Greek side proved the perils of extreme 
nationalism and strengthened Cypriotism as an alternative ideology.
320
 On the other hand, the 
euphoria of a military victory boosted Turkish Cypriots‘ morale and significantly secured 
their identity which was based on Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Cypriot declaration of 
independence and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 
(TRNC) which received recognition only from Turkey until now, strengthened the 
institutionalization of Turkish nationalism in the northern part of the island.  
 The nationalist approach of the new state saw Turkish Cypriots as an inseparable part 
of Turkey which is regarded as a `motherland (anavatan)’, as well as the liberator and 
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protector of the Turkish Cypriot ‗baby land (yavruvatan)’. Cypriotness was only portrayed as 
a geographical definition therefore the official discourse made no distinction between the 
mainland Turks and the Turkish Cypriots. Asked his opinion about Cypriot identity, 
nationalist Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş who established the TRNC said; ‗There are 
neither Turkish Cypriots, nor Greek Cypriots, nor Cypriots…the only Cypriot living in 
Cyprus is the Cyprus donkey‘.321 The nationalist discourse depicted Greek Cypriots as 
untrustworthy and blamed them for ruining the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus by 
continuing to demand enosis even after the independence in 1960. In this context, the Cyprus 
problem was seen by many Turkish Cypriots as merely the unrecognition of the TRNC and 
its isolation from the rest of the world. 
 However, Turkish nationalism has become increasingly insecure in recent years, as 
manifest in the rise of other identifications. As Ramn put it ‗Turkish Cypriots have entered 
into a new process in which a new identity is constructed and negotiated in connection with 
their trans-national position between Greek Cypriots, Turkey, the Turkish immigrant 
population in North Cyprus and the EU‘.322 In this process, Cypriotism, which originated 
with the Greek Cypriot AKEL party, has emerged as the main competitor of Turkish 
nationalism in the northern part of the island.  
This ideology emphasizes the difference of Cyprus from both Greece and Turkey as 
well as the existence of a common Cypriot culture and citizenship while discouraging any 
kind of ethnic nationalism. Cypriotists‘ rejection of ethnic nationalism stems from their 
original Marxist ideology. During the 1980s Cypriotist parties in North Cyprus adopted a pro-
Soviet position due to an influx of members who had been attracted to leftist ideology while 
studying at Turkish universities.
323
 Due to the internationalist approach of Communist 
ideology and its emphasis on class struggle, nationalism was seen by Cypriotists as a case of 
false consciousness which serves the interests of the bourgeoisie.  Although parties which 
support Cypriotism on both sides of the island have moved towards a Western European style 
social-democratic and liberal ideology after the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, ethnic nationalism is still not a part of their identity. Without denying the 
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ethnic plurality on the island, they argue that the people of Cyprus must principally regard 
themselves as Cypriots first and then Greeks, Turks or others.  
In this context, the supporters of Cypriotism in North Cyprus strongly disapprove of 
the rising immigration from Turkish mainland. They see the immigrants as a major element 
in Turkey‘s ‗Turkification‘ policy which in their eyes will not only make indigenous Turkish 
Cypriots a minority in their own country but will also ‗orientalise‘ their culture. According to 
them, the only way to prevent this from happening is to create a truly Cypriot and truly 
independent federal state that would ensure the political equality of the island‘s two major 
communities. In addition, they are the strongest supporters of the EU membership and 
emphasize its role as the only possible framework within which a common Cypriotness can 
emerge. In other words, they portrayed supra-national European identity as a model for a 
common and civic Cypriot identity, which they see as essential for the re-unification of the 
island.  
According to a recent study in 2006, ‗Turkishness‘ is still the most frequent way of 
defining identity among Turkish Cypriots. However ‗Cypriotness‘ which was chosen as the 
most important component of identity by 35.8 percent of the Turkish Cypriots and is far more 
popular among the younger generations
324
 strongly undermined the security of Turkish 
nationalistic identity on the island. As noted above, this identity insecurity in the Turkish 
Cypriot community has a significant impact on the bargaining power of the Turkish side in 
Cyprus peace negotiations. In order to understand how this happens, let us now focus on the 
factors which undermined the security of Turkish nationalism in the TRNC.  
Generally speaking, we can talk about four major factors which influence the identity 
debates in North Cyprus. First of all, Turkish Cypriots have been suffering from 
internationally-imposed embargoes which prevent them from directly engaging in any 
political, economic, social and cultural activities with the rest of the world for more than forty 
years. This isolation prevented the development of a strong private sector as well as a 
competitive market economy in North Cyprus. As a result, the Turkish Cypriot economy is 
heavily dependent on grants from Turkey. Public sector is the largest employer in North 
Cyprus; providing about one third of the Turkish Cypriot population with employment. 
Personnel expenditure is more than a quarter of government spending, going up to one third 
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of all expenditure in 2006.
325
 This ambitious recruitment policy and the waste of effective 
human capital has not only made North Cyprus‘ public sector over-crowded, ineffective and 
inefficient but also created an unsustainable economic system which does not encourage 
production. As a result, North Cyprus suffers from chronic high budget deficits, low local 
investments and dependence on Turkish aid and loans.
326
  
 Apart from its economic dimension, international isolation affects the lives of Turkish 
Cypriots in many other ways. Since 1974, Turkish Cypriot ports & airports have been closed 
to direct international trade and travel. The educational institutions of North Cyprus, most 
notably universities, their students and scholars constantly face academic embargoes. 
Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to participate or host international teams, or 
sporting/cultural events. For example, no teams or individuals from North Cyprus have 
participated at any of the following since December 1963, Olympic and Commonwealth 
Games, World and European sporting tournaments such as athletics championships or 
football competitions.
327
 Combined with economic insecurity and political uncertainty, all 
these factors paved the way for a decline in Turkish Cypriots‘ national morale and 
confidence. 
Secondly, the borders of the internationally unrecognized TRNC do not correspond 
with the conventional perceptions of ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries on the island. 
Turkish Cypriots were traditionally scattered all over the island and moved to Northern 
Cyprus only after the 1974 war. Many of those who left their properties in the south were 
settled to the properties abandoned by the Greek Cypriots after the population exchange 
agreement. Nevertheless, many could not develop a strong affiliation with their new 
properties and territories. This is partly due to the unrecognition of the TRNC in the 
international community and the invalidity of the documents given by its authorities 
(including title deeds) according to international law. Apart from holding internationally 
invalid title deeds, Turkish Cypriots are also aware that any settlement will entail the return 
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of some territory to the Greek Cypriot side. The number of villages/towns that will be 
returned in case of a settlement ranges from 50 to 70 which will affect the lives of 
approximately 65000 Turkish Cypriots. Under these circumstances, developing an emotional 
affiliation with the territories they currently live in is quite difficult for many Turkish 
Cypriots.   
The third factor which influenced the identity debates among the Turkish Cypriots is 
the new context that emerged after Greek Cypriots officially began negotiating membership 
with the EU in 1995 with the consent of the Turkish government. This new context added a 
new dimension namely ‗Europeanness‘ to the identity debates in North Cyprus and led to the 
rise of identity insecurity in the country. Towards the end of the 1990s the EU emerged as a 
key issue in the internal politics of North Cyprus. The immense dialogue between the 
European institutions and the Turkish Cypriot civil society has played a key role in the 
transformation of dominant attitudes in the Turkish Cypriot community, particularly in 
regards to how they define their own identity and an ideal solution to the Cyprus problem. 
Furthermore, it created an affiliation for the union among many Turkish Cypriots when 
combined with the political, economic and identity insecurity of the community as a result of 
its forty year isolation from the rest of the world. This affiliation shows the relationship 
between the domestic insecurity and attitudes towards a collective identity.   
The final and possibly the strongest factor which undermined the identity based on 
Turkish nationalism in the TRNC is the rising immigration to North Cyprus from Turkey. 
Until 1974, the Turkish Cypriots used to live in a multi-cultural environment with Greeks, 
Armenians, and the British. In this cosmopolitan environment they embraced ethnic identity 
as a source of solidarity and as a response to dominant Greek nationalism on the island. Since 
1974, Turkish Cypriots are living in an ethnically homogeneous territory together with 
Anatolian immigrants who migrated to North Cyprus in large numbers with the 
encouragement of nationalist Turkish leadership. According to Hatay, the number of Turkish 
immigrants in North Cyprus which has a total population of 264,172
328
 reached to 102,000
329
 
in 2006.  
Although nationalist discourse made no distinction between the new-comers and 
native Turkish Cypriots, there are noticeable socio-economic differences between the two 
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communities most notably concerning the role of religion in society. Turkish Cypriots are one 
of the most secular Islamic people in the world. Religious practices are kept to a minimum 
and Turkish Cypriot women do not cover their heads. On the other hand, immigrants from 
Turkey are mostly from rural backgrounds and are practicing Muslims. Moreover, many of 
them speak Arabic or Kurdish as their first language.   
Augmented interaction between the Turkish Cypriots and the Anatolian migrants had 
made differences more noticeable and has created tensions in the country.
330
 Due to many 
factors including the experience of British rule, a very high level of education, and  intense 
interaction with the Cypriot Diaspora, most Turkish Cypriots began to perceive themselves as 
more ‗civilized‘ and ‗European‘ compared to mainland Turks. In this context, they see rising 
immigration from Turkey as an immense threat to the original Turkish Cypriot identity. Some 
circles even declared that the original Turkish Cypriot identity is on the verge of extinction.  
Apart from cultural and identity-based differences, Anatolian immigrants are coming 
from the poorest regions of Turkey and are much worse off than native Turkish Cypriots. 
This inequality paved the way for a dramatic rise in the level of crime in North Cyprus. 
Therefore, a widespread notion among the native Turkish Cypriots is linking the immigrants 
with crime. As a matter of fact, statistics reveal that more than 60 percent of the criminals in 
North Cyprus‘ jails are originally coming from Turkey or other foreign countries.331 In brief, 
Anatolian immigrants in North Cyprus played an important role in undermining Turkish 
nationalism and consolidating the regional Cypriotist identity by providing an internal ‗other‘ 
to the indigenous Turkish Cypriots.   
All these factors undermined Turkish nationalism in the TRNC, alienated Turkish 
Cypriots from their political leadership as well as ‗motherland‘ Turkey and destabilized the 
country. This alienation threatened the nationalist parties‘ hegemony in North Cyprus after 
almost five decades. The rising popularity of Cypriotism and the Turkish Cypriot anxieties 
over losing their unique identity were manifested with explicit anti-Turkish activism and the 
rise of leftist (Cypriotist) parties during the peace negotiations between 2001 and 2004. Some 
leftist activists such as the authors of daily Afrika newspaper criticized Turkey and its 
military presence on the island explicitly to the extent of calling Turkey a colonial, occupying 
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power who is trying to assimilate the Turkish Cypriots.
332
 Moreover, four massive rallies 
with the participation of almost half of the entire Turkish Cypriot population
333
 were 
organized between late 2002 and early 2003 to demand the re-unification of the island.
334
 The 
protestors who participated in these demonstrations carried EU flags next to the proposed 
new flag for the United Republic of Cyprus and banners with slogans that included, ―This 
nation is ours,‖ ―Denktaş resign,‖ ―We can‘t wait another 40 years,‖ ―We don‘t want to live 
in a prison,‖ ―Yes to the Annan Plan, yes to the world‖ and even ―Turkish army of 
occupation.‖335 In 2003 elections, the Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetci Türk Partisi, 
CTP) which comes from a Cypriotist tradition won the majority in the Turkish Cypriot 
Parliament for the first time in the history of North Cyprus.  CTP‘s leader Mehmet Ali Talat, 
who declared himself as a ‗Cypriot patriot‘ rather than a ‗Turkish nationalist‘ in 1997 while 
arguing that the Turkish Cypriots‘ interests do not always coincide with those of Turkey, 
became the new Prime Minister of the TRNC.  
The demonstrations and the election results were depicted by the Turkish and 
international media as a demonstration of the erosion of Turkish nationalism on the island. 
Special emphasis in the media coverage of the demonstrations was on the abundant 
appearance of European and united Cypriot flags next to only a few Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot flags.  The headline of the mainstream Turkish newspaper Star after the elections in 
North Cyprus was ‗yav-rum vatan (half-Greek land): Unfortunately half of North Cyprus 
which we used to call yavruvatan (babyland) is pro-Greek. The elections revealed this 
unpleasant reality‘.336 The Turkish media‘s coverage of the pro-unification rallies, election 
results and the growing anti-Turkish activism in North Cyprus generated a negative image for 
Turkish Cypriots in Turkey. It gradually changed the perception of the Cyprus problem in the 
country and undermined the Turkish public‘s sensitivity over the issue. In this way, it 
weakened the Turkish position in the negotiating table by undermining Turkey‘s justification 
to be on the island.  
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THE POSITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY & BUSINESS GROUPS: 
 This section will examine the relationship between the security of Greek and Turkish 
identities and the civil society cooperation and business ties between the two neighbours. 
Until recent years, Greek and Turkish businessmen and civil societies were reluctant to 
cooperate with each other due to their fear of alienating public opinion and leadership. 
Business groups could not see the benefits of cooperation since they used to see each other as 
competitors rather than potential partners. In other words, political problems and the 
antagonistic identities of the two countries prevented the Greek and Turkish business groups 
and civil society from seeing the benefits of cooperation.  
 Nevertheless, the rise in the identity security of both countries in the EU context after 
1999 legitimized Greek-Turkish cooperation at the civil society level and enabled the 
business groups of both nations to see their common interests and generally the benefits of 
cooperation. The EU context provided a legitimate ground for mutual cooperation and 
empowered domestic actors in both countries who are in favour of closer bilateral relations. 
Moreover, the institutional status of candidacy made Turkey eligible for many additional 
forms of EU funding. This has allowed the EU to directly support the development of civil 
society in Turkey and assist Greek-Turkish confidence-building civil initiatives. Apart from 
funding, the EU has also become a reference point in the construction of new political and 
social identities in both countries and in this way legitimized Greek-Turkish cooperation both 
at governmental and civil society level.
337
  
 In this context, many Greek and Turkish civil society organizations increased pressure 
on their respective governments for closer cooperation. In 2000, 230 Greek and Turkish 
NGOs had joined the confidence-building attempts between the two countries through multi-
level cooperation. Cooperation at the civil society level paved the way to cooperation at the 
state level as well. Since 1999, the two states began cooperating on various issues such as 
tourism promotion, the fight against terrorism, removal of landmines along the border, trade, 
mutual investment, illegal immigration and environmental issues. Moreover, many peace-
oriented NGOs in Greece intensified pressure on the Greek government for supporting 
Turkey‘s bid to join the EU.   
 Improved relations at both governmental and civil society levels have boosted the 
economic interaction between Greece and Turkey as well. The annual bilateral trade volume 
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between the two neighbours has dramatically increased in recent years and reached $2.8 
billion in 2007, up from $230 million in 1990.
338
 In the same year, Turkey exported 1.309 
billion US Dollars worth of goods and services to Greece, and imported 865.6 million US 
Dollars worth of goods and services from Greece.
339
 Greek businessmen also realized that the 
structural reforms made after 1999 and the customs union with the EU have substantially 
improved Turkish markets accessibility and investment potential. In this context, they started 
to see Turkey, which is the most important Balkan partner of the EU, as a dynamic export 
market and investment area. For example, in 2000 the Athens Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (ACCI) started a series of contacts with the business groups of Turkey in order to 
improve the commercial relations between the two countries. In his welcoming speech, Mr. 
Yiannis Kapralos, the President of the chamber, said;  
 ―The recognition of Turkey as a candidate country for accession sends a hopeful message to 
the business communities of the two countries…In this context, Greek chambers and mainly 
the ACCI, can play an important role to the furthering of economic collaboration between 
Greece and Turkey‖.340  
The President of the Turkish department of the ACCI Mr. Nikoletopoulos also 
underlined the willingness of the Greek business community for cooperation with Turkey. In 
his speech, he said;  
‗after the earthquakes of 1999, the approach attempted, opened new horizons for cooperation 
in many sectors including constructions, tourism, shipping…The privatization of Turkish 
national industries is a high class opportunity for Greek investors‘.341   
These contacts bore fruit and between 2002 and 2006 Greek exports to Turkey 
increased 130 percent while Greek imports from Turkey increased 105 percent. Moreover, by 
investing 2.8 billion US Dollars, Greece ranked fourth among countries that made direct 
foreign investment in Turkey. In April 2006 the National Bank of Greece acquired 46 percent 
shares of Turkish private Finansbank which is the fifth biggest bank in the country, by paying 
2.774 million US Dollars. This is the biggest commercial contract which was signed in the 
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history of Greece and Turkey. Moreover, another Greek bank EFG Eurobank-Ergasias 
acquired 70 percent of Turkish Tekfenbank while Greek Alpha Bank is negotiating with 
Turkish Alternatifbank in order to establish a partnership. In 2006, 228 Greek firms were 
operating in Turkey compared to 10 Turkish firms in Greece. Nevertheless, important multi-
national companies of Turkey such as Linens, Doğtaş Mobilya and Ayyıldız Tekstil have 
opened or planning to open retail outlets in the Greek market.
342
  
The AKP government fully supported the establishment of closer economic ties with 
Greece. In 2003 it signed an important agreement with the Greek government in Ankara to 
build a natural gas pipeline connecting the two countries which will deliver 500 million cubic 
meters of natural gas from Azerbaijan to Greece, via Turkey. In 2005 the Turkish economy 
minister Kürşat Tüzmen met Greek economy minister in Athens to seek ways for boosting 
trade ties between the two countries. After the meeting Tüzmen said ‗we are welcoming the 
acquisition of Finansbank by the National Bank of Greece since it is demonstrating the level 
of confidence between Greece and Turkey‘.343 Big business groups in Turkey also supported 
AKP‘s efforts to boost economic ties with Greece as well as its effort to solve the Cyprus 
problem as soon as possible. For example, TÜSİAD organized several conferences and other 
events in order to demonstrate the positive sides of the UN proposal in Cyprus to the Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot public. In one of these conferences, TÜSİAD‘s head Tuncay Özilhan 
said ‗thanks to the sensitive balance that the Annan Plan will establish, many concerns of the 
Turkish Cypriots are not valid anymore‘.344    
On the other hand, rising trade links and particularly direct investment from Greece 
caused suspicions among the Turkish secularists, notably the main opposition CHP, the 
military and some state departments and NGOs. As a matter of fact, low politics cooperation 
between the two countries was initiated by İsmail Cem from the secularist Democratic Left 
Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) and his Greek counterpart Georgios Papandreou in 1999. 
Nevertheless, the rising identity concerns of the secularists due to both internal and external 
factors after 2002, triggered suspicions in regards to rising economic interdependence with 
Greece. 
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Some civil societies belonging to this camp spread rumours that Greeks and Israelis 
are buying properties in Kurdish-inhabited Southeast Anatolia which created doubts in the 
Turkish public. Furthermore, the CHP engaged in a lawsuit in order to stop the sale of real-
estates to foreigners which was eased as part of the EU reforms.
345
 The Turkish military was 
also not very pleased with the rising economic ties with Greece. Commenting on the sale of 
some Turkish banks to Greeks, military bank OYAK‘s President Yıldırım Türker said 
‗OYAK would not sell out to Greeks at any price, and reportedly praised nationalist 
sentiments as "noble".
346
 Furthermore, in 2007 the Turkish Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BDDK) had blocked the entry of a third Greek bank to the Turkish 
banking sector (following Finansbank and Tekfenbank) in light of report from the National 
Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT). According to the report which 
cancelled a half billion US Dollar agreement, a member of the board of Alpha Bank was a 
former Greek spy with close past ties to Kurdish terrorist group PKK.
347
  
As the above discussion showed, there is a strong relationship between identity 
security of Greece and Turkey and the level of their business ties and civil society 
cooperation. The rise in both countries‘ identity security in 1999 improved political ties and 
boosted civil-society cooperation and business links. Nonetheless, the rise of identity 
concerns in Turkey from 2002 onwards particularly among the secularists impeded the 
further enhancement of interaction between Greek and Turkish civil societies and prevented 
the business groups from realizing their full potential for economic cooperation. Considering 
the geographical and cultural proximity between the two countries, the potential for economic 
and civil-society cooperation is clearly significant. Since the EU‘s attitude strongly influences 
the security of both countries‘ identity, the future prospect of Turkish-Greek civil-society and 
economic cooperation will be strongly influenced by the progress in the accession talks 
between Turkey and the EU as well as Greece‘s position during the talks. 
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SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS: 
 This section aims to demonstrate how the fluctuations in the security of Greek and 
Turkish identities affects the popular perceptions of each other, through shaping the 
discourses and representations of the ‗other‘ in both countries‘ history education, media, arts, 
literature and popular culture. History education is perhaps the most important channel 
through which nationalist ideologies and their associated enemy perceptions are transmitted 
to the public opinion. Media also plays a significant role in shaping the public opinion while 
arts, literature and popular culture are very important channels through which negative or 
positive images of the ‗other‘ are conveyed to current and future generations. Therefore 
constructive attitudes in these areas can significantly contribute to the positive transformation 
of societal perceptions. Nevertheless, attitudes in history education, media and popular 
culture are strongly related with the security of a country‗s identity.  
During the process of developing a nation-building strategy to construct a secure 
national identity for Greece and Turkey, Turks and Greeks were attributed the role of the 
‗other‘ in both countries. Particularly in Greece, the Turks have become an essential 
component of the nation-building process. The nation-building process generally highlights 
the positive features of national identity while attributing its negative features to foreign 
factors. In the Greek case, while the Hellenic past which was full of achievements was 
embraced, recent history, notably the Ottoman period was rejected. This period was held 
responsible for the establishment of a religious, anti-rational and bureaucratic system which 
prevented progress. In this context, the fall of Constantinople (modern Istanbul) was chosen 
as the major memory and trauma of the Greek nation.
348
   
Turks played an important role in the construction of Greece‘s collective identity as a 
member of the modern and Western world as well. As a new state situated on the economic, 
political and geographical periphery of Europe, Greece perceived its cultural similarities with 
Turkey, a country with a complex identity between the East and the West, as a threat to its 
Western identity. As a result, the Greek state tried to sharply differentiate Greece‘s identity 
from Turkey, by highlighting their differences and trying to dissociate the Greek nation from 
the Turks as much as possible through various channels.    
 Firstly, the Greek language was purified by eliminating many words of Turkish origin 
and going back to the Hellenic source to create a new language called Katherevousa.  This 
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new language which was closer to ancient Greek was used for official purposes until 1976 
and created a diglossic situation whereby most of the Greek population was excluded from 
the public sphere and advancing in education.  
 Secondly, the educational system emphasized the pre-eminence of European culture 
over others (most notably Ottoman-Turkish), the contributions of ancient Greeks to European 
culture, and the continuity of Greek culture over several centuries. School textbooks 
portrayed the Turks as the main enemy and ‗other‘ of the Greeks and denied the common 
cultural denominators between the two nations. Theodosopoulos wrote ―in an indirect 
manner, national education symbolically relies upon the image of the Turk to foster an 
understanding of what it means to be a Greek... the logic is one which sees Greeks as 
civilized, Turks as barbarians, Greeks as peaceful, Turks as warmongers, Greeks as 
courageous, and Turks as cowards‖.349 In these respects, the Turkish rule of Greece 
(Tourkokratia) was presented as a black period which brought Greek culture to a temporary 
halt. It is conceptualised as a significant period in the ‗History of Greece‘, but as having no 
relevance for the ‗History of Greeks‘. As Soysal and Vasiliou noted, it is via this distinction 
that the Ottoman Turk becomes the Greek‘s ‗other‘.350  
 The efforts of the state to dissociate the Greeks from the Turks were supported by the 
Greek media and intelligentsia as well. While the Greek media depicted Turkey as 
monolithic, inherently non-European and incapable of changing, Greek intellectual circles put 
the Turks to a lower cultural position and associated them with negative features which is 
well-reflected in the words of well-known Greek writer Nikos Kazantzakis who wrote; 
‗To gain freedom first of all from the Turk, that was the initial step, after that, later, new 
struggle began: to gain freedom from the inner Turk- from ignorance, malice and envy, from 
fear and laziness, from dazzling false ideas, and finally from idols, all of them, even the most 
revered and beloved‘.351  
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 The placing of the Turks into a lower cultural position led to the emergence of a 
superiority complex among the Greek society against their former colonial masters. 
Regarding this perception Keridis wrote ‗many Greeks exhibit arrogance based on a 
perceived ―historical superiority‖ that bestows a status-bearing classical heritage and all its 
cultural capital on contemporary Greeks and often demonizes neighbouring Turks as 
―uncivilized Asians‖‘.352 In this context, the Greek political elite became reluctant to interact 
with their eastern neighbour and relied on perceptions of natural difference to explain their 
conflict with the Turks.
353
  
 Despite not being a central element, Greeks were not neglected in the nation-building 
process of Turkey. The dominant representation of Greeks, which is well manifested in 
school textbooks, is a neighbour unreliable, unfaithful, cunning and insatiable who has made 
a habit of hostility towards the Turks. In addition, Turks attempted to create their own 
nationalistic mythology based on a thesis which rejects the connections between modern and 
ancient Greeks. Due to long years of co-existence, the Turks never thought that their former 
subjects were the descendants of well-known ancient Greeks. According to the official 
Turkish history thesis, all great civilizations, including the Ancient Greeks, actually 
originated in Central Asia and derived from the Turks. In this understanding, the portrayal of 
modern Greeks as the direct descendant of ancient Greeks was only a dynamic tool of some 
European powers in order to foster the separatist movements within the Ottoman Empire. For 
this reason, Greece is often depicted in the Turkish discourse as the ‗spoiled kid of Europe‘ 
and at best a `fake European` which implies immaturity, undeserved-ness and abuse of 
position.
354
 
 In brief, both countries used the ‗other‘ in order to bolster its own identity to different 
extents. As a result, the discourse and representations of the ‗other‘ in both countries‘ history 
textbooks, media and popular culture have been quite negative until recent years. The media 
particularly played a significant role in reinforcing negative societal perceptions and 
impeding reconciliation. For example, a key reason for the failure of the ‗Davos Process‘, 
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which was initiated by Turgut Özal and Andreas Papandreou in 1988, was the uncooperative 
attitude of the public opinion encouraged by the media in both countries. In 1996, the media 
in both countries greatly contributed to the rising tension over the Imia/Kardak, with their 
chauvinistic rhetoric and irresponsibly escalatory actions such as the planting of a Turkish 
flag on the islet by Turkish journalists.
355
  
Nevertheless, the fundamental changes in Greece‘s and Turkey‘s domestic political, 
economic and social structures, in the context of globalization and European integration, have 
brought a dramatic change in the discourses and representations of the ‗other‘ in both 
countries. In particular, the removal of restrictions on the freedom of speech, the 
enhancement of minority rights and the deregulation of the media sector in both countries 
during the 1990s which created independent informational networks, reduced the popularity 
of official nationalist discourses and the antagonistic constructions of identities. All these 
developments permitted alternative scripts of the conflict and alternative representations of 
the other which challenged the dominant portrayal of history and the prevalent constructions 
of Greek and Turkish identities. 
Enhanced identity security of both countries within the EU context towards the end of 
1990s and the solidarity following the devastating earthquakes in Athens and Izmit in the 
summer of 1999 also legitimized and accelerated the positive change in the representations of 
the ‗other‘ in educational textbooks, media and popular culture. In this context, there have 
been collaborative efforts among historians in both Greece and Turkey to cleanse history 
textbooks from chauvinistic content and demonizing references. In the Turkish media many 
articles which praised the political development of the Greek state were published. For 
example, the well-known journalist Sami Kohen wrote in the Turkish daily Milliyet;  
‗it is also difficult not to admire Greece‘s current position within the union…just a few years 
ago certain EU circles harshly criticize its weak economy and uncooperative attitude…Let‘s 
admit that the pragmatic, progressive policies of the Simitis administration have played an 
important role in Greece‘s successful rise within the EU ranks‘.356   
 Furthermore, the language of (and the use of the actual word) ―war‖ which was 
regularly used in news reports before the 1999 earthquakes, were replaced by the language of 
―peace‖ where Greece is no longer depicted as‖ the other‖ or ‗the enemy‘ but instead as part 
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of ―we‖ and a close friend.357  
Greek-Turkish relations are also being addressed in Turkish arts, literature and 
popular culture. Recent Turkish films and other television shows addressed the aspects of 
Turkish-Greek relations that not so long ago would have been taboo, such as Derviş Zaim‘s 
Çamur (Mud, 2003) and Yeşim Ustaoğlu‘s Bulutlari Beklerken (Waiting for the Clouds, 
2004). In 2008, for the first time, a Turkish film named Güz Sancısı (The Pain of Autumn) by 
Tomris Giritlioğlu has taken a serious look at the Anti-Greek riots and mob in Istanbul on 
September, 6-7, 1955 that accelerated the migration of the city‘s Greek population to Greece. 
According to the distributor Özen Film, more than five hundred thousand have watched the 
film since its release on March 2008.
358
 This sudden interest in a dark chapter of the Turkish 
past demonstrates the relationship between social and political structures and the emotional 
lives of individuals, including their perceptions of guilt and shame.  
Regarding the general change in the representation of Greeks in the Turkish media 
and popular culture, Herkül Millas, an ethnic Greek writer from Istanbul, wrote ‗Turks seem 
to have forgotten the sad experiences with their Greek neighbours in the past, and now 
remember them mostly with their entertaining sides with a culture of nostalgia‘.359  In a three-
day conference on Istanbul‗s Greek community, which was a first in the history of republican 
Turkey, Adnan Ekşigil from Yeditepe University spoke about contemporary trends in 
Turkey, whereby the former Turkish "culture of conquest" to erase the Greek heritage has 
been replaced by a popular culture of nostalgia, where anything Greek is now in fashion‘.360 
From the increasing number of Turkish tourists in Greece to the rising popularity of Greek 
music and taverns in Istanbul, there are strong indicators of a changing perception of Greece 
in the Turkish society.  
The representations of Turkey in the Greek media and popular culture also started to 
change in the post-1999 era. We witnessed a shift from monolithic to more pluralist 
representations of Turkey in the Greek newspapers which talk about a change in Turkish 
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intentions with a particular focus on Turkish politicians.
361
 They emphasized the positive 
efforts of certain Turkish statesmen such as İsmail Cem, who was the Turkish Foreign 
Minister from 1997 to 2002, and a particular group which Eleftherotypia described as ―the 
Europhile powers of the neighbour and all those who wish to escape the control of the armed 
forces and to build a democracy, as we know it in the West.
362
 The representation of Turkey 
as pluralistic and changeable enabled its portrayal as open to EU‘s ‗civilizing‘ influence. 
 The 2003 Greek film Politiki Kouzina (Kitchen of Istanbul), which attracted a lot of 
attention in both Greece and Turkey, tells the story of a Greek family from Istanbul and 
highlights difficulties they faced in adapting to Greek society, and the conformist pressures 
placed on them by the nationalist ideologies both in Turkey and Greece.
363
 The film 
challenged the prevalent constructions of Greek and Turkish identities and invited its 
watchers to critically re-assess their viewpoints in regards to history. In 2005, the Mega 
television of Greece started to broadcast a Turkish soap opera, Yabancı Damat (Foreign 
Groom), which tells a love story involving an affair between a Greek boy and a Turkish girl. 
The drama revolves around the couple‘s efforts to convince themselves and their families to 
move beyond cultural stereotypes and historical prejudices. In many ways, it gives political 
messages to its viewers. For example, its approach towards the Greek-Turkish rivalry was 
humorous which is often treated as nothing more than a joke.
364
 Moreover, by portraying the 
couple‘s grandparents as the strongest opponents of their relationship, the serial implied that 
the nationalisms of the ‗old Turkey‘ and ‗old Greece‘ are the real problem that must be 
tackled to achieve a civilized and ‗European‘ peace between the two countries. The show has 
become extremely popular among the Greek audience. Schleifer wrote: ‗it was, in many 
ways, the most significant exposure Greeks had to Turks since, well, they were living 
                                                          
361
      Lazarou, E. (2009), ‘Mass Media and the Europeanization of Turkish-Greek Relations: Discourse 
Transformation in the Greek Press 1997:2003’, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and South Eastern 
Europe, No.23  
362
      Eleftherotypia, 13 December 1999 
363
     Rumelili, B. (2005), “The European Union and the Cultural Change in Greek-Turkish Relations”, Working 
Papers Series in EU Border Conflict Studies, No.17,p.22 
364
    Papailias, P. (2005), “TV Across the Aegean : The Greek Love Affair with a Turkish Serial”, Available online 
at 
http://www.lsa.umich.edu/UMICH/modgreek/Home/_TOPNAV_WTGC/Media%20and%20Culture/TV%20Acro
ss%20the%20Aegean.pdf 
 169 
 
together as citizens of the Ottoman Empire.‘365 The show's popularity revealed nostalgia in 
Greece for a glimpse of their common past with the Turks. Unsurprisingly, recent years 
witnessed an increasing interest in Greek society for Turkish culture which is manifested with 
rising popularity of Turkish music and mushrooming Turkish restaurants in Athens. 
 As the above discussion showed, enhanced security of Greek and Turkish national 
identities especially after 1999, paved the way for a positive change in the representations of 
the ‘other‘ in both countries‘ media and popular culture. To a certain extent, changing 
representations started to eliminate the deep-rooted prejudices and stereotypes regarding the 
‗other‘ in both societies and enhanced the level of emotional identification between their 
members. Nevertheless, rising debates in Europe regarding Turkey‘s European credentials, 
the slowdown in Turkey‘s accession talks with the EU and the continuation of the problems 
regarding the Aegean Sea and Cyprus is unfortunately impeding this positive transformation 
in societal perceptions.  
 
CONCLUSION: 
 As the above discussion showed, the fluctuations in the identity security of Turkey 
within different institutional contexts strongly influence the positions of all political actors in 
the country, notably the military, political parties, and civil society and business groups, in 
regards to relations with Greece and the Cyprus problem. Enhanced identity security of the 
country after 1999 due to the approval of its EU candidacy with the consent of Greece, 
significantly transformed the country‘s domestic structure and influenced the positions of all 
actors which influence the formulation of Turkey‘s foreign policy towards Greece and 
Cyprus, including that of the military. The EU context also brought a significant change in 
mutual societal perceptions in both Greece and Turkey. Changing perceptions legitimized and 
expanded the commercial, social, educational and political cooperation between the two 
neighbours. All these developments triggered a transformation in Turkey‘s policy towards 
Greece and Cyprus which is manifested with the initiation of peace talks in Cyprus in 2001. 
 However, the rise to power of AKP with Islamic roots and the party‘s attempts to 
pursue an independent policy from the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş, transformed the 
Cyprus problem into another source of polarization and power struggle between diverse 
political parties and actors in Ankara. This complicated the definition of Turkey‘s national 
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interests, led to an ambivalent and ‗double-headed‘ foreign policy and caused confusion 
about Turkey‘s exact position on the matter during the peace talks.In other words, the 
extreme internal division and polarization  prevented the formulation of a coherent foreign 
policy and weakened the Turkish side‘s negotiating power at the table.  
 As a result, Greek Cypriots achieved EU membership in 2004 as the only legitimate 
representative of the entire island despite their rejection of the EU-backed Annan plan. On 
the other hand, Turkish Cypriots were left out despite the promises of European leaders that a 
‗yes‘ vote will end the isolation of North Cyprus. Although the positive attitude of the 
Turkish government towards the reunification plan in Cyprus eased the start of accession 
talks between the EU and Turkey, the negotiations are open-ended in which the full 
membership is not guaranteed. Moreover Turkey is still expected to make concessions in 
Cyprus.  
 All these developments indicate that Greek foreign policy has been more successful in 
comparison to the foreign policy of Turkey. Greece successfully used diplomacy to 
internationalize and Europeanize its disputes with Turkey and redefined the Cyprus problem 
as a post-1974 phenomenon caused by the intervention of Turkey. Since 2004, the 
relationship between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey is firmly embedded in the EU framework 
where the former two enjoys a comparative advantage as full members. The accession of 
Greek Cypriots to the EU, the on-going isolation of Turkish Cypriots, and the ambivalent 
messages from the EU regarding Turkish membership caused a dramatic decline in the 
credibility of the union in Turkey. This undermined the security of Turkey‘s identity and the 
country entered into a period of instability since 2006.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
TURKEY‟S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST:  
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 domestic concerns in 
regards to national identity have prevented Turkish governments from making an effort to 
improve either bilateral or multilateral cooperation with most states of the Middle East. 
Despite its strong historical and cultural links with the region, Turkey has principally been an 
observer of events in the Middle East rather than being directly involved. Turkey‘s isolation 
in the Middle East is in large part a consequence of the Kemalist perception of foreign policy 
as an instrument for constructing a secular nation-state with a Western identity. For this 
reason, relations between Turkey and the Middle East should be examined in the context of 
Turkish identity. 
 With its limited interaction, Turkey could not be an effective player in the region‘s 
affairs and failed to bridge the gap between Europe and the Islamic world. Nevertheless, 
Turkey has started to pursue an activist foreign policy towards the Middle East in recent 
years. Turkey‘s activism in this region can be explained by the country‘s enhanced identity 
security in the EU context after 1999 which has undermined the political power of the 
military and paved the way for the democratization of Turkish foreign policy. This has 
altered Turkey‘s threat perceptions as well as her own image in the region. The conservative 
outlook and Islamic roots of the AKP has also contributed to the transformation of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. Thanks to its activist policy, Ankara has become an 
important diplomatic actor in the Middle East in recent years after decades of passivity. Over 
the past few years, Turkey has established close links with Syria and Iran and become a 
mediator between Israel and the Arabs. This rising prestige and power of Turkey in the 
Middle East is illustrated by the choice of a Turk, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, as the Secretary 
General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference by a democratic vote.  
 In brief, a positive relationship with the Middle East is probably the most-enhanced 
dimension of Turkish foreign policy in recent years. At this point a good question to ask is 
―will Turkey be able to play a constructive role in bridging the gap between the West and the 
Islamic world and prevent a possible civilisational conflict in the foreseeable future‘? Despite 
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all the positive developments in recent years, Turkey‘s ability to engage in the Middle East is 
still threatened by domestic political instability, likely to stem from identity issues such as the 
Kurdish nationalism and political Islam.  
 This chapter will outline the way different conceptions of Turkish identity lead to 
different foreign policy pathways and how Turkey‘s unstable corporate identity can hinder 
development along any one path. In doing so, it will firstly examine the positions of the 
military and the political parties. Subsequently, the discussion will focus on the Kurdish issue 
since it has been a major impediment on Turkey‘s democratization and activism in the 
Middle East. The next section will focus on business links between Turkey and the Middle 
East. Unlike previous chapters, this chapter will not talk about civil society since Turkish 
civil society does not play a major role in the formulation of Turkey‘s Middle East policy and 
civil society remains relatively weak in this region. The final section will concentrate on 
mutual perceptions between Turkey and the Middle East since they also influence the 
political attitudes and behaviours of foreign policy makers. 
 
 THE TURKISH MILITARY & THE MIDDLE EAST: 
This section aims to illustrate how the variations in the identity security of Turkey 
influences the Turkish military‘s position in regards to relations with the Middle East. To 
better understand the position of the Turkish military on relations with the Middle East, one 
has to bear in mind the two most important internal political issues in Turkey namely Kurdish 
nationalism and political Islam. These issues which constitute the greatest challenges for the 
military‘s aim of creating a secular, nation-state with a ‗Western‘ identity, were perceived 
and portrayed as Middle Eastern in origin. By doing so, the military externalized the 
unwanted parts of Turkey‘s identity and legitimized the use of extraordinary measures for 
tackling these issues. This strategy required de-orientalization at home and alienation from 
the Middle East in the foreign policy.
366
 In this context, interaction with the Middle East was 
kept to a minimum level and Ankara has only sought stability in its Middle East policy.
367
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For instance, the Saadabad Pact which was concluded with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan 
in 1937 was actually securing non-interference in domestic affairs among its members.
368
 
Likewise, the Baghdad Pact which is considered as the strongest interaction between Turkey 
and the Middle East before the end of the Cold War was only an extension of Turkey‘s 
NATO obligations. In order to enhance the security of its ‗Western‘ identity, Ankara 
appeared to see itself as the NATO‘s vehicle in the region and formulated its Middle East 
policy from a non-regional perspective.
369
  
 Nonetheless, as noted in the previous chapters, Turkey‘s ‗Western‘ identity has been 
severely undermined after the end of Cold War due to both external and internal reasons. The 
EU showed a great hesitancy about declaring Turkey as a candidate and prioritized the entry 
of former Eastern bloc countries. At home, Islamists became increasingly important in the 
1990s and the Welfare Party‘s (Refah Partisi, RP) share of the total vote increased to 19 
percent in the municipal elections of March 1994. Welfare Party candidates for mayor won in 
twenty-nine cities and in four hundred towns, including Istanbul, Ankara and almost all of the 
predominantly Kurdish municipalities in the southeast.
370
 In the context of rising identity 
insecurity, the military has sought to overcome Turkey‘s isolation within the Western world 
through the new alliance with Israel. 
   Turkey‘s military elite and the Ashkenazi elite of Israel share a common 
identification with the West. According to the Turkish military, Israel is the only ‗Western‘ 
and ‗civilized‘ country in the region. In this regards, relations with this country was perceived 
in terms of Turkey‘s historic Western orientation in foreign policy. Moreover, in both 
countries the military plays an important role in politics. Regarding the role of the military in 
Israeli politics Richard Sale, an intelligence correspondent for United Press International 
(UPI), wrote;  
‗the setting of national strategies and priorities is a consensus issue in Israel, not 
carried out by bodies headed by political appointees, but by men in uniform... All previous 
Israeli governments have given 'a tremendous amount of attention' to suggestions by the 
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military‘.371  
Many Israeli leaders have military backgrounds including David Ivry, Amnon Lipkin-
Shahak and Ehud Barak. This common identity between the Turkish military and the Israeli 
political elite led to common threat perceptions such as religious fundamentalism and general 
instability in the Middle East. In addition to the common threat perceptions, ongoing 
terrorism is the most important security problem in both countries. For this reason they have 
been more tolerant towards each other in regards to progress on human rights. Unlike the EU 
and the United States, Israel has been selling military hardware to Turkey on an 
unconditional basis. When asked by the Jerusalem Post, whether Israel considers human 
rights when it sells arms to other countries, David Ivry, an advisor to the Israeli defence 
minister said "Israel to this day has a policy of not intervening in any internal matters of any 
country in the world, we don't like it when others interfere in our internal matters. For this 
reason, our policy doesn't touch on such matters."
372
 
Considering these factors, Israel was a very attractive option for the Turkish military. 
Consequently, Israeli-Turkish military cooperation began to accelerate in mid-1990s. The two 
countries signed a secret security agreement on 13 March 1994 which was followed by an 
unpublished accord on training exercises in 1995.
373
 Until 1995, Ankara seemed to favour the 
development of military cooperation with Israel but out of the public eye. Nonetheless, the 
emergence of the RP, which promised to abrogate agreements with Israel and develop closer 
relations with the Islamic world during the election campaign, as the largest single party at 
the national elections of 24 December 1995 brought a change in the military‘s strategy. Since 
then, relations with the Middle East illustrate an example of the historical power struggle 
between the civilians and the army in Turkish politics. In this context, the military publicly 
signed a far-reaching military coordination agreement with Israel in early April 1996. The 
accord provided, among other things, for Israeli air force planes to utilize Turkish air space 
for training purposes.
374
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 Six months after the elections, the RP‘s leader Necmettin Erbakan established a 
coalition government on 28 June 1996. As soon as coming to power, Erbakan signalled his 
intention to re-orient Turkish foreign policy towards the east and turn Turkey into a leader in 
the Islamic world. The military did not wait too much to respond and concluded the signing 
of the Defence Industry and Co-operation agreement with Israel in order to give a message to 
the RP that they were powerful enough to determine the orientation of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy. In response, Erbakan chose Iran and Libya as the destinations of his first official 
visits. During his visits, Erbakan initiated several institutions including the ‗Developing 
Eight‘, an Islamic common market and even an Islamic NATO. On 30 January 1997, the 
mayor of Sincan near Ankara whose municipality was in the RP‘s control, held an event on 
Jerusalem, attended by Iranian Ambassador Ali Reza Bagheri who made a call for the 
implementation of Shariah. The military responded by sending tanks through the town, 
arresting the mayor, declaring the Iranian ambassador as persona non grata and launching an 
investigation against the RP.
375
 On 24 February, General İsmail Karadayı paid a visit to Israel 
without even informing the government, which was interpreted as a response to Erbakan‘s 
attempts to develop ties with the Islamic world. This was followed by the so-called post-
modern coup when the National Security Council ordered the government to implement a 
package of measures to prevent the spread of Islamic political and social movements in 
Turkey.  
During this tense time of rising disagreements between the military and the 
government Israeli foreign Minister David Levy visited Ankara on April 1997 and met with 
Chief of Staff General Karadayı.376 During this visit, Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to 
sign a free-trade agreement with Levy. The military aimed to humiliate the government and 
show that it is in the charge of Turkish foreign policy. Ironically, Turkey and Israel 
concluded their most important military cooperation agreements during Erbakan's tenure, 
which ended in June 1997, when he tendered his resignation under pressure from the MGK.  
The parameters of Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East started to change after 
1999. The transformation of Islamists after the ‗soft-coup‘ with the establishment of AKP, 
the capture of the leader of the terrorist organisation PKK and the approval of Turkey‘s 
candidacy by the EU enhanced the security of Turkey‘s identity. The EU context brought 
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stability, empowered civilians vis-à-vis the military and triggered a rapid democratization 
process in public and foreign policies of Turkey. As mentioned earlier, due to the enhanced 
security of Turkey‘s identity, the military tolerated the EU-related reforms which caused a 
decline in their power. In addition, the military preferred to remain silent regarding recent 
foreign policy developments such as the support of the Turkish government for the Annan 
Plan in Cyprus and the Turkish Parliament‘s refusal to support the US-led coalition in Iraq.  
 In brief, due to the enhanced identity security of Turkey after 1999 the military 
became less active in the formulation of Ankara‘s policy towards the Middle East. At this 
point, let us focus on the position of political parties to better understand the relationship 
between the level of Turkey‘s identity security and its capability to play a role in the Middle 
East commensurate with its size and capabilities. 
 
THE POSITION OF TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES: 
 As noted above, Turkey‘s enhanced identity security after 1999 allowed a more 
democratic foreign policy. In this context, political parties and civil society started to play a 
greater role in the formulation of Turkey‘s policy towards the Middle East. Due to its 
identity, the AK party has been particularly enthusiastic and capable of playing a greater role 
in the re-structuring of the Middle East in the post 9/11 context. After all, it comes from a 
political tradition which takes pride in Turkey‘s Ottoman past and perceives its Muslim 
identity as an asset for Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the AKP displayed a more cautious 
and coherent approach compared with its predecessor Welfare Party. Instead of proposing a 
hegemonic relationship with the Islamic world, the AKP suggested a relationship based on 
mutual interests and cooperation. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan has never explicitly mentioned an 
aim to establish an Islamic union under Turkey‘s leadership. He merely emphasized his 
government‘s interest for cooperation and the maintenance of a conflict-free relationship with 
the region.  
While seeking to consolidate Turkey‘s ties with the Islamic world, the AKP has taken 
reasonable care not to damage Turkey‘s strong ties with the West. It made use of institutions 
like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to intensify cooperation between the 
Islamic world and the West. The meetings of EU-OIC are an example of AKP‘s approach in 
foreign policy. This new approach is an attempt to enhance Turkey‘s international status as 
spokesman for the Muslim world both within and outside the union through a combination of 
the Western orientation of foreign policy with Turkish society‘s cultural and historical links 
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to the Islamic world.
377
    
Nevertheless the AKP‘s self-perception and policy vision which aimed to make a 
balance between the West (including Israel) and the Islamic world has complicated the 
definition of Turkey‘s national interests. The first and probably the biggest foreign policy test 
for the AKP government was the crisis between the United States and Iraq in 2003. In order 
to open a northern front for the invasion of Iraq Washington asked its strategic NATO ally to 
allow the deployment of almost seventy thousand American soldiers on Turkey‘s southern 
border. The decision to allow the northern front or not required great diplomatic ability since 
it was involving the most fragile of balancing acts for Ankara.
378
 However the environment 
for Turkey was not as helpless as it was during the first Gulf Crisis in 1990-91. First of all, 
9/11 and other developments had already restored the country‘s strategic importance for the 
West. Secondly, Turkey has improved its democracy and achieved significant progress 
towards EU accession which greatly enhanced its identity security.  
In this context, Ankara prioritized its own national preferences rather than its 
commitment to the NATO and denied the opening of a northern front despite the United 
States offer of a multi-million dollar economic compensation package. Most members of both 
the ruling AKP and the main opposition CHP voted negatively in the parliament session. The 
cooperation between the AKP and CHP showed that when Turkey‘s identity is relatively 
secure, the two opposing parties are more likely to cooperate on foreign policy issues. Since 
almost 80 percent of the Turkish public disapproved of the Iraq war this was considered as 
the most democratic foreign policy decision in recent years. Furthermore to a certain extent it 
challenged Turkey‘s negative image in the Middle East and has been a turning point for its 
relations with the region.  
Although Turkey did not join the US-led occupation forces in Iraq, Ankara has put 
tremendous effort into mobilizing regional support for a stable Iraqi state. In order to 
contribute to political stability of Iraq, the Turkish government initiated the Platform for Iraqi 
neighbours which met in Istanbul for the first time on 23 January 2003 with the aim of 
finding a peaceful solution to the problem. The platform maintained its activities after the 
beginning of the war. Through the platform, Iraq‘s neighbours agreed on the territorial 
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integrity and political unity of Iraq.
379
 This was the first time Ankara was cooperating with its 
neighbours on the future of Iraq and the Kurds. Some meetings of the platform were attended 
by representatives from the EU and the UN. Ankara‘s Iraqi diplomacy also found sympathy 
in the region. A clear indicator of this sympathy was Erdoğan‘s invitation to the Arab League 
summit in 2006 as a special observer.  
Turkey‘s rising prestige paved the way for a pro-active role for Ankara in the Arab-
Israeli conflict as well. Considering the deep-rooted issues between the two sides maintaining 
neutrality whilst playing this role has been a difficult task for the AKP. Its attempts to win the 
hearts of one side often threatened its relations with the other. For instance, Prime Minister 
Erdoğan‘s participation in the Arab League Summit in 2006 and his harsh critique of Israeli 
policies in the Palestinian territories was resented by Israel. And this was only the beginning 
of a ‗cooling down‘ process between the two allies. In the same year, Turkey has established 
close ties with Iran and Syria; with which Israel have very tense relations. On top of that, 
Khaled Meshal, the newly elected leader of the Hamas, was invited to Ankara by Erdoğan in 
February 2006.  
Israel‘s ambassador in Ankara responded to Erdoğan by comparing Hamas with the 
Kurdish terrorist organization PKK. Subsequently, one of the strongest Jewish interest groups 
in the United States, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), has formally recognized the 
‗genocide of Armenians‘ at the hand of Turkey, marking a dramatic U-turn over the 
organization's position on the issue.
380
 Considering AKP‘s Islamist roots, its contact with a 
fundamentalist Islamist group like Hamas naturally enhanced the suspicions of the Turkish 
secularists, particularly in the context of rising identity insecurity due to the slowdown in the 
EU process. Speaking about Khalid Mashaal‘s visit, the main opposition CHP‘s deputy leader 
Haluk Koç said;  
―With this visit Turkey came to a position where it can‘t make its point on similar 
groups…HAMAS aims to turn Palestine into an Islamic republic and govern it according to 
Islamic law. After this visit, Turkey came to a point where it can‘t say, ‗This is a terrorist 
group, and this group has certain troubles finding a diplomatic solution‖.381 
 Nevertheless, in the same year Ankara has managed to restore its ties with Israel. In 
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order to soften the ‗Hamas crisis‘, the AKP by-passed the foreign ministry and invited the 
Israeli ambassador to the party‘s headquarters. With this party diplomacy, Erdoğan has 
ensured the Israeli side that its aim of meeting Hamas‘ President is putting forward 
international demands to stop violence and work with Israel. In this meeting Erdoğan even 
offered to act as a mediator between Hamas and Israel. Israeli ambassador Avivi‘s statement 
after the meeting revealed the success of AKP‘s party diplomacy. He said; ‗the relationship 
between Turkey and Israel is excellent. Hamas should not influence our relations‘.382 The 
AKP also pleased Israel by proposing to send Turkish troops to Lebanon.  
This proposition received strong opposition at home. CHP‘s MP and vice-President 
Onur Öymen criticized the government for not sending troops to Northern Iraq which he 
described as the source of terrorism in Turkey, but sending them to Lebanon to fight for 
Israeli interests.
383
 Another CHP MP Ali Topuz warned the government by saying ‗a 
government which is unable to clean its own house looks eager to clean other‘s houses. This 
might be the straw that broke the camel‘s back‘.384 President Sezer, some officers within the 
military and many civil society organizations also expressed their concerns. Nevertheless, the 
AKP has managed to suppress the opposition and send Turkish troops to Lebanon. After this 
decision, the Israeli ambassador in Ankara said;  
‘We are not expecting anyone to fight for us. Turkey is sending its troops to secure its 
own national interests and regional responsibilities…Yet, the relationship between Turkey 
and Israel is as good as it has ever been before‘.385  
Under the rule of the AKP, Ankara has also strengthened its relations with other 
countries in the Middle East. Saudi King Abdullah and Egyptian President Mubarak visited 
Turkey in 2006 and 2007 respectively. These visits established a new strategic dialogue and 
partnership between Turkey and these states on energy cooperation and regional security. 
More importantly, close ties have been established with Syria and Iran, with which Turkey 
had problematic relations during the 1980s and 1990s. Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mustafa Miro visited Turkey in July 2003. This visit which was the highest level of 
diplomatic contact between Turkey and Syria since 1985, paved the way for cooperation 
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agreements on health, oil, natural gas and customs. Furthermore, in January 2004 President 
Bashar al-Assad became the first Syrian head of state to visit Turkey in fifty seven years. 
This visit further enhanced the cooperation between the two neighbours and started a 
personal relationship between Erdoğan and al-Assad.  
Since then the two leaders have met frequently and are known to have a friendly 
relationship. This relationship contributed greatly to the acceptance of Turkey as the mediator 
by both sides in Syria‘s peace talks with Israel. Another implication of the improved relations 
was Damascus‘ support for Turkey‘s military operation in Northern Iraq in 2007 as a 
response to rising terrorist attacks in the country. Commenting on the approval of the 
operation by the Turkish Parliament Syrian President Assad said ‗Turkey has a right to 
defend itself against this separatist and terrorist organization. As Syria, we are glad that the 
Turkish Parliament approved the operation‘.386 In 2008, Al-Assad and his wife Asma chose 
Turkey‘s popular resort Bodrum for their first holiday outside of their country.387 This 
demonstrated the extent of improvement in Ankara‘s relations with Damascus since 
according to Syria‘s protocol rules, Presidents do not go to foreign countries for holidays. 
The Syrian couple was welcomed by Erdoğan and his wife in Bodrum Airport and the two 
leaders discussed the latest developments in the peace talks between Syria and Israel.   
Turkey‘s relationship with Iran has also improved in recent years. The two neighbours 
began to cooperate in a wide variety of fields that range from fighting terrorism, energy and 
drug trafficking through to promoting stability in Iraq and Central Asia. In this context, 
Iranian President Ahmedinejad was invited to Turkey by the Turkish President Abdullah Gül 
despite the American efforts to isolate this country. Ahmeninejad arrived in Istanbul on 14 
August 2008. This visit was the highest level of diplomatic contact between the two countries 
since 1996. It strengthened Turkey‘s cooperation with Iran and confirmed her independent 
policy in the region. Nevertheless, it did not bring an energy deal between the two countries 
as expected. According to the Guardian, the United States tolerated this visit with the 
condition of not signing any agreement on energy cooperation.
388
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In addition to the external reactions, this visit also created a tension between the 
diverse camps of Turkey. The main reason behind this tension was the location of the 
meeting since the Iranian leader preferred to meet his Turkish counterpart in Istanbul instead 
of capital Ankara in order to avoid visiting Atatürk‘s mausoleum. During his visit, 
Ahmedinejad prayed in Istanbul‘s famous Sultanahmet (Blue) Mosque. With permission 
from Turkish authorities, he allowed Iranian television to videotape him during the entire 
prayer. As he left the mosque, Ahmadinejad got out of his car to greet a crowd of his 
sympathizers who were chanting, "Death to Israel! Death to America!".
389
 Following the visit 
CHP President said ‗with his attitudes and messages Ahmedinejad made Iranian regime‘s 
propaganda. AKP tolerated his non-compliance to the state protocol and turned Turkey into 
an area of propaganda for him‘.390     
To conclude, Turkey has become an increasingly important actor in the Middle East 
after 1999. However the AKP‘s paradoxical attitudes due to its complex identity threatened 
Turkey‘s ties with the West particularly in the context of the slowdown in EU accession talks. 
These attitudes also increased the concerns of the secularists who are worried about the 
maintenance of Turkey‘s secular and Western identity. These concerns brought an end to the 
consensus between Turkey‘s diverse camps in regards to the Middle East policy and severely 
limited Ankara‘s ability to act as an effective player in the region‘s affairs. 
 
THE KURDISH ISSUE & TURKEY‟S MIDDLE EAST POLICY: 
Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, domestic conflict over 
Kurdish identity has been slowing down Turkey‘s political development. Considering its 
terror dimension since the 1980s, Kurdish separatism has been the most important threat to 
Turkey‘s stability. Its implications threaten the development of democracy and human rights 
and endanger the balance between civil society, the state and the military in Turkey.
391
 Apart 
from its domestic dimension, it has also been a major issue in Turkey‘s relations with the 
Middle East, particularly with other Kurdish-inhabited countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. 
Turkey‘s involvement in Northern Iraq which threatens Turkey‘s relations with the West and 
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Israel is also related with the Kurdish issue. For these reasons, this section will focus on the 
Kurdish problem and will demonstrate how the changes in the identity security of Turkey 
influences its policy to tackle the problem and  how this influenced Turkey‘s Middle East 
policy in general.  
To the Kemalist founders of Turkey, Eastern Anatolia, and particularly the Kurds 
represented tribalism, backwardness and banditry.
392
 Kemalists generally looked down on the 
Kurdish culture and perceived the Kurds as an economic burden on their country. As Göle 
pointed out ‗Turks who were considered barbarians in the West, tried to enter into the 
civilized world by creating their own barbarians in the form of first Muslims and second the 
Kurds‘.393 Despite this perception, Kemalists remained highly committed to the pre-
dominantly Kurdish-inhabited South-eastern Anatolia. This commitment cannot be explained 
merely by the region‘s economic or strategic importance.   
It has a deeper emotional and psychological dimension which is connected with the 
so-called ‗Sèvres Paranoia‘.394 For this reason, the loss of the Kurdish-inhabited southeast 
would be perceived as a big blow to the spatial identity of Turkey. In this context, any 
demand for Kurdish cultural freedoms was seen as an existential threat to the integrity of 
Turkey. The Kurdish identity also challenges the Kemalist aim of creating a modern, 
centralized and secular nation-state with a Western identity. As Barkey pointed out the 
recognition of the existence of the Kurds in Turkey makes rejecting the Middle Eastern 
identity more difficult for the Turkish state.
395
 In this context, Kemalists denied the Kurdish 
identity and strongly opposed increasing the local autonomy of the region. Instead, they 
attempted to assimilate the Kurdish population by banning the use of Kurdish names, 
language and the word ‗Kurdistan‘. Foreign policy was also used as an instrument of nation-
building and assimilation. As noted above, Kurdish nationalism was portrayed to the public 
as an external phenomenon with its roots in the Middle East. In this context, the Turkish state 
pursued an isolationist and non-active foreign policy in the region in order to strengthen 
internal cohesion and secure its identity. 
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Nevertheless, these policies failed to integrate the bulk of the Kurdish minority into 
the new secular Turkish Republic for various reasons. First of all, the establishment of new 
borders and a national economy destroyed the traditional economic networks between the 
Kurds in Turkey and its neighbouring countries.
396
 Secondly, the state did not implement any 
land reform in Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, the Kurds remained as a semi-feudal society with 
little chances for economic development. Thirdly, the exclusion of Islam from the public 
sphere destroyed the most important bond between the Turkish state and the Kurds. As 
İçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci noted ‗religious and traditional Kurds had little appetite for a 
secular Turkey‘.397 Unsurprisingly, the early rebellions of the Kurds in 1920s and 1930s 
which were harshly suppressed by the state were more religious and tribal in nature than 
ethnic nationalist.  
After the establishment of the multi-party system in 1946, Turkish political parties, 
particularly centre-right parties, began to cooperate with powerful local Kurdish landowners 
(known as Aghas) in order to secure the loyalty of the Kurdish population. In time Aghas 
have become assimilated members of the Ankara government. According to Taşpınar, one 
third of the Turkish Parliament during the 1950s was composed of powerful Kurdish 
landowners.
398
 However, most of the Kurdish population was still living in an environment of 
extreme poverty and psychological insecurity. Since Turkey‘s cleavages developed along 
ideological lines rather than ethnic and religious during the Cold War years, most members of 
the Kurdish intelligentsia were attracted by Marxist ideas. Nonetheless, in line with the rise of 
ethnic nationalism and identity politics towards the end of the Cold War, Kurdish nationalism 
in Turkey had become much more prominent. The Kurdistan Worker‘s Party (Partiya 
Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK) politicized and united Turkey‘s Kurds on an ethnic nationalist 
basis and started a guerrilla war against the Turkish state in 1984.     
The Turkish state responded to Kurdish terrorism with military actions. Kurdish 
regions were placed under martial law and the regional governors who controlled these 
provinces were granted extraordinary powers such as the power to evacuate villages and 
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farmland, close media outlets, and later forcibly resettle citizens.
399
 Although these actions 
brought a temporary stability to the region, they further weakened the loyalty of the Kurds to 
the Turkish state. As a result, the PKK increased its members and sympathizers in Turkey, 
acquired more resources and modern military weapons and became almost like a national 
army. At the same time, thousands of Kurds migrated to Western Europe due to unstable 
conditions, which to a certain extent internationalized the issue.
400
  
In a regional context, Turkey, Syria and Iran did not cooperate on the Kurdish issue 
despite the fact that the domestic policies of one government could influence the stability of 
others. Each state responded differently to the Kurdish problem which shows the difficulty of 
achieving cooperation between countries with diverse political identities. Turkey particularly 
avoided interaction due to its anxieties over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. While 
Turkey was avoiding interaction with these governments, the PKK developed closer ties with 
them. Until the end of the 1990s, Syria had provided valuable safe havens to the PKK in the 
region of Beqaa Valley and tried to use it for getting concessions from Ankara over the 
supply of water. Iran provided the terrorist organization with supplies in the form of weapons 
and funds. The PKK also found support in some European countries such as Belgium, Greece 
and Cyprus. In addition to state support, many international human rights organizations 
started campaigns throughout the world for supporting the enhancement of Kurdish cultural 
and political rights in Turkey.  
In the meantime, the PKK changed its ideology from Marxism to Islamic discourse 
after the end of the Cold War which boosted its popularity among the traditionally religious 
Kurdish society of Turkey. Rising domestic instability and international pressure forced the 
Turkish state to change its strategy as well. Complete denial of the Kurdish identity was 
abandoned, and the Turkish state began to focus on economic and cultural aspects of the 
problem rather than security. In this context, a $20 billion integrated project which provided 
the construction of 21 dams and 17 hydroelectric power plants (known as the Southeast 
Anatolian Project, GAP) was introduced. The aim of this project was to improve the 
agricultural production and infrastructure in the region which will eventually provide 
employment and prosperity.  
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In the 1990s the Kurdish identity began to be recognised at least on a private and 
individual level. The ban on speaking the Kurdish language was lifted in 1991 under the 
premiership of Özal. According to Somer, these measures were related with Özal‘s foreign 
policy vision. He wrote ‗foreseeing the potential disintegration of Iraq after the Gulf War, 
Özal determined that the best Turkish response to the possibility of a U.S-backed Kurdish 
entity in Iraq was to sponsor Kurds‘.401 As a result of this thinking, a long-time state policy of 
avoiding any formal relations with the Iraqi Kurds was abandoned.  
After the death of Özal, his liberal approach did not continue. The EU‘s hesitation to 
declare Turkey as a candidate for membership and the rise of political Islam at home severely 
undermined the security of Turkey‘s identity in the eyes of secularists, notably the military. 
As a result, Ankara turned back to its militaristic strategy in order to tackle the Kurdish 
problem. Military conflict between the state and the PKK was intensified until the capture of 
the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. After this event, the Turkish state has declared 
victory against the PKK on the combat zone. Nonetheless, this did not bring an end to the 
multi-dimensional Kurdish question in Turkey.  
Despite being portrayed by the Kemalists as merely a security issue, the most 
important source of the Kurdish problem is the socio-economic inequality between the Kurds 
and the rest of the Turkish population. Statistics reveal that the economic frontier between the 
least developed areas and the rest of Turkey roughly corresponds to the ethnic divide between 
the Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority of Eastern Anatolia.
402
 Due to several reasons 
the GAP did not bring the desired prosperity to the region. The issue of land ownership and 
redistribution is imprecise. Besides, private-sector is still hesitant to invest in this instable and 
isolated area. Consequently, per capita income in Eastern Anatolia is only about 40 per cent 
of the national average.
403
  
This economic disparity is one of the most important barriers for the integration of the 
Kurds into mainstream Turkish culture and society. It paved the way for the massive Kurdish 
migration in the 1980s from Eastern Anatolia to the more developed parts of Western Turkey. 
Augmented interaction between urban Turks and rural Kurds made differences more 
noticeable and created a social snobbery among the former group towards the latter. This has 
                                                          
401
   Somer, M. (2005), “Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, 
and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.38, No.6, p.618 
402
   For a detailed discussion please see Icduygu, A., Romano, D. And Sirkeci, I. (1999), “The Ethnic Question in 
an Environment of Insecurity: the Kurds in Turkey”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.22, No.6 
403
   Ibid. 
 186 
 
generated to a sense of exclusion among the Turkey‘s Kurds. Also, it made using the political 
process more difficult for them which impeded their integration into the mainstream Turkish 
society and eased their mobilization by the terrorist organizations. 
However, the approval of Turkey‘s EU candidacy and the capture of PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 brought a rise in the identity security of the country. This softened 
up the political climate in Ankara and allowed a more democratic policy to tackle the Kurdish 
problem which is necessary to meet EU‘s ‗Copenhagen criteria‘. As former Prime Minister 
Mesut Yılmaz, declared in December 1999 ‗the road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir‘404, 
the largest city in predominantly Kurdish-inhabited South-east Anatolia.   
As a party which prioritizes EU membership, the AKP adopted a relatively liberal 
approach compared to previous Turkish governments. Due to the features of AKP‘s identity 
which stems from an anti-establishment and Islamist tradition, Erdoğan did not hesitate to 
adopt a liberal approach. After all, nationalism is a concept alien to Islam because it calls for 
unity based on tribalistic ties, whereas Islam binds people together on the belief in Allah and 
His Messenger. In other words, Islam calls for the ideological bond. Erdoğan‘s personal 
history of fighting for more religious freedom (and his subsequent imprisonment under the 
Article 312 of the Turkish criminal code for reading a few lines from a poem) may have also 
encouraged him to challenge the status quo not only in matters of religion/secularism but also 
those of ethnicity.
405
 
In this context, the AKP emphasized the social and economic aspects of the Kurdish 
issue instead of focusing merely on its security dimension. As soon as coming to power, the 
party has announced some economic investment plans in the south-eastern provinces and 
improved the cultural and educational rights of the Kurds. On 30 November 2002, the 
emergency rule in the south eastern Anatolia was lifted completely. As part of EU-related 
reforms and new political climate, Ankara started allowing Kurdish broadcasting and the 
teaching of Kurdish at private language institutions in 2002.
406
 Subsequently, the parliament 
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passed laws allowing parents to give their children Kurdish names. In 2003, Turkey passed a 
law that allowed Kurds to have their own radio stations for the first time which resulted in 
limited Kurdish broadcasts. The abolition of the death penalty and the release of former 
Kurdish parliamentarians from prison in 2004 were other important developments in regards 
to the Kurdish problem.  
 In addition to these developments, the government adopted a new discourse in the 
fight against PKK terrorism. On August 2005 Prime minister Erdoğan declared that Turkey 
had a "Kurdish problem," had made "grave mistakes" in the past, and now needed "more 
democracy to solve the problem."
407
 On December 2005 he explicitly stated that there are 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin who have certain problems that have to be settled. Erdoğan 
suggested that the Turkish citizenship is the supra-identity (üst-kimlik). According to him, the 
Kurdish identity should also be recognized a sub-identity (alt-kimlik). These statements 
generated livid reactions from Turkey's secularist and nationalist circles. CHP blamed the 
Prime Minister for being vague about, and failing to fully describe, the Kurdish problem. 
According to this group, Erdoğan fell into the trap where he helped to legitimize the demands 
of the illegal PKK which was an unfortunate situation for the country.
408
   
 During an official visit to New Zealand in the same month, Erdoğan pushed the limits 
of the secularists by saying ‗Turkey's dozens of ethnic groups were tied together by their 
shared religion - meaning Islam: "Turkey is 99 percent Muslim, and above all, it is our 
religion that ties us all together."
409
 Erdoğan's statements on Turkish identity occupied the 
public agenda throughout December 2005. On the subject of Prime Minister Erdoğan's 
definition of Islam as the "cement" of the people of Turkey, opposition CHP member of 
parliament Ali Topuz said; 
"[…] if religion [Islam] is the cement of our people, what are we supposed to do about our 
non-Muslim minorities [and] the atheists? Are we going to exclude them from our nation? 
[…] The prime minister must remember that Ataturk brought us secularism, and absolute 
separation of state and religion is one of the most important principles of the Turkish 
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revolution. […] I call on the prime minister to demonstrate political maturity."410  
 Despite these debates, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) decided 
to allow limited broadcasting in Kurdish (45 minutes) by the end of January 2006.
411
 
Moreover, the AKP started to pursue a more cooperative foreign policy towards the Kurdish-
dominated Northern Iraq and Iraqi neighbours. The AKP had agreed with the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) to begin air flights between Erbil and Istanbul for humanitarian 
reasons. Turkish companies were encouraged to invest in oil and gas companies which 
operate in Northern Iraq. Furthermore trade with Northern Iraq was improved and reached to 
a volume of $2.5 billion in 2007. Rising trade and other economic ties has not only provided 
employment for nearly two hundred thousand people in the southeast of Turkey but also 
increased the interdependence between Turkey and Northern Iraq which may possibly 
restrain the Iraqi Kurds from demanding greater autonomy.
412
 On the other hand, Ankara 
started to pursue regional diplomacy in order to legitimize its war against the PKK. In this 
context, it utilized the formalized meetings of Iraq‘s neighbours and managed to generate 
support from Syria and Iran regarding its sensitivities on the territorial integrity of Iraq and 
the PKK terror.            
The AKP's relatively conciliatory approach to Kurdish demands, its allocation of 
significant funds to the Kurdish regions, its Islamic identity which appeals to the traditional 
and pious Kurds and finally its strategy of nominating ethnic Kurds as candidates
413
 gave its 
fruits in the 2007 elections. A notable aspect of the AKP's electoral success was its huge 
appeal among the Kurdish voters. In many provinces heavily populated by the Kurds, the 
party more than doubled its share of the vote and won a victory against the Kurdish separatist 
Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). This victory provided the AKP 
with an opportunity for initiating new reforms but the party faced strong pressure from the 
secularists and nationalists in the context of rising identity insecurity due to both internal and 
external reasons. The AKP‘s priority to lift the headscarf ban in Turkish universities instead 
                                                          
410
 Middle East Media Research Institute, ‘PM Erdogan: Islam is Turkey’s Supra-Identity’, 7 February 2006, 
Special Dispatch, No.1086. Available online at: 
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP108606 
411
 Yavuz, H. Ozcan,N. and A. Ozcan. (2006). ―The Kurdish question and Turkey's Justice andDevelopment 
Party―, Middle East Policy, VOL. XIII, NO. 1, Spring.,p.114 
412
   For a detailed discussion please see Olson, R. (2006), ―Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the 
Wider Middle East, and Iran‖, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.14, No.4 
413
   Around 100 of the AKP‘s 341 MPs are believed to be of Kurdish origin. 
 189 
 
of initiating a comprehensive democratization package attracted harsh criticisms from the 
civilian military bureaucracy, media groups and certain civil society organizations. Indeed, 
the AKP faced being completely disbanded by the constitutional court. The rise in PKK terror 
since 2006 also strengthened the secularists and provided an opportunity for the military to 
publicize its views through press releases, briefings to journalists and interviews with top 
officers.
414
 Ambivalent messages from the EU were another factor which undermined 
Turkey‘s identity security and in this way overshadowed the reform process in the country 
including the Kurdish issue. Undoubtedly, the feelings of isolation and humiliation in the EU 
context triggered the rise of nationalism and alienated those who are in favour of improving 
the cultural and political rights of the Kurds.   
 In this context of rising identity insecurity, the AKP government did not want to take 
the risk of bringing the Kurdish issue into the agenda. On the contrary, it surrendered to the 
secularists‘ pressure and adopted a relatively nationalistic discourse compared to its earlier 
position of early 2000s. On October 2007, the government went further and approved cross-
border raids on the PKK bases in Northern Iraq. Thanks to earlier diplomacy, this decision 
found some support in the region. Syrian President Assad said ‗Turkey has a right to defend 
itself against this separatist and terrorist organization. As Syria, we are glad that the Turkish 
Parliament approved the operation‘.415 Eventually, Turkish Air Forces started an aerial 
bombardment against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq on 16 December 2007. This was 
followed by a ground incursion of Northern Iraq on 21 February 2008. The Turkish army 
declared that their goals had been achieved and the operation came to an end on 29 February 
2008. This short-lived operation triggered strong criticism from the opposition. CHP‘s leader 
Deniz Baykal argued that the operation was short-lived because the United States does not 
want the PKK to be completely eliminated in the region.
416
  
Although the operation did not last long enough to eradicate the PKK, it was a big 
blow for the terrorist organization. Moreover, by keeping the operation limited and short 
Ankara secured its regional support regarding its war on terror. The short military incursions 
did not raise strong criticism in Iraq either. During the operation the Iraqi President Jelal 
                                                          
414
 Polat, R.K. (2008), ‘The AKP and the Kurdish Issue: What Went Wrong’, SETA Policy Brief, No.14,p.3 
Available online at http://www.setav.org/document/Policy_Brief_No_14_Rabia_Karakaya_Polat.pdf 
415
   Sabah, ‘Esat: Kuzey Irak’a Operasyon Yapılsın. Yanınınzdayız’, October, 13th, 2007. Available online at 
[http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/10/18//haber,51E403EE2C73406D8F94274252DE5637.html] 
416
   NTV (16:32 TSİ 03 Mart 2008). Baykal: ABD, PKK’nın bitirilmesini istemedi (Baykal: USA did not want the 
elimination of the PKK) 
 190 
 
Talabani emphasised that the operation is only against the PKK and said ―We see the PKK as 
a terrorist organization. I recommend them to leave their bases in Qandil Mountains‘.417 
Kurdish regional leader Barzani also stated that they do not want to be a part of the conflict 
between the PKK and Turkey.
418
  
 After these operations, 2008 witnessed a revival in the government‘s interest in 
initiating reforms on the Kurdish issue. This can be explained with the AKP‘s enhanced self-
confidence after the constitutional court‘s decision not to ban the party and the government‘s 
efforts to secure Turkey‘s identity by getting membership talks with the EU back on track. 
The party announced its plans to open a Kurdish state television channel. In January 2009 the 
state-owned TV channel TRT 6 launched 24-hour broadcasting in the Kurdish language. 
Erdogan spoke Kurdish in his welcoming message to TRT 6. Several CHP officials, 
including the party leader Deniz Baykal strongly criticized the government for the launch of 
the TRT6 and claimed that this would go against the ―basic understanding of the state.‖419 In 
another statement he said; ―It is not right to spend the money of the state and 70 million 
people in line with the ethnic demands of a certain group of our citizens. The duty of the state 
is not to encourage ethnic identities. Turkey is heading in the wrong direction.‖420 
In 2009, AKP went even further and declared plans to introduce a comprehensive 
‗Kurdish opening‘ very soon. The details of the plan are still not finalized. Nevertheless, 
some possible measures which are being discussed currently include the acceptance of 
Kurdish as a second language at schools, restoring the names of the geographical locations to 
their original Kurdish names and the establishment of Kurdology institutes that will study 
Kurdish language and literature. The main opposition CHP has already announced that it will 
not become part of the government‘s ‗Kurdish opening‘. Baykal said; Baykal said: ―I would 
like to inform Mr. Prime Minister that we will in no way become part of this process that we 
don't know who is behind. Mr. Prime Minister has set out on a wrong path. He will not find 
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us to be companions during this journey.‖ 421 
As the above discussion showed, the identity of diverse actors and the identity 
security of Turkey in the EU context strongly influence Ankara‘s position on the Kurdish 
issue. The most radical reforms on the issue and the most active cooperation with other 
Kurdish-inhabited countries took place under the rule of AKP which has Islamic roots and 
coincided with the period in which relations with the EU were at their best. Since 2005, 
however, ambivalent messages from the EU in regards to Turkish membership, controversy 
over presidential elections, the AKP‘s focus on lifting the headscarf ban in universities and 
rising PKK attacks undermined the identity security of the country. This context threatened 
the stability of Turkey and revitalized the discourse of encirclement and distrust to the EU. 
As a result, the government has turned to a nationalistic stance on the Kurdish issue and 
engaged in military activities in Northern Iraq. Since 2008 we witnessed a revival in the 
AKP‘s interest to initiate new reforms in the Kurdish issue due to the party‘s willingness to 
get Turkey‘s accession talks with the EU back on track which will undermine identity 
insecurity of the country and soften the political climate in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, this 
triggered a furious reaction from the secularists. The debates were continuing in the country 
at the time this chapter is being written. We will wait and see if the AKP can overcome the 
secularists‘ objections and realize the reforms to improve the political and cultural rights of 
Turkey‘s Kurds. 
 
BUSINESS TIES: 
 This section will examine the relationship between the variations in the security of 
Turkey‘s identity and its business ties with the Middle East. Until recent decades, Turkey‘s 
economic contacts with the Middle East were rather low. Both Turkish and Middle Eastern 
businessmen were reluctant to cooperate with each other. A deep-seated mutual suspicion 
prevented them from seeing the benefits of economic cooperation. Although some Turkish 
businessmen attempted to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the newly-rich oil 
exporting countries after the first oil shock in 1973, this effort was too little, too late. The 
ignorance of Arab culture, language and trading procedures and the lack of a direct trade 
legacy enhanced mutual prejudices on both sides. Moreover, as Robins put it; ―even at the 
height of Arab economic power in late 1970s and early 1980s there was always a sense of 
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distaste in Turkey for the Arabs‖.422 Whenever Turkish companies attempted to establish 
commercial ties with this region they were criticized by the state and the military which was 
simply not interested in the so-called ‗Green Capital‘ (the unofficial term used to describe the 
financial assets of domestic Islamists and Islamic states) due to identity concerns. 
 Nevertheless, the 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in the value of trade between 
Turkey and the Middle East. In 1982, 44.2 percent of Turkish exports were going to the 
Middle East. In particular, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia emerged as important trading partners 
of Turkey. Turkey‘s neutrality during the Iraq-Iran War secured its commercial ties with both 
countries. Before the Gulf War Iraq was the most important trading partner of Turkey in the 
Middle East. In 1990, Turkey had $2.5 billion worth of annual trade with Iraq, making it the 
fourth largest trading partner in the world. This dramatic increase in the economic interaction 
between Turkey and the Middle East was triggered by the changing structure of the Turkish 
political system and economy from an import substitution model based on etatism to a liberal 
and export oriented model during the 1980s. Turgut Özal, prime minister from 1983 to 1989, 
played a key role in this process which reflects the importance of the political elite‘s 
perceptions on the determination of development strategies and the economic relations of a 
country. According to him, increasing trade with Turkey‘s neighbours will not only enhance 
his country‘s prosperity but also its value as an ally of the West.  
 Ankara‘s choice to support the United States in the Gulf War by allowing American 
forces to fly missions from its air bases, despite its strong economic interaction with the 
Middle East, particularly with Iraq, showed that the second motivation was in fact more 
important for Özal‘s government. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey was in an effort to 
prove its strategic significance to the West. Turkey‘s ‗Western‘ identity and the international 
role which was attached to it were threatened with the changing determinants of Western 
identity in the post-Cold War period. In this context, Özal attempted to enhance the security 
of Turkey‘s ‗Western‘ identity and prioritized Ankara‘s strategic commitment to the West 
over its economic interests.  
The cost of this pro-Western policy for the Turkish economy has been enormous. 
When the UN sanctions were put in place after the war ended in 1991, trade between Turkey 
and Iraq fell practically to zero. Turkey has lost somewhere between $30 and $50 billion in 
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trade because of the UN embargo.
423
 Other Arab states were also provoked to punish Turkey 
with economic penalties. For example, a $21 billion project to transport surplus water from 
the Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers to Arab states and Israel through a so-called ‗Peace Pipeline‘ 
was suspended. The economic cost of the Iraq war brought its political and social costs as 
well. Most of Turkey‘s trade with Iraq before the war was made through country‘s south-
eastern provinces, making it the worst affected region from the UN sanctions. Since this 
region is mostly inhabited by Turkish Kurds, ending trade with Iraq enhanced the social 
discontent among this group and increased the political tension in the country. In the 
environment of rising unemployment and other economic problems, the Kurdish terrorist 
organization PKK easily recruited new members and intensified its attacks against the 
Turkish state. Although Turkey gained international praise for siding against Iraq, this was 
not sufficient for securing its place within the Western camp. Moreover, Turkey could neither 
increase its exports to the Middle East nor received sufficient compensation from the United 
States to cover its loss from the war.  
 During the 1990s identity-related domestic issues, notably the rise of Islamism and 
Kurdish nationalism, and the support of some Middle Eastern states to these movements 
continued to affect Turkey‘s commercial links with the region negatively. Nevertheless, the 
election of the reformist Mohammad Khatami as the President of Iran in 1997, the end of 
Syria‘s support to the PKK after the Turkish threat in 1998 and the capture of terrorist leader 
Öcalan prepared the political atmosphere for better economic relations. The approval of 
Turkey‘s EU candidacy which boosted the country‘s identity security and the rise of the AKP 
with a ‗conservative/Muslim democrat‘ identity to power after the 2002 national elections 
have further enhanced this positive environment.  
From the very beginning, the AKP has showed a great enthusiasm to improve 
Turkey‘s economic and political relations with the Middle East. Most Middle Eastern leaders 
too, especially Arab monarchs who owe their legitimacy to religion, have felt more 
comfortable to deal with the AKP compared to previous militant secularist governments of 
Turkey. Most leaders of the AKP have Islamist backgrounds. Some of them including current 
President Gül and Bülent Arınç, spent many years in the Arab countries and can speak the 
Arabic language fluently. These factors helped many AKP leaders to establish business 
partnerships with the Arab companies. When combined with the impact of the EU related 
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economic reforms, the existence of a conservative government, have transformed Turkey to 
an exciting market to invest for the oil rich states of the Persian Gulf. In recent years Turkey 
received massive investments from the Middle Eastern countries, most notably the United 
Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In 2006 Arab capital invested in 
Turkey was $2 billion.  
Arabs mostly invested in the finance sector, tourism and real estate. In 2005, the 
Lebanese company Oger purchased 55 percent of the Turkish Telecom by paying US$5.5 
billion. After winning the bid, the company‘s vice-president Mohammad Hariri said ‗AKP‘s 
strong reference to Islam was an important factor which influenced our decision to take part 
in the bid and pay this amount of money‘.424 In the same year Oger did manage to buy 
Turkcell, the largest Turkish mobile company, for $6.6 billion while Prince Muhammed bin 
Rashid al-Makhtum of Dubai visited Istanbul to sign a deal for investing US$ 300 million in 
an office and business complex consisting of two, three hundred meter high buildings to be 
called the ‗Dubai Towers‘. In January 2006, the Dubai Islamic Bank bought Turkey's MNG 
Bank for $160 million. Several Arab companies bid on government-owned companies that 
were to be privatized, including various sea ports. Many others, such as Salma Harib and 
Umar Ayish visited Turkey to investigate the possibilities of investment. According to 
Jordanian entrepreneur Mohammed Asfour who is also an advisor to King Houssein ‗the 
most important reason behind the recent interest of the Arab capitalists in Turkey is the fact 
that AKP is ruling the country‘.425 
Turkish companies too showed great enthusiasm to do business in the Arab countries. 
In December 2005, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce paid a several-day visit to Dubai and 
Qatar. In the same year, Baytur, the biggest Turkish construction company had signed two 
contracts worth $379 million to build the Qatar Islamic Art Museum and the Qatar National 
Library while another Turkish company, Tekfen, announced its engagement in constructing a 
158-kilometer natural gas pipeline for $115 million. In 2006 Turkish-Austrian Company 
TAV was awarded an $869 million contract to participate in the building of the new terminal 
for Doha International Airport
426
. Apart from these mutual investments, trade between 
Turkey and the Middle East has also grown from $3 billion to $17 billion over the last decade 
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and today the vast majority of it is non-oil business.  
Despite its apparent economic benefits for the Turkish economy, secularists have 
become increasingly suspicious of the rising economic interdependence between Turkey and 
the Islamic world. In the context of rising identity insecurity due to the slowdown in the EU 
process, economic interaction with the Islamic world has become another source of tension 
between the diverse camps of Turkey. Big-scale investments from the Arab countries caused 
particular anxiety among the secularists despite their contribution to the economic growth of 
Turkey. For example, in 2005 the rumours about selling a state farmland in Yalova, which 
was established by Atatürk, to the Arabs caused severe reactions in the secularist camp.  
CHP‘S MP Gürol Ergin stated ‗selling Ataturk‘s farmland to the Arabs is disrespecting his 
legacy thus it is unacceptable. We will do our best to prevent this deal‘.427 Secularist media 
started to publish articles which expressed the concern about the cultural impact of the 
increasing Arab investment in Turkey. Journalist Haluk Şahin wrote; 
‗Capital might not have a race or nationality but it surely has a culture. It brings its 
culture to wherever it goes. For this reason the source of capital is important. As people of 
Istanbul we should ask ourselves; ‗What kind of a culture will the Arab capital bring to our 
city? How it will influence our daily lives? What modes of attires, entertainment, and social 
activities are going to be encouraged with this money? And who is this capital going to 
cooperate with?‘ 428  
In 2008, AKP‘s cooperation with Arab capital has come to light once again.  Turkey‘s 
second biggest media conglomerate, Sabah ATV, was purchased by Ahmet Çalık who is a 
close associate of Prime Minister Erdoğan. This deal has caused controversy in the country 
since Mr. Çalık who raised money for the purchase from two state-owned banks and a Qatari 
company, was the only bidder. Moreover, according to the Economist, ‗Mr. Erdoğan has 
lobbied the Emir of Qatar personally to invest in the deal. CHP has asked the parliament to 
investigate the deal, saying that it stinks‘.429 
These debates show that until Turkey achieves a securer identity and eliminates all 
prejudices and fears about the Islamic world, especially regarding the development, it will not 
be able to fulfil its economic potential with the Middle East. Despite the recent developments, 
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Arab countries account for only 10 percent of Turkey's foreign trade, and oil-rich Oman, for 
example, represents only 1 percent of this number. In brief, Turkey has not yet fully 
transformed its geographic and cultural proximity with the Middle East to economic benefits. 
Despite the positive trend in recent years, Turkey‘s economic ties with the Islamic world 
continue to be volatile due to its fluctuating identity security. 
 
SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS: 
 Most of the Turks and their Middle Eastern neighbours continue to see each other in 
the light of their acquired images. Although most countries in the Middle East are not 
democratic, societal perceptions still have an influence on the political attitudes and 
behaviours of foreign policy makers. For this reason, this final section will examine the 
construction of historical images in Turkey and the Middle East. Subsequently, the discussion 
will shift to recent changes in the mutual images.  
 As a matter of fact, perceptions between Turkey and the Middle East can show 
significant differences from one country to another. After all, unlike the European countries, 
the states of the Middle East do not form a unified block with common principles and 
policies. Nonetheless, we can broadly talk about three distinct areas, the Arab world, Iran and 
Israel.  
A. THE ARAB WORLD:  
Arabs and Turks have traditionally had negative perceptions of each other. From a 
historical point of view, the Arab uprising in collaboration with Britain during the First 
World War is remembered in Turkey as an act of betrayal. As former President Cemal Bayar 
confirmed ‗Turkey was simply not disposed…to re-establish a close relationship with a 
nation which has stabbed the Turkish nation in the back‘.430 For a long time after the war, this 
perception has legitimized Kemalists‘ reluctance to establish ties with the Arab world. 
During the process of developing a nation-building strategy to construct a secular 
nation-state with a ‗Western‘ identity, the Turkish state has implemented a far-reaching 
policy of de-Arabization and de-Islamization of the Turkish society.
431
 The Ottoman script 
which was based on the Arabic alphabet was replaced with a new variant of the Latin 
alphabet. In addition, the newly established Turkish Language Association initiated a 
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campaign to reform the language by getting rid of Persian and Arabic loanwords and 
replacing them with native variants and coinages from ancient Turkic origins. The influence 
of Islam, which was the most important link between the Turks and the Arabs, was also 
methodically reduced with the Kemalist reforms. Eventually, Islam lost its status as the 
official religion of the Turkish state in 1928.   
In addition to the reforms of the state, intellectual circles of the time associated Islam 
and particularly the Arab world with backwardness. Many writers of the period expressed a 
lack of respect for the Arabs and attributed the lack of sufficient development in the Ottoman 
Empire to their cultural influence on Turkish society.
432
 For example, novelist Burhan Cahin 
wrote;  
‗We came near to extinction as we tried to free ourselves from this race (the Arabs) 
which has lost all nobility and vitality. I personally would much rather see as neighbours on 
our southern frontiers fashionable Parisians, than Syrians who have made the pilgrimage to 
Mecca‘433   
The placing of the Arabs into a lower cultural position generated a sense of superiority 
in the Turkish society against their former co-patriots. Images of the untrustworthy Arab and 
the uncivilized, backward Arab states governed by Sharia law are common in Turkey, 
particularly among the secularized upper classes in urban centres. Nonetheless, most of the 
people living in rural areas remained conservative, religious and as such aware of their 
similarities with the Middle Eastern Arabs.
434
  
While Kemalists were portraying the Arabs as a backward nation, the Arab discourse 
on Turkey emphasized the notion of the ‗terrible Turk‘ who suppressed the development of 
Arab nationalism. During the nation-building processes of many Arab states, Ottoman rule 
was presented as a period of foreign domination which prevented the economic development 
of the Arab lands.
435
 In the history textbooks, the Turks were portrayed as brutal, 
domineering and arrogant oppressors or colonialists. In addition, the Westernizing reforms in 
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Turkey during the 1920s and the 1930s were presented by the Arab media as the 
abandonment of Islam and turning into Christianity. For instance, even many years later, in 
radio broadcasts Saudi Arabia declared the secular Turkey and its founder Ataturk as an 
‗enemy of Islam‘.436 In this context, many Arabs perceived Turkey as a traitor in the Middle 
East and an instrument of Western politics especially after its accession to the NATO in 
1952. Due to these perceptions, Arab states neglected Turkey in their foreign policies for so 
many years and established their own links with the West and other parts of the world.  
Mutual perceptions between Turkey and the Arab world have started to change during 
the 1980s. Turgut Özal who served as the Prime Minister of Turkey between 1983 and 1989, 
made frequent visits to Arab countries and opened his country to the Arab world. During this 
period, Arab tourists constituted a large part of Turkey‘s total revenues from tourism.437 
Nevertheless, this momentum did not last long enough to destroy the negative perceptions on 
both sides. Even the rise of Islamists in Ankara during the 1990s did not make a significant 
change on the perception of Turkey in the Arab world. This was due to the fact that 
traditional Islamist movements in Turkey maintained a sense of superiority against other 
Muslim countries in a similar manner with their Kemalist rivals. For this reason, they 
explicitly aimed to establish an Islamic union under the leadership of Turkey.  
This aim was greeted with suspicion in the Arab world due to the perception of 
Ottoman Turks as an imperial power. At home, it was perceived as a threat to Turkey‘s 
identity by the military and paved the way for the so-called ‗soft coup‘ and the 
implementation of several measures to prevent the spread of Islamic political and social 
movements in the country including a strict head-scarf ban in Turkish universities. On top of 
that, it encouraged the military to reveal and strengthen its cooperation with Israel. These 
developments contributed to the reinforcement of Turkey‘s negative image in the Arab world. 
Another important factor which damaged Turkey‘s prestige in the region during this time 
period was the EU‘s decision on December 1997 to reject Ankara‘s candidacy for full 
membership. This decision undermined the perception of Turkey as a European state in the 
Middle East and was seen as a confirmation of the failure of the Kemalist modernization 
project. 
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Nevertheless, in recent years important developments led to a dramatic change in 
Turkey‘s image in the Arab world. First of all, the EU‘s approval of Turkey‘s candidacy in 
1999 enhanced the identity security of the country in the eyes of the military. This perception 
paved the way for a rapid democratization process in Turkey‘s public and foreign policies 
with the consent of the military which supported the implementation of the EU-related 
reforms and tolerated the rise of a political party with Islamic roots. The AKP which has been 
in power since 2002 transformed Ankara‘s vision towards the Middle East. As noted earlier, 
reformist Islamists support Turkey‘s EU membership and by no means see the country as the 
leader of the Islamic world. Nonetheless, they expressed a strong interest for cooperation and 
the maintenance of a conflict-free relationship with the Arab world.  
In this context, Ankara started to pursue a more balanced foreign policy between the 
West and the Islamic world. Since almost 98 percent of the Turks are Muslims (at least 
nominally), a more democratic foreign policy generated a closer approach in the Middle East 
to the Arab position. A good example of Turkey‘s more democratic foreign policy was 
forbidding the US troops from using Turkish territory in the war against Iraq in 2003 which 
has been a turning point for Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East.438 This new approach 
received appreciation from the great majority of Arabs, particularly when they compared 
Turkey's position to that of their own governments; most Arab leaders were implicitly co-
operating with the United States, making military bases available and providing logistical 
help.
439
 There were many articles in Arabic media at the time admiring the Turkish position 
and asking that their countries learn from Turkey how to say no to the USA. Prime Minister 
Erdoğan's strong criticism of the US military operations in Iraq and of Israel's murder of 
Sheikh Yassin, founder of the Hamas movement further enhanced Turkey‘s rising prestige in 
the Arab world. While Erdoğan described the assassination as "state terrorism", none of the 
Arabic leaders spoke out against the attack on Yassin, confined to a wheelchair.
440
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The rising prestige of Turkey in the Arab world generated an interest for Turkish 
popular culture as well. For instance, Turkish soap operas dubbed into Arabic using a 
colloquial Syrian dialect such as ‗Gümüş/Noor’ and the ‗Lost Dream’ has been extremely 
successful in many Arab countries. In Saudi Arabia only, 3-4 million viewers admit to 
watching Gümüş/Noor daily on the Saudi-owned MBC channel. According to New York 
Times the final episode of the show attracted a record 85 million Arab viewers.
441
 Thanks to 
these television shows which simultaneously portray conservative and secular values, Arabs 
were able to "experience" Turkish customs and habits. Associated Press reported that they 
attracted a lot more attention than Western TV shows because they offer new content (i.e. a 
secular lifestyle) in a familiar setting (i.e. a Muslim society)
442
 just like Turkey‘s new image 
which combines democracy with a conservative political elite. 
Interest in the soaps has brought a surge in visits to Turkey by Arab tourists. The 
number of Middle Eastern and North African visitors increased 50 percent in two years and 
reached nearly two million in 2008.
443
 The picturesque Abdul Efendi villa overlooking the 
Bosporus strait in Istanbul in which the Turkish series Gümüş/ Noor was filmed has become a 
major attraction for the Arab tourists visiting Turkey and tourism offices around the Arab 
world are offering organized trips to this palace. 
 Turkey‘s success in commencing accession talks with the EU under the rule of the 
AKP further enhanced the country‘s prestige in the region. Since full membership became a 
concrete possibility, some Middle Eastern states, notably Turkey‘s neighbours, began to see 
the potential opportunities of becoming EU‘s neighbours. In this context, the outcome of the 
accession talks became an important issue to be followed in the Arab world. For example, 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan‘s press conference on 17 December 2004 after Turkey was 
offered a chance to start accession talks was followed by two hundred representatives from 
the Arab media.
444
 Syrian Information Minister Dr. Mehdi Dahlallah expressed Syria's 
support for Ankara's bid to join the EU and said ―Turkey will be a bridge between the Arab 
countries and the EU… Syria is very pleased that Turkey will be an EU member in the near 
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future, making them a neighbour to the EU‖.445 Likewise, during Erdoğan‘s Damascus visit 
on 22 December 2004, Syrian President Assad who has a personal, friendly relationship with 
the Turkish Prime Minister said; 
―‖You (Turkey) follow an honourable foreign policy. We admire you. We take you as model 
for our foreign policy… Turkey's EU membership process is being watched by the Arab 
world. We are pleased; Turkey will be an EU member. This will be crucial for us and for our 
region. When you enter the EU we will be a neighbour of Europe".
446
 
This strong interest indicates the rising power of Turkey in the region and the 
importance of her EU bid for the entire Middle East. In this context, the outcome of Turkey‘s 
accession talks has become even more important in the sense that it is now more likely to 
send either a negative or positive message to the entire Islamic world. This has naturally 
enhanced the negotiating power of Turkey and its supporters within the EU against those who 
disapprove of the prospect of full membership.   
B. IRAN: 
The perception of Turkey in Iran is quite different from that in the Arab world. In this 
regard, Jung wrote that: ‗in Iran, despite all ideological differences, in general Turkey seems 
to be treated with interest and respect, the Arab position in contrast has been by neglect‘.447 
Likewise, the Turks have historically distinguished Iranians from the Arabs and showed an 
admiration for this nation. Both countries have seen their independence threatened but never 
lost. Therefore many Turks and Iranians feel a sense of superiority in the Middle East and see 
each other as equal competitors.448 In this context, Turkish-Iranian relations have traditionally 
been developed on the basis of mutual respect between two independent and strong states. It 
is no wonder that Turkey and Iran shares one of the oldest borders in the world which has not 
changed since 1639.  
Despite this peaceful historical record, since the 1979 Iranian revolution these two 
countries perceive each other as threatening for their own political and social structures. The 
Islamic Revolution altered the self-perception of the Iranian state which started to see itself as 
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the protector of all Muslims in the world. In this context, since 1979 the Turkish military and 
the secularist establishment lost trust in Iran and blamed the Iranian governments for 
supporting Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey. As a matter of fact, ‗turning into a second Iran‘ 
has been portrayed as the worst nightmare by the Turkish secular elite. On the other hand the 
Iranian state has perceived Turkey‘s secular system as a potential threat for the legitimacy 
and survival of its own regime. These perceptions did not allow the two countries to see their 
mutual interests and reduced the chances of cooperation. Nevertheless, due to historical 
factors and mutual respect, Iran and Turkey have never come to the brink of war despite 
having conflicting political regimes.  
In recent years, perceptions of Turkey in Iran have been significantly improved. As 
noted above, the rise in the identity security of Turkey in the EU context after 1999 paved the 
way for the democratization of Turkish foreign policy. In this context, Ankara became more 
open for dialogue with Iran. Moreover, democratization of foreign policy brought the 
transition of Turkey‘s relations with Israel from hyperactivity to normal ties. This has been 
another important catalyst for the change in Turkey‘s perception in Iran. The Islamic 
background of Turkey‘s new political elite also contributed to the restoration of its image in 
Iran. Apparently, for the ruling AKP, the Islamic Republic of Iran appeared much less 
threatening than it did to previous Turkish governments. This perception was illustrated by 
some statements of AK party leaders concerning the Iranian nuclear program which greatly 
increased the sympathy for Turkey in Iran. For instance, after a public meeting Prime 
Minister Erdoğan said; ‗asking a country to stop its nuclear program is not fair when you 
continue producing weapons of mass destruction‘.449 Turkey‘s rising prestige in Iran which is 
illustrated with a dramatic increase in the number of Iranian tourists in the country which 
reached to one million in 2005, made Ankara a potential mediator between Iran and the West. 
C. ISRAEL:  
Respective perceptions between Turkey and Israel are totally different from the rest of 
the region. From a historical point of view, the acceptance of Jews who fled from persecution 
in Spain during the fifteenth century to the Ottoman lands is still remembered in Israel as an 
act of saving. Turkey also served as a transit for European Jews fleeing Nazi persecution 
during the Second World War and became the first country with a Muslim majority to 
formally recognize the State of Israel in 1949. Since then the two countries have been 
engaged in military, diplomatic and economic cooperation. As noted above, the 1990s were 
                                                          
449
   Cumhuriyet, 20 September  2007 
 203 
 
the heyday of relations between Turkey and Israel. Nonetheless, the bilateral relations 
become strained in recent years due to the deterioration of mutual perceptions.   
The outbreak of the second intifada in fall 2000, Israel‘s rising ties with the Kurds of 
Northern Iraq after the war in 2003, the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 and the 
more recent activities of Israel in Gaza has severely damaged Israel‘s image in Turkey.450 
The Turkish media which have reported Israeli attacks against Palestinians in great detail 
contributed to the spread of Anti-Semitism in Turkey. In 2005, Mein Kampf, the book which 
was written by Hitler while he was in prison before he rose to power in 1933, has become a 
bestseller in Turkey. According to the book‘s publishers more than 100,000 copies have been 
sold in two months.
451
 During the war in Lebanon in summer 2006, Israeli tourists who 
visited Turkey's southern region met some hostile reactions from locals. A shop window in 
Alanya displayed a placard, "For Children Killers, Israelis No Sale, No Entry." One Israeli 
family was actually attacked by an individual in the same town.
452
 The Turkish daily Yeni 
Şafak took the Turkish Radio and Television Association (TRT) to task for including in its 
programming the Roman Polanski movie The Pianist, which deals with a Polish Jewish 
pianist during the Second World War. In response, the TRT removed the program.
453
 
In this context, Turkish politicians did not hesitate to strongly criticize Israeli policies 
in the Palestinian territories. Erdoğan led the way by warning Israeli leaders that ―history will 
judge them for the black stain they are leaving on humanity‖.454 He even went as far as to 
declare that the blood of the dead Palestinian children would not be left on the floor
455
, and 
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that Israel‘s deeds were "a crime against humanity".456 On 29 January 2009, Erdoğan heavily 
criticized the Israeli President Shimon Peres and his policies in Palestine during the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, and subsequently walked out of the forum in protest.  
 These developments did a great deal of damage to Turkey‘s image in Israel as well. 
For example, many Israeli travel companies initiated a boycott of Turkey after harsh criticism 
of Turkish official to Israel‘s operations in Gaza. According to daily Hürriyet, Turkey‘s 
popular holiday resort Antalya alone lost sixty one percent of its Israeli visitors in 2009.
457
 In 
brief, the intensification of the war between Israel and the Palestinians in the second half of 
the 2000s and AKP‘s self perception of being the spokesman of Muslims in the West 
gradually deteriorated the mutual perceptions between the Turkish and Israeli societies and 
damaged the bilateral relations between the two countries.  
 
CONCLUSION: 
 As the above discussion illustrated, variation in its identity security strongly 
influenced Turkey‘s political development as well as the formulation of its foreign policy 
towards the Middle East. Due to having a highly insecure corporate identity, the secularists, 
notably the military has pursued an isolationist and non-active foreign policy in the Middle 
East until recent decades. When Turkey‘s identity became even less secure due to the EU‘s 
exclusionary attitudes and the rise of Islamism during the 1990s, the military has sought to 
overcome this insecurity by establishing an alliance with Israel. Since then, relations with the 
Middle East illustrate an example of the historical power struggle between the civilians and 
the army in Turkish politics.  
 Nevertheless, the transformation of Islamists with the establishment of AKP, the 
capture of the leader of the terrorist organisation PKK and the approval of Turkey‘s 
candidacy by the EU enhanced the security of Turkey‘s identity and changed the parameters 
of its Middle East policy. The EU-related reforms empowered the civilians vis-à-vis the 
military and triggered a rapid democratization process in public and foreign policies of 
Turkey under the rule of AKP. As a result, Ankara started pursuing a more balanced foreign 
policy between the West and the Islamic world. By co-chairing the UN sponsored ‗Alliance 
of Civilizations‘ with Spain in November 2006, Turkey proved that it does not hesitate to 
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represent or speak on behalf of the Islamic world. These developments enhanced the prestige 
of Ankara in its region and paved the way for an intense economic and political interaction 
between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours.  
Nevertheless, the AKP‘s inconsistent attitudes in recent years due to its complex 
identity threatened Turkey‘s ties with Israel and the West. These attitudes also increased the 
concerns of the secularists who are worried about the maintenance of Turkey‘s secular 
identity particularly in the context of the slowdown in EU accession talks. These concerns 
brought an end to the consensus between Turkey‘s diverse camps in regards to the Middle 
East policy and severely constrained Ankara‘s ability to play a greater role in the region. In 
brief, Ankara‘s ability to act as an effective player in the region‘s affairs is still constrained 
by its identity-related issues.  
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CONCLUSION: 
The purpose of this study was to show the complex links between identity and 
Turkey‘s foreign policy and foreign policy capacity. The main research question of the thesis 
is ‗how a complex and insecure identity influences Turkey‘s foreign policy behaviour and its 
capacity to develop an international role commensurate with its size and capabilities‘. In line 
with this purpose, the investigator adopted a constructivist approach which argues that the 
identities of states are essential for understanding international relations and they must be 
examined in concrete historical settings. Before evaluating the achievements and limitations 
of this thesis and suggesting possible further research based on or related to this thesis, the 
first part of this final chapter will evaluate how the constructivist approach contributed to a 
better understanding of Turkey‘s foreign policy and foreign policy capacity in the post Cold-
War period while highlighting the main findings of each chapter. 
As indicated in chapter one, rationalist approaches argue that states‘ preferences and 
identities are exogenously given by the international system. Accordingly, all states have 
egoistic and fixed interests that are limited to a narrow conception of utility maximization.
458
 
On the other hand, constructivists treat identity and interest as endogenous and socially 
constructed. Consequently they can vary depending on historical, cultural, political and social 
context. In line with this view, they rejected the neo-realist assumption that there is a single 
logic of anarchy and argued that relations between states are shaped by ‗distinct cultures of 
anarchy‘, so Wendt, for example, distinguishes between i.e. Hobbesian, Lockean, and 
Kantian variants.
 459
 Each of these is constituted by a particular notion of the basic 
relationship between self and other, namely; enemy, rival and friend. Consequently, only the 
Hobbesian culture is a truly self-help system and transformation from one culture to another 
is possible.
460
  
If Hobbesian culture lasts over a long period of time, then, it would be useful to think 
of the system in rationalist terms. Nevertheless, depending on the process of interaction with 
others, states define and re-define their identities and base perceptions of their interests on the 
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new definitions of their identities. Likewise, domestic developments such as demographic 
changes or shifts in political elites with different role identities may change the identity of the 
state, which can transform their behaviours and eventually the nature of systemic interaction. 
Rationalism operates to artificially restrict the possibilities to conceive change both within 
and of the system itself. After the end of the Second World War, a shift from a Hobbesian to 
a Kantian culture of anarchy started to develop in Western Europe. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the continent has entered a post-modern system in which bipolarity and rivalry has been 
replaced by the development of a Kantian security community. In a post-modern security 
system, we have two partially overlapping pluralistic security communities in Europe, 
namely NATO and the EU. 
Turkey‘s engagement with these two pluralistic security communities has deeply 
influenced its ‗culture of anarchy‘ as well. Turkish approach with regard to international 
relations has traditionally been influenced by the Hobbessian and Lockean interpretations of 
anarchy. The long tradition of seeing the world from a realpolitik perspective relates to 
Turkey‘s political culture which is deeply influenced by the military establishment.461 In 
other words, Turkey‘s security-seeking identity was not exogenously given but shaped in a 
historic process and within an institutional context. Therefore, an examination of domestic 
cultural-institutional context in which Turkey‘s national interests were formed is essential to 
understand Turkish foreign policy even when it was informed by Hobbesian logic.   
As shown in chapter two, Turkey had been a militarist society since its foundation as 
a republic in 1923. The armed forces, led by Kemal Atatürk, played a decisive role in the 
establishment of the Turkish state as well as all of its institutions. This highly militaristic 
political culture was legitimated with several discourses of legitimations. Central to these 
discourses of legitimations were a definition of Turkish national identity as Western, 
homogeneous and secular. Other legitimations were related with Kemalists‘ interpretation of 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and include geographical 
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determinism, the Sèvres Syndrome
462
, and several types of fear, notably Islamic counter-
revolution (Irtica), encirclement by enemies and disintegration.
463
 Turkey‘s militarist 
political culture was translated into an isolationist foreign policy which was characterized by 
a tendency to shy away from cooperation. The foreign policy of the early republican period 
mainly sought stability and non-interference in Turkey‘s domestic affairs.  
 Nonetheless, the beginning of the shift from a Hobbesian to a Kantian culture of 
anarchy in the West after the end of WW2 and the Kemalists‘ need to uphold Turkey‘s state-
sponsored construction of Western identity at home, brought a new understanding of 
international politics and paved the way for Turkey‘s Western orientation in foreign policy on 
the basis of its NATO membership. This was a foreign policy formulated in association with 
the nation-building project that was dominated by a quest to secure Turkey‘s Western 
identity, along with security necessities. During the Cold War, national security and foreign 
policy issues were mostly considered as a function of Turkey‘s NATO membership and other 
Western institutions. This arrangement enabled a degree of parliamentary democracy to arise 
while a range of sensitive domestic issues such as the Kurdish issue, as well as some foreign 
policy issues, such as bilateral conflicts with Greece and the Cyprus problem, remained 
beyond the realm of democratic debate and decision-making. Ankara‘s position towards its 
Middle Eastern neighbours was also continued to be shaped by a Hobbesian logic as Turkey 
perceived itself as the only ‗civilized‘ country in its ‗uncivilized‘ neighbourhood.  
Since the 1980s, Turkey has been experiencing a major political and economic 
transformation. This transformation has brought Turkey much closer to Kantian values which 
are manifest in both its domestic and foreign policy behaviour. The engagement of Turkey by 
the EU and the principle of conditionality that the Union employs with applicant countries 
have been critical in the transformation of Turkey‘s domestic and foreign policies. However, 
this transformation cannot be fully understood without considering the changes in Turkey‘s 
corporate identity during the 1980s. As highlighted in chapter two, a series of political and 
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economic liberalizing reforms of this period paved the way for the emergence of a Turkish 
civil society and empowered Islamic groups, which eventually started to question Turkey‘s 
security conceptions and foreign policy practices. On the other hand, the revival of Kurdish 
nationalism and political Islam in the 1990s despite several interventions significantly 
reduced the army‘s prestige in the eyes of the country‘s liberal and intellectual circles. These 
developments led to a re-definition of Turkey‘s corporate identity and influenced Ankara‘s 
foreign policy understanding which manifested itself in a wider identity abroad, Ottoman 
rather than Turkish covering all neighbouring Muslim peoples and all minorities in Turkey.  
The transformation of Turkish domestic and foreign policies was paused with the rise 
of political Islam and the increasing identity insecurity of the secularists in the context of 
Turkey‘s envisaged isolation in the West following the end of the Cold War. The EU‘s 
hesitation to declare the country as a candidate also facilitated the predominance of the 
military and the hardliners within the state establishment and undermined the efforts of the 
reformists. As a result, Ankara‘s long tradition of viewing the world from a realpolitik 
perspective was revitalized in the second half of the 1990s. The violence surrounding the 
Kurdish problem and the security challenges created by the PKK left Ankara on various 
occasions emphasizing the significance of military capabilities and means over political 
ones.
464
 Consequently, Turkey regularly intervened in Northern Iraq and incessantly 
suspected neighbouring countries of backing the PKK and of trying to weaken Turkey‘s 
integrity. Indeed, Turkey threatened to use military force against two of its neighbouring 
countries, namely Greece and Syria, in 1996 and 1998 respectively. During this period, 
Ankara was earning itself a reputation for being a ‗coercive regional power‘.  
Nevertheless, as shown in chapter three, the EU‘s decision to recognize the country as 
an official candidate for membership in 1999 consolidated Turkey‘s emerging political-
military culture and its shift towards a Kantian vision. The EU‘s conditionality has been the 
most important catalyst for change and reform in Turkey‘s domestic and foreign policies. By 
making basic norms of liberal democracy a condition for the most important incentive that it 
has to offer, namely membership, the Union developed the policy of ‗conditionality‘ as an 
effective policy instrument to transform the governing structures, economies and the civil 
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societies of its candidates.
465
 Nevertheless, as Checkel and Zürn noted, ‗the success of the 
EU‘s incentives depends on the construction of a certain relationship between those involved 
in the process and the diffusion of ideas that leads to valuing membership‘.466  
In the construction of this relationship among the Turkish political actors, different 
logics of action interacted with each other.  The transformation of the Islamists‘ position from 
an anti-Western to a pro-EU position was initially triggered by the so-called ‗soft coup‘ 
against the Islamist-led government in 1997. However, an instrumental logic alone does not 
fully capture the reasons behind this transformation. An equally important factor in the 
change in the Islamists‘ position regarding EU membership was the understanding that a 
European-style democracy will enhance civil liberties in Turkey, including those of devout 
Muslims. Moreover, this transformation, which took shape under the guide of the AKP, 
reflected the changing demands of Islamic social groups who had in the past opposed 
globalization and Turkey‘s integration with the West. During the last decade, these social 
groups, notably the ‗Anatolian bourgeoisie‘ became increasingly exposed to and demanded 
participation in relations with the outside world, in the form of educational and business 
opportunities. 
In this context, the AKP emerged as a policy entrepreneur in Turkey and presented 
the EU-related reforms as long-overdue policies that would benefit the Turkish society at 
large rather than interference in Turkey‘s domestic politics. Moreover, the party rejected the 
argument that reforms would undermine the unity of the Turkish state. In its election 
manifesto, it highlighted the positive impact of the Copenhagen criteria on human rights and 
civil liberties in Turkey. On that basis, the party leaders began to state constantly the 
Copenhagen criteria should be seen as ‗Ankara criteria‘ that would be met in full with or 
without EU membership. The consistency of their statements and justifications for complying 
with EU norms suggested a certain learning process and norm internalization which was 
subsequently reflected in their behaviour.  
As soon as coming to power in 2002, the AKP government issued a program and 
action plan that emphasized EU norms as a basis for constitutional/legal reforms. 
                                                          
465
 See Grabbe, H. (2001), ‘How Does Europeanization affects CEE Governance? Conditionality Diffusion and 
Diversity’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.8, No.6 
466
 Checkel, J. And Zürn, M. (2005), ‘Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe 
and the Nation State’, International Organization, Vol.59, Issue 4, p.1064 
 211 
 
Nevertheless, changing the decades-long ‗state‘ policies on secularists‘ redlines, i.e. the 
Kurdish problem and the role of the military and the Cyprus problem would not be an easy 
task for the AKP. In the course of 2002, as Turkey debated the adoption of reforms to fulfil 
the Copenhagen criteria, there were numerous public figures from the secularist camp who 
made references to the Europeans‘ or the West‘s intentions of undermining and dividing up 
Turkey. These arguments intensified particularly in the context of reforms that would 
enhance the cultural and educational rights of the Kurdish minority. Initially, the military was 
also highly concerned about the consequences of the suggested reforms on the national 
security of Turkey.  
Nevertheless, the military did not veto the EU-related reforms even though they 
would significantly reduce its political powers. In view of its commitment to the ideals of 
Westernization, its learning from the past experiences, and its socialization within Western 
institutions such as NATO, the military regarded the civilianization of political system as 
appropriate. The military‘s traditional rhetoric of democratization has also led to rhetorical 
entrapment or what Schimmelfennig also calls ‗community trap‘.467 However, as Sjursen 
pointed out the effectiveness of such processes of shaming is dependent on the actors‘ belief 
that the norms at stake exist and are valid.
468
 In brief, the EU norms did not function merely 
as constraints on Turkish actors‘ policy preferences to support EU-related reforms. They also 
legitimized the construction of new interests and enabled them to adopt new and different 
behaviour. Consequently, Turkey experienced a major reform process with regard to its 
democracy and human rights standards. As a result of these reforms, it has become much 
more open to pluralism and much more at ease with its cultural and ethnic diversity. Turkish 
foreign policy, especially towards its neighbouring countries, has also changed and evolved 
to become more ‗soft-power‘ based and cooperation-oriented, instead of being focused on the 
long-prevailing threat perceptions.  
The introduction and the first widespread appearance of the ‗win-win‘ rhetoric in the 
context of the Cyprus problem was the first indicator of the changes that would occur in 
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Turkish foreign policy.
469
 However, as chapter four showed, the transformation of Turkey‘s 
decades-old ‗state‘ policy on Cyprus has been an uneasy process. As the deadline for 
reaching a settlement based on the Annan Plan, 28 February 2003, approached, opponents of 
the plan invoked the Sèvres Syndrome. This was manifested with the statements of the 
secularist opposition party CHP as well as some leading public figures from the secularist 
groups. These groups gave a strong support to hardliner Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş 
who was refusing to further negotiate the plan while publically fighting with the AKP 
leaders. Some top-ranking military officers also voiced their opposition to AKP‘s new 
Cyprus policy. Nevertheless, the military eventually preferred to remain silent on its 
reluctance and leave the political responsibility to the government. The military‘s silence on a 
‗high politics‘ issue such as the Cyprus problem was another indicator of its changing attitude 
in regards to the civilian contributions to foreign and security policy making and the need for 
democratic accountability.  
The extent of debates and the existence of a strong opposition to change in both 
domestic and foreign policy issues, namely the adoption of EU-related reforms and a new 
Cyprus policy, was actually a reflection of Turkey‘s contested identity. Due to a lack of 
consensus on its state identity, Turkish politics have been ambivalent and the resulting 
foreign policy preferences have been unstable. This was manifested with the ‗double-headed‘ 
policy of Turkey during the Cyprus peace talks between 2002 and 2004. Ambivalence in its 
Cyprus policy caused inestimable damage to both Turkey‘s political development and its 
foreign policy capacity. Even though the AKP managed to overcome the secularists‘ 
resistance and changed Turkey‘s Cyprus policy through dialogue and debate, the 28 February 
deadline for settlement was missed and Greek Cypriots secured EU membership in 2004 
regardless of the outcome of UN‘s re-unification talks. This removed one of the strongest 
incentives of Greek Cypriots to back the Annan Plan and contributed greatly to the overall 
‗No‘ result in the 2004 referendum on the re-unification of the island. Consequently, Ankara 
failed to eliminate the ‗Cyprus obstacle‘ on its progress towards achieving its most important 
foreign policy goal, namely EU membership.  
Although, Turkey started EU entry talks in 2005, Greek Cypriots have frequently used 
their position in the Union to prevent the opening of chapters, or areas to negotiate to ensure 
                                                          
469
 Kirişçi, K. "Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times", European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 
Chaillot Paper - n°92, September 2006. P.51 
 213 
 
policies meet EU standards, as a pressure tactic on Turkey. Ankara is also under EU pressure 
to open its ports and airspace to Greek Cypriot shipping and aviation, which it has so far 
failed to do. As a result, the negotiating process between Turkey and the EU came to a virtual 
halt in 2006. The deterioration of relations with the EU damaged the pro-EU consensus in 
Turkey and resulted in the intensification of the confrontation over secularism and national 
identity. In this context, the AKP failed to pursue substantial reforms between 2005 and 2008 
enhancing the EU‘s skepticism about its commitment to the accession process. All these 
developments are a clear manifestation of the negative consequences of lacking a consensus-
based, secure identity for Turkey‘s political development as well as its ability to pursue its 
foreign policy goals.  
However, despite the failure in Cyprus and the deadlock in the EU process, the shift 
of Turkey‘s foreign policy from a Hobbesian logic towards a Kantian one, in line with the EU 
requirements, continued. The AKP government has embraced the EU rhetoric of ‗good 
neighbourly relations‘ and the goal of ‗developing an area of peace and stability‘. In recent 
years, Ankara sought to normalize its relations with all of its neighbouring countries. This is 
manifested with the maintenance of its support for the resolution of the Cyprus problem even 
after the Annan Plan referenda, its efforts to resolve the Aegean dispute with Greece, its 
attempt at rapprochement with Armenia, its increasing cooperation with Russia, and most 
importantly its dialogue-oriented policy towards Iran, Iraq and Syria. All these policies 
indicated the consequences of a change in behaviour of Turkey in the ‗Kantian‘ direction, 
hinting at a certain learning process and successful norm internalization in the EU context. 
As shown in chapter five, this change has been most evident in Turkey‘s policies 
towards the Middle East. Since 2002, Ankara has been cooperating with its Muslim 
neighbours in a range of areas going beyond security needs. It pursues a pro-active trade, 
energy and cultural policy towards them and has indeed become a strong promoter of 
regional integration. Apart from enhancing bilateral ties and fostering cooperation in a wide 
range of sectors, Ankara has also put much effort into improving its regional diplomacy 
which is manifest in its engagement with the Palestinian issue. As a result of its enhanced ties 
with Muslim countries, Turkey has attained a new role of mediator between the West and the 
Islamic world. Ankara mediated between Syria and Israel during the Lebanon War in 2006, 
between Israel and Hamas in 2008 and between the West and Iran concerning the latter‘s 
nuclear programme in 2010. 
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Rationalist scholars understand Ankara‘s recent interest in the Middle East as a 
rational response to structural changes in its security environment since the end of Cold 
War.
470
 They particularly highlight rising concerns with regard to terrorism and Kurdish 
separatism in the post-Cold War period. Structural factors, notably the resurgence of PKK 
terrorism, have certainly influenced Turkey‘s threat perceptions and encouraged Ankara to 
reconcile with its neighbours. Nevertheless, they do not give us a clue about why Ankara‘s 
reconciliation with its Muslim neighbours did not happen when the Turkish foreign policy 
was dominated by secularists. Consequently, structural accounts are also less helpful to 
understand why different leaders adopted diverse approaches to deal with Turkey‘s security 
concerns. As chapter five indicated, Özal, for example, attempted to co-opt Kurdish rebels 
and launched good relations with Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq and the Arab world in 
general. Erbakan sought Pan-Islamic initiatives with Iran and Libya. On the other hand, 
Kemalists attempted to balance this by consolidating ties with the United States and Israel 
and by launching radical, hard-line measures in regards to the Kurdish issue.  
In order to understand the reasons behind Turkey‘s changing approach to tackle its 
security issues as well as its shifting foreign policy in the Middle East, one needs to know the 
perceptions of its political leaders at decision-making level which are shaped by diverse sub-
national identities. Each sub-national identity possesses an inter-subjective meaning of the 
‗self‘ which shapes actors‘ interpretation of the ‗other‘ and in this way their foreign policy 
preferences. As noted in chapter one, national interests in ‗torn‘ societies are defined and re-
defined through a clash of sub-national identities. This is well illustrated with the change and 
ambivalence in Turkey‘s foreign policy towards the Middle East since the end of the Cold 
War.  
 Turkey‘s ignorance of the Middle East until the 1980s relates to its previous state 
identity that was defined by Kemalist values and belief systems. As part of Kemalist nation-
building, Ankara was inclined to externalize its domestic problems, notably Kurdish 
separatism and political Islam. In this regards, while attributing the rise of Kurdish separatism 
to Syrian support, the rise of Islamism was linked to Iran‘s goal of exporting Islamic 
revolution to other Muslim countries. Kemalist security culture also perceived the Arab 
countries through the lens of historical events during the First World War. These 
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interpretations and perceptions certainly influenced the way Kemalists defined Turkish 
national interest in regards to the Middle East and indeed constrained Turkey‘s relations with 
the region. 
 On the other hand, Turkey‘s rising interest in the region in the post-Cold War period 
relates to the political transformation of the country and social actors‘ perceptions that shapes 
its state identity and determines the framework in which national interests are defined. 
Turkey has been in a process of democratization since the 1980s. This process was speeded 
up in 1999 by the EU‘s decision to recognize the country as a candidate for full membership. 
Democratization has brought a change in perceptions through which securitized issues, 
notably minority issues, have begun to be de-securitized. As mentioned above, EU-related 
reforms also brought a significant decline in the role of the military in the securitization of 
political issues, and in this way narrowed the range of ‗others‘ both inside and outside 
Turkey. 
 These developments prepared a suitable ground for the transformation of Turkey‘s 
position towards the Middle East which gained momentum after the AKP came to power in 
2002. The foreign policy of Turkey since then is based on Ahmet Davutoğlu‘s strategic 
depth‘ (stratejik derinlik) doctrine which can be regarded as an external manifestation of the 
AKP‘s attempt to transform Turkey‘s society and politics through a process of identity re-
construction. This doctrine emphasizes the Islamic dimension of Turkey‘s identity both 
internally and externally, promotes multi-dimensional and pro-active relationship with 
neighbouring countries and stresses the use of ‗soft power‘ tools to enhance Ankara‘s 
influence and prestige in the region.
471
 According to Davutoğlu, Turkey is a central country 
with multiple regional identities and should not be limited just to one unified character. In 
contrast to the secularist elites‘ understanding of Turkey as part of the West, Davutoğlu‘s 
doctrine claims that Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally within one 
single region.
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 The key principle of the ‗strategic depth‘ doctrine is the policy of ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’. This policy demonstrates a revolutionary alteration in the Turkish perception of 
the international environment since it is not in the line with the notion that Turkey is 
surrounded with enemies who continually seek to undermine its integrity.
473
 One of the major 
policy outcomes of ‗strategic depth‘ is Turkey‘s identification with the former Ottoman 
regions and a return to the Middle East with a special focus on Syria and Iran. Theoretically 
speaking, the AKP expanded the boundary of the Turkey‘s ‗self‘ and the previous ‗other‘ 
became an extension of the ‗self‘. Consequently, Iran, for example, which was a major source 
of threat perception during the 1980-90s, is no longer defined in Ankara as an enemy or as a 
threat despite its enhanced military capabilities and nuclear ambitions.  
 While including certain Islamic elements, Turkey‘s new position towards its 
neighbourhood does not signify the Islamization of its foreign policy but rather a 
transformation of its security culture due to domestic changes and its engagement with the 
EU. As mentioned above, Turkey is seeking to enhance ties with all of its neighbours. Put 
differently, Turkey‘s relations with its non-Muslim neighbours are not deteriorating while its 
relations with the Muslim ones are enhancing. Furthermore, Ankara‘s continuing zeal for EU 
membership confirms that Turkey‘s Middle Eastern policy and its rising importance as a 
regional power is not antagonistic to or incompatible with its strong ties with the EU and the 
West in general.  
Nevertheless, some of the change in Ankara‘s behaviour is the result of a certain 
preference of the AKP leaders to enhance political, economic and cultural ties with the 
Islamic countries, particularly with the former enemies of the Kemalist regime such as Syria 
and Iran, sometimes at the expense of damaging relations with Israel. Indeed, Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Middle East in recent years indicates how certain contradictory elements 
of the AKP‘s identity affect the definition of Turkey‘s national interests. These are related 
with the contrast between the principle of ‗zero problems with neighbours‘, on the one hand, 
and the moderate Islamic identity of the party, on the other. Therefore, the transition of 
Turkey‘s relations with Israel from a very close alliance to a normal and recently a 
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problematic relationship is consistent with a constructivist explanation and shows how 
identity insecurity can undermine alliances.
474
 
As should be clear throughout the thesis, the shifts in Turkey‘s foreign policy have 
stemmed from its engagement with international institutional contexts, notably with the EU, 
as well as from the shifts in power of its diverse groups with different role identities. In this 
regards, a constructivist account is more useful than a rationalist explanation to understand 
the dynamics of Turkey‘s shift in its foreign policy behaviour for two reasons. Firstly, it 
accurately emphasizes the discontinuity and change in Turkish foreign policy. Considering 
this change, rationalist assumptions with regard to fixed interests and rational actors do not fit 
with the nature of Turkey‘s foreign policy. Secondly, an identity-based account can throw 
light on the relationship between Turkish leaders‘ own perception of themselves and their 
perception of others as a key determinant of Turkey‘s foreign policy choices. The 
significance of decision-makers‘ perception is not related only with material interests but also 
with their views regarding the nature of international relations, as well as their own identity 
and role conceptions, which ultimately influence the formulation of their foreign policies.  
To conclude, the transformation of Turkey‘s domestic structure that has started in the 
1980s and gained momentum after 1999 in the EU context deeply influenced its ‗culture of 
anarchy‘. This transformation within Turkey has significant repercussions for the European 
integration project as well. Due to the way in which it has evolved as a result of its 
transformation, Turkey is becoming increasingly capable of contributing to the EU‘s efforts 
to promote peace and stability in its close neighbourhood. Therefore, when analyzing the 
influence of Turkish membership to the EU, it is important to consider the meaning of 
Turkey‘s domestic and foreign policy transformation in the context of the future of the EU‘s 
neighbourhood.
475
   
Nevertheless, Turkey‘s capability to exercise ‗soft power‘ and contribute to stability 
and democratization in its region is still constrained by its insecure identity. The process of 
Turkey‘s transformation towards an EU-style liberal democracy is certainly not yet complete 
and is ongoing. Therefore, Ankara must keep on its transformation and complete its reform 
process. However, due to a lack of consensus on state identity, there are still circles in the 
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country who are resisting reforms. These circles indeed stand a chance of disturbing the 
process considering that Turkey is still struggling to resolve difficult identity related issues. 
These issues range from finding a workable solution to the Kurdish problem that goes beyond 
granting basic cultural rights to reconciling democracy and secularism with Islam in a way 
that will provide the country with a sense of consensus and stability rather than polarization 
and instability. How these issues will be dealt with and solved and whose preferences will 
prevail is very much related with Turkey‘s relations with the EU. Whether the EU will 
maintain its commitment to Turkish membership prospects or not will be critical for the 
future transformation of Turkey.  
 
EVALUATING THE RESEARCH: 
After looking at the benefits of the constructivist approach to a better understanding 
of Turkey‘s foreign policy and foreign policy capacity, it is appropriate to evaluate the 
contribution the thesis makes to our knowledge of the subject.  A number of aspects deserve 
particular attention. 
This thesis has in a number of ways carried out original work. It has contributed to the 
understanding of the formulation, execution and effectiveness of Turkey‘s foreign policy by 
showing how diverse identities and their interaction shaped Turkish national interests, which 
in turn suggested contradictory foreign policy goals and paved the way for an ambivalent 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Part of the thesis‘ originality consisted in 
examining the contested and insecure nature of Turkey‘s state identity and its impact on the 
foreign policy orientation of the country as well as its foreign policy capacity. In doing so, it 
provided further insight to the role of the clash between diverse sub-national identities in the 
formation of Turkey‘s threat perceptions and national interests. Many studies of Turkish 
foreign policy have been cynical of prioritizing identity or even ideology in explaining 
Ankara‘s foreign policy behaviours. There are a few scholars who have paid closer attention 
to the relationship between Turkey‘s identity and its foreign policy choices. However, even 
these studies treated Turkey‘s identity as a unitary and domestically unquestioned entity.476 
This thesis moved our attention from a singular understanding of Turkey‘s identity to a range 
of contesting identities at the domestic level. 
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The analysis of sub-national identities is an important contribution since in many 
cases such as Turkey state identities were not constructed through a national consensus. The 
identity conceptions of excluded groups can survive and indeed continue to shape societal 
perceptions and affect political debates. In the process of democratization, these groups 
become more assertive of their identities in political life, thus bringing the state against 
society and social groups against each other. The result is an intense identity insecurity which 
influences not only a state‘s behaviour in the international system but also its ability to pursue 
stable foreign policy goals. Thereby, this thesis also shed light on how identity insecurity 
affected Turkey‘s political development as well as its capacity to develop an international 
role commensurate with its size and capabilities. More specifically, it showed the relationship 
between Turkey‘s insecure identity and its ambivalent politics which brings instable and 
contradictory foreign policy behaviour, especially towards the EU and the Middle East.  
In addition, this thesis highlighted the important role that the EU plays in the 
transformation of Turkey‘s identity and security culture. It showed that positive signals from 
the EU accelerate the reform process through securing the national identity, strengthening the 
reform-minded segments and contributing to the emergence of a consensus between diverse 
political groups whereas by contrast ambivalent messages revitalize identity insecurity, 
damages national consensus and in this way slows down the reform process. This thesis also 
addressed some under-researched issues which influences the formulation of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy. These included the identity debates in the Turkish Cypriot community which 
have an influence on Turkey‘s Cyprus policy as well as its relations with the EU and the 
deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations during recent years which lends support to the view 
that the maintenance of international alliances is contingent upon mutual identification.  
Despite these contributions, there are a number of elements worth mentioning which 
this thesis did not address or did not do so in great detail. This thesis dealt with Turkey only 
and concentrated on its relations with the EU, Greece, and the Middle East due to the reasons 
mentioned in the introduction. Consequently, one of the limitations of this thesis includes the 
lack of an in-depth discussion of Turkish foreign policy‘s other dimensions. Even though 
some aspects of Turkey‘s relations with the United States, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
were addressed throughout the thesis, this could have been done in more detail. Relations 
with the Caucasus and Central Asia could indeed constitute another case study for this thesis. 
However, the cases studied clearly demonstrate the method and type of findings one might 
use and expect in such cases. 
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Although Turkey constitutes a unique case due to its history and geography, some 
other countries experience similar issues with it in terms of their foreign policy choices and 
foreign policy capacity. Therefore, whilst it was not possible given the limits of a PhD thesis 
an interesting avenue of development would have been to compare the Turkish case that of 
other states/societies that also have an insecure identity, e.g. Russia. While discussing some 
aspects of identity issues in other countries such as Greece and the CEECs, the discussions 
did not go into detail. Furthermore, this thesis did not draw attention to some countries which 
are experiencing similar issues with Turkey due to the contested nature of their identities.  
Finally, this thesis did not draw substantial benefit from the interviews that were 
conducted by the investigator in Turkey. The data gathered via these limited number of 
interviews was helpful in the process of shaping the ideas of the thesis and expanded the 
horizons of the research by revealing some important points which did not seem relevant 
previously. The full potential of this method was reduced by financial and time constraints as 
well as by the unwillingness of some interviewees to state their opinions on sensitive identity-
related issues. Nevertheless, the use of a wide range of Turkish and international newspapers 
and internet news sources was particularly useful, as they helped to identify actors‘ public 
statements and justifications for their actions. Newspaper articles also helped to show how 
diverse groups constructed different meanings for significant events in Turkey‘s foreign 
relations in the post-Cold War period. 
FUTURE RESEARCH: 
 Based on the findings of this thesis, but also taking its limitations into account, 
subsequent follow-up work seems necessary and promising, and the following research 
aspects being recommendable. 
 Comparing the theoretical findings of the case studies with other dimensions of 
Turkish foreign policy 
Future work could include placing the findings for selected cases into a wider analysis 
of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Turkey‘s foreign policy towards the 
Caucasus and Central Asia deserves particular attention. Indeed, Turkey‘s failed attempt to 
normalize its relations with Armenia in 2009 is a good example which shows how identity 
shapes Turkish foreign policy choices. Even though normalization of relations with Armenia 
would have a positive effect on Turkey‘s EU bid while bringing trade opportunities for both 
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sides and facilitating the further stabilization of the region, the Turkish government 
prioritized solidarity with its fellow Turkic ally Azerbaijan and linked the issue to a 
preliminary improvement in the negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
 Comparing the linkage between identity and foreign policy capacity of Turkey with 
other countries  
This thesis argued that identity debates, and in particular the clash between secularist 
and Islamist ideologies, have dominated and shaped Turkey‘s foreign policy formulation and 
undermined the country‘s ability to develop a stable role in the post-Cold War period. Since 
the analysis is carried out on the Turkish case only, further research is required to increase 
consistency and validity of the findings of the thesis regarding the linkage between identity 
security and foreign policy capacity. As mentioned above, severe debates on national identity 
is also observable in some other countries. In particular two cases, namely Russia and 
Ukraine, which show numerous similarities with the Turkish case deserves special attention. 
In Russia, identity issue is as old as Turkey and date back to the nineteenth century 
debates between Slavophiles and westernizers. In both countries, unstable identity is fed by 
feelings of injured national pride which is a result of their historical exclusion from the rest of 
Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders fluctuated between their own 
historical anchors of identity – westernism, on the one hand, Slavophilism, on the other, and, 
finally, Eurasianism. As Mankoff pointed out, Russian foreign policy is under the pressure of 
these conflicting identity conceptions.
477
 Consequently, Moscow lacks a clear idea of its 
foreign policy goals and pursues an erratic foreign policy under the influence of contradictory 
identity conceptions. The frequently mixed signals from the West—sometimes treating 
Russia as an equal partner, sometimes warning that it still needs to be encircled and 
contained—also affects Moscow‘s  behaviour.  
Ukraine also shows similar characteristics as its Black Sea neighbour Turkey. 
Ukrainian foreign policy is also guided by two conflicting anchors of identity, namely 
European and Slavic/Eurasian. Furthermore, the choice of foreign policy orientation in the 
country is also complicated by the identity preferences of the Ukrainian society.
478
 Electoral 
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maps are similar to those in Turkey and reveal a long-standing east-west divide among the 
country‘s population. Unsurprisingly, Kiev constantly re-defines its identity and pursues an 
ambivalent foreign policy especially towards the EU and Russia. As Molcahnov pointed out 
redefinition of identity in Ukraine has passed full circle from Russia to Europe to Russia and 
to the EU once again.
479
  
Considering the similarities involved between the above cases and Turkey, further 
examination on the identity issue in Russia and Ukraine will be helpful for a better 
understanding of the relationship between identity, foreign policy orientation and foreign 
policy capacity and will allow us to make more general conclusions on this important 
question in International Relations. Further research could include a comparative analysis of 
the Turkish case with other similar cases such as Russia and Ukraine. An important 
difference between these three countries can be observed in their level of engagement with 
inter-democratic Western institutions. Due to its NATO membership and EU candidacy, 
Turkey currently possesses the strongest institutional links with the West. Therefore, a 
comparative analysis between these three cases can provide further insight into the role that 
international institutions play in the domestic and foreign policy transformations of their 
members, candidates and neighbours.     
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